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WATERMARK

Watermark accepts submissions annually between November and February. We are dedicated to publishing original critical and theoretical essays concerned with literature of all genres and periods, as well as works representing current issues in the fields of rhetoric and composition. Reviews of current works of literary criticism or theory are also welcome.

All submissions must be accompanied by a cover letter that includes the author's name, phone number, email address, and the title of the essay or book review. All essay submissions should be approximately 12-15 pages and must be typed in MLA format with a standard 12 pt. font. Book reviews ought to be 750-1,000 words in length. As this journal is intended to provide a forum for emerging voices, only student work will be considered for publication. Submissions will not be returned. Please direct all questions to csulbwatermark@gmail.com and address all submissions to:

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A Note from *Watermark*'s Editor

Whenever I'm prompted to reflect on a time period of scholarly collaboration, where intelligent minds engage with discourse and language for cultural production, I'm always rewarded with immense feelings of honor and gratitude. Inheriting an editor's seat at the table that curates Watermark was no different, where I find myself incredibly fortunate to participate in advancing the traditions and spirit of this journal—a spirit that a previous editor aptly noted is "integral to the healthy evolution" in Watermark's abilities to provide "an awareness of tomorrow's possible evolutionary nuances." This spirit looms throughout the following collection of intersecting critical and theoretical ideas that engender a new body of life known henceforth as the eleventh volume.

In prefacing this panoply of eclectic works, my mind playfully wanders away from trying to materialize these feelings (as ephemeral and ineffable in nature as they are) into language. Instead, I regress to an approach I once frequently enjoyed during my adolescence, when my virginal relationship with a pen and paper wasn't subjected to audience consideration, so writing about human interactions often began with answering the following: how would the aliens hovering above make sense of what we're doing? Inviting this fictitious perspective signifies (and celebrates) the value in Watermark's on-going pursuit to examine, complicate, and (de)construct ontological and epistemological understandings of the world around us. Like its predecessors, the eleventh volume offers a body of work dedicated to an unyielding engagement with critical issues and ideas through various fields and genres of literary arts.

Although initially our extraterrestrial friends above may not find much empirical significance in the sedentary acts of producing Watermark's contents, where reading may appear as nothing more than creatures staring at marked-up splices of dead trees for hours, vividly hallucinating, it is through the spirit of providing awareness to tomorrow's evolutionary nuances where any alien (or alienated) being will find a genealogy of knowledge that offers transformative and healthily nuanced patterns of existence beyond the observable domains of power. In addition to echoing the theme of 'spaces' from Re/Inventions 2017, CSULB's Interdisciplinary Graduate Student Conference, we encouraged graduate students to submit critical and theoretical papers concerned with any theme or topic. We received an extraordinary body of submissions that represented a wide range of topics, genres, eras, and fields, produced by all levels of graduate study, from nearly all corners of the world. The essays we've selected for this issue carry the spirit of Watermark by exploring new territories in the study of literature. We're proud to continue the tradition of publishing original essays that invite

new approaches to English studies. From Saint Margaret to Lady Gaga, the following essays challenge hegemonic discourses and dominant narratives of race, gender, sexuality, and identity that demand destabilization, as an integral part of a healthily nuanced evolution.

Perhaps my favorite reflection on this year's volume derives from considering its subtle, unspoken nod to the title coined in its first issue. For the simple (and silent) function of a watermark is to impose an identifying pattern or image within, and between, some form of valuable language onto paper, measured only by its density, and made visible only through holding it up in its entirety to the light, in order to reveal its full intention and purpose. The necessity of watermarks, which discourage replication and repetition of commonly known and identified cultural patterns, invites all individuals to consider the mobility and displacement of power through symbols often invisible to the bare eye. A watermark serves as a gentle reminder to seek out and discover new meaning within and beyond accessible forms of valuable language, which will encourage future genealogies to disembark with exhausted symbols of repressive institutionalized power, and participate in the interplay between emerging networks of language, subjectivity, and nature that spark new dialogues about transformative social change.

For over a decade, graduate students in the English department at CSULB assemble a dedicated staff in a collaborative effort to continue the tradition of providing a forum for emerging voices in graduate studies across the globe. The eleventh volume of Watermark rests in your hands entirely because of the assiduous staff that voluntarily devoted their time and energy to make this volume a reality. This edition of Watermark is forever indebted to the efforts of all our readers and editors who so graciously contributed their wit and wisdom behind the scenes. I would like to extend a special heartfelt thanks to our spectacular team of managing editors, whose tireless efforts and consistent leadership was the reason this volume made it to the press. With special thanks to Vanessa Strodel and Danielle Alsky for undertaking extra initiative without hesitation, and Christopher Maye for serving as the staff's much needed artistic director.

On behalf of the entire Watermark staff, I would like to express our deepest gratitude for the guidance and support of our faculty advisor, Dr. Norbert Schürer, as well as the avid assistance of Lisa Beherendt and Doris Pintscher, the visionary departmental leadership of Dr. Eileen Klink, and the continuous motivation, inspiration, and mentorship provided by the English Department faculty, in which this journal serves as a testament to their continual investment in student success.

Jordan Khajavipour
Executive Editor

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“Subtle Subversion”: An Exploration of Gender Identity Construction and Performativity in J.R.R. Tolkien’s *The Lord of the Rings*

Danielle A. Alsky

A large portion of gender criticism surrounding Tolkien’s works in the past few decades, especially regarding *The Lord of the Rings*, focuses on gender from a feminist, heteronormative perspective. The bulk of this criticism seeks to discover the reason for and significance behind the limited amount of female characters within *The Lord of the Rings*. A survey of this literature reveals that the critiques can be grouped into two general categories[1] arguing one of two sides: that Tolkien’s female characters are simply objects, oppressed by male dominance with little to no power, or they are proactive agents of their own destiny, appropriating traditionally masculine characteristics in order to achieve their goals as powerful women.

Though these arguments analyze a wide variety of characters, both male and female, one character who appears in every essay is Éowyn, the White Lady of Rohan. Due to her significant character development and prominent role as a main female character in the novel, critics utilize her as evidence for both sides of this academic conversation. Some scholars, such as Candace Fredrick and Sam McBride, argue that Éowyn most nearly embodies a strong feminist character when she battles and kills the Lord of the Nazgûl, attaining her long desired goal of glory, honor, and great deeds. She fails to embody this fully though, they contend, when she falls back into the traditionally expected womanly role: she marries Faramir and becomes a “healer” and “lover of all that is not barren” (39). Other critics, such as Melissa McCrory Hatcher in her article “Finding Woman’s Place in *The Lord of the Rings*” and Nancy Enright in her article “Tolkien’s Females and the Defining of Power,” disavow this reading, asserting instead that Éowyn’s struggle is against herself, thus positioning her as the most complex character in the story, who only finds wholeness, healing, and happiness through an inner peace she finally attains by self-empowerment (Hatcher 53-54, Enright 133). Jane Chance, Jack Downs, and Leslie Donovan also contribute to this conversation,

1 Other critics seek either to prove or disprove Tolkien’s alleged misogyny, but that enters areas of biographical research and source criticism, which lie outside the scope of this paper.

maintaining that the main female characters in *The Lord of the Rings*, such as Galadriel, Goldberry, and especially Éowyn, exhibit immense female power and agency, and, in different ways, each offer correctives to traditional understandings of female characters found in the medieval romance genre and within Northern mythologies.

What these textual analyses all share is an assumption founded in a feminist, heteronormative perspective, which conceives of these female characters' identities in one of two culturally constructed, traditional ways: masculine or feminine. These arguments, though attempting to do substantial, progressive work by empowering women while seeking to dispel gender categories, paradoxically reify the gender identity categories they endeavor to tear down. In the process of arguing over whether Éowyn succeeds in exemplifying a strong female character or not, these critics construct their own ideas of female identity, while simultaneously perpetuating the masculine/feminine gender identity binary. In this way, heteronormative feminist criticism falls short, disabling the possibility of gender identity subversion. Queer criticism, however, attempts to reimagine these ideas, demonstrating the possibility of gender subversion through variations on repeated socially constructed gender identities.

Queer criticism is not new to literary theory, but few critical readings exist that discuss *The Lord of the Rings* through a queer studies lens. A few articles that do, penned by David M. Craig and Robin Anne Reid, offer interesting arguments regarding *The Lord of the Rings* and its relation to queer theory. In her article, Reid analyzes light and dark imagery used in the novel, drawing "from queer studies and applied linguistics (stylistics)" in order "to develop an analysis of the grammatical construction of female characters' bodies in *The Lord of the Rings*" (98). Craig, in his essay, focuses on masculinity and queer theory, arguing that though *The Lord of the Rings* is "about the heroic exploits of a world of men," it still "challenges that very notion of masculinity" because it is ultimately a book about "the religious ideal of love" epitomized in the relationship between Frodo and Sam, whose "quest is held together by their love…a love which dare not speak its name" (18). Both arguments seek to offer an alternative reading to a novel typically understood from a heteronormative perspective; however, neither address the possibility of agency by performing more nuanced gendered categories.

Drawing on Judith Butler to inform my reading of *The Lord of the Rings*, I aim to address these lacking areas, to show how Butler's understanding of gender identity construction and performativity offers a possibility for agency that corrects the heteronormative perspective of these critics and proposes a more nuanced reading of gender within *The Lord of the Rings*. Moreover, using these definitions, I intend to show that through Éowyn, *The Lord of the Rings* argues that gender is performative in nature, and that by recognizing gender as performative allows for the possibility of the subversion of identity and agency, thus complicating and disrupting the possibility of feminist, heteronormative readings of characters in the text. Recognizing that this is no mean task, I intend to analyze Éowyn in detail to both focus the scope of this essay and to engage with fellow feminist and queer theorists who discuss her in their arguments. I understand, however, that this reading could be viewed by some as limiting, but I write with the intention of exploring this topic further in the future.

Judith Butler: Gender Identity Construction and Performativity

Judith Butler, in her book *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, seeks to uncover the socio-political stakes that shape and form identity within societal discursive practices. For Butler, "the identity categories," meaning the socially constructed male and female identities, "often presumed to be foundational to feminist politics and deemed necessary in order to mobilize feminism as an identity politics," simultaneously works "to limit and constrain in advance the very cultural possibilities that feminism is supposed to open up" (147). In other words, though the strong, female identity connected with the early American women's feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s was wrought with the intention of bringing about positive social change, its strict parameters defining what a woman is and is not actually restricted the freedoms the movement intended to establish.

In order to illuminate this movement's ideological failure and thus offer a corrective, Butler uses a "genealogical critique," a perspective that "refuses to search for the origins of gender, the inner truth of female desire, a genuine or authentic identity that repression has kept from view," but rather seeks to "investigate the political stakes in designing as an *origin* and *cause* those identity categories that are in fact the *effects* of institutions, practices, and discourses within multiple and diffuse points of origin" (x-xi). The feminist movement Butler critiques was founded upon rejecting woman's originally conceived identity—socially constructed traditional gender roles of the masculine and feminine. The problem Butler identifies in her critique is a struggle with the movement's identity formation, showing that though the movement desired to obtain freedom for women from socially constructed gender roles, it still identified with a traditional socially constructed female identity. The socio-political stakes, then, exist in where this process unfortunately excluded a significant number of people of different races, gender identities, and classes who also deserved the freedoms for which the movement was advocating. Thus, Butler's argument culminates in the claim that searching for an origin of identity is not productive, and, furthermore, the attempt to establish an origin of identity necessitates a certain set of gender identity assumptions that continually reify the heteronormative status quo.

Furthermore, another ideological component Butler seeks to pinpoint and dismantle from the women's movement is the idea that an identity assumes a constituted "I," completely separate from other identities. This ideology stems, again, from the movement's construction of female identity—they excluded others who did not identify with their specific definition of what a woman's identity should be and, thus, constructed their own boundaries of identity. Within this framework, then, agency assumes an established identity, a constituted "I," wherein the individual strives against the status quo, which has been established outside the constituted "I." The feminist movement trumpeted this constituted "I" to establish their agency.

For Butler, however, identity and its agency is not so easily constituted. Identity is "a practice…a signifying practice" where "culturally intelligible subjects" are the result of "a rule-bound discourse that inserts itself in the pervasive and mundane signifying acts of linguistic life," meaning

that identity is continually created through the discourses of multiple socially constructed institutions (145). Furthermore, Butler contends that because identity is both constituted and disabled through discourse, the subject

> is not *determined* by the rules through which it is generated because signification *is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition* that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the production of substantializing efforts. In a sense, all signification takes place within the orbit of the compulsion to repeat; 'agency,' then, is to be located within the possibility of a variation on that repetition. If the rules governing signification not only restrict, but enable the assertion of alternative domains of cultural intelligibility, i.e. new possibilities for gender that context the rigid codes of hierarchical binarisms, then it is only *within* the practices of repetitive signifying that a subversion of identity becomes possible. (145, italics mine)

In other words, identity is constituted through discourse, and because language continually changes and develops, identity is never stable and constant. Assuming an understanding of identity in this way, "agency'" cannot be "associated with the viability of the 'subject,' where the 'subject' is understood to have some stable existence prior to the cultural field that it negotiates" (143). Rather, agency must, like all else, exist within the relations of power, such as the social, political, economic, and cultural institutions constituted by humankind, which continually constitute identity. There is, then, no possibility to exert all-encompassing power over others, but there is the ability to disrupt these power relations through variations on the *repetition* that occurs within the discourse that constructs these gender identities. Consequently, Butler conceives of the possibility of gender identity subversion through the *repeated acts* that construct Butler's idea of performativity. Recognizing the inability to escape socially constructed gender identities, Butler finds the possibility to destabilize gender norms through variations on performed gender identities. In the rest of this essay, I will draw on Butler to demonstrate how *The Lord of the Rings* argues that gender is performative in nature, and then proceed to show how Éowyn's character offers readers a picture of gender identity subversion within institutional linguistic discourses.

Gender Identity Construction in *The Lord of the Rings*

Through many of the main characters in *The Lord of the Rings*, such as Aragorn, Arwen, Boromir, and Galadriel, we find that masculine and feminine gender identities are continually constructed and performed. In her essay "The Feminine Principle in Tolkien," Melanie Rawls analyzes specific word choices and their appearances in the text in order to argue that Tolkien's characters each exhibit both masculine and feminine characteristics equally. Though the scope of her essay focuses on *The Silmarillion*, Rawls still analyzes characters in *The Lord of the Rings*, such as Aragorn, whom she claims "must display characteristics feminine and masculine—the feminine power of healing, the masculine skill of wise and just rule" in order to prove his "fitness to reign" (100). Much of Rawls' analysis develops in this way, using and perpetuating both the masculine and feminine sides of the gender binary in order to show what she deems is the holistic construction of these characters. Her argument is significant, however, because it shows how the main characters in *The*

Lord of the Rings continually perform gendered identities in ways that perpetuate their construction according to the gender binary, and not in ways that subvert gender identities.

A close reading of the text, specifically pertaining to the main female characters, Goldberry, Galadriel, and Éowyn, evidences this gender identity performativity. When the four hobbits first meet Goldberry, Galadriel, and Éowyn, the three women are immediately described according to their beauty, suggesting an initial and important textual emphasis on female identity constructed through physical markers. For example, in their first meeting, Goldberry is described as having "long yellow hair" that "rippled down her shoulders," a "green gown, green as young reeds, shot with silver like beads of dew; and her belt was of gold, shaped like a chain of flag-lilies, set with the pale-blue eyes of forget-me-nots" (Tolkien 123). Later, during the hobbits' stay with Tom Bombadil, Goldberry is referred to multiple times as the "Fair lady Goldberry" by both the hobbits and Tom. The word "fair" is continually used to refer to Goldberry's appearance and demeanor (121-24). Furthermore, Goldberry is the one who prepares the table for the meal, though Tom is the one who takes credit for the preparations. Tom returns from his jaunt in the forest and booms when he enters the house

> 'Here's my pretty lady!' he said, bowing to the hobbits. 'Here's my Goldberry clothed all in silver-green with the flowers in her girdle! Is the table laden? I see yellow cream and honeycomb, and white bread, and butter; milk cheese and green herbs and ripe berries gathered. Is that enough for us? Is the supper ready?' (124)

Goldberry responds, "It is,'" appropriately fulfilling the role she is expected to perform by Tom, by preparing the meal (125). At one point in the story, Tom picks out a brooch for Goldberry to wear, saying, "Here is a pretty toy for Tom and for his lady! Fair was she who long ago wore this on her shoulder, and Goldberry shall wear it now!" (145). This instance clearly portrays Tom choosing for Goldberry what she must wear, in order to make her who he wants her to be: fair and beautiful, like the woman who wore the brooch before. Tom's position over Goldberry is further emphasized in the scene where both the hosts and guests are gathered around the table, and the text describes "the hobbits…seated at the table, two on each side, while at either end sat Goldberry and the Master," the terminology establishing Goldberry's subservient place to her "Master" (125). Goldberry willing performs her gender according to Tom's expectations of her gender.

Galadriel's and Éowyn's introductions in the text reflect similar gender specific descriptions to Goldberry, though the women occupy different positions. Though Galadriel's is one of power and position, her name is continually connected with the title "Lady" and her actions are those of a ruling figure; her physical description mirrors that of Goldberry's. Galadriel too is described through her hair, clothing, and eyes: her hair is "of a deep gold," "clad wholly in white," and her eyes are deep, "keen as lances in the starlight, and yet profound, the wells of deep memory" (354). It is interesting to note that Galadriel is described in tandem with her husband Celeborn in a way that Goldberry is not, but only Galadriel, not Celeborn, is continually noted for her beauty after their introduction. For example, Gimli comments again and again upon her glory, saying that "the Lady Galadriel is above all the jewels that lie beneath the earth!" (356). Still more, Galadriel's name is continually connected with the word *fair* (361-65), suggesting again, as with Goldberry, an emphasis upon her

socially constructed feminine identity through her physical markers as a woman.

Éowyn's introduction, through the eyes of Aragorn, begins similarly to Galadriel's and Goldberry's. Aragorn's account describes her as "very fair," with "long hair…like a river of gold. Slender and tall she was in white robe girt with silver; but strong…and stern as steel, a daughter of kings," one who is "fair, fair and cold, like a morning of pale spring that is not yet come into womanhood" (515). Again, as with Galadriel and Goldberry, the word *fair* directly links Éowyn's identity to her beautiful appearance, suggesting that her physical beauty is integral to her identity as a woman. Furthermore, once Théoden is cured of Wormtongue's poisonous influence and the men are invited into his palace for food and shelter, Éowyn is expected to, as the Lady of Rohan, serve the meals and prepare the beds, while appropriately "waiting upon the king" and his men (521). She bears a cup of refreshing drink to the men when Théoden asks, and when she is commanded to stay behind and keep watch over the people of Rohan while the Riders head West to Isengard, she does not protest, accepting the position silently. Poised "alone before the doors of the silent house," and "clad in mail…her hands laid upon the hilt" of her sword as she watches the Rohirrim ride away, her silence and solitude suggests a dissatisfaction with her assigned gender role, and a longing to be among the men riding into battle (525, 523).

Her female identity is further reified by the conversation Éowyn has with Aragorn when she seeks to join him on his journey to the Paths of Dead. She says to him, "Lord, if you must go, then let me ride in your following. For I am weary of skulking in the hills, and wish to face peril in battle" (784). Aragorn, however, tells her that her "duty is with [her] people," to which she replies, "Too often have I heard of duty," claiming that she has "waited on faltering feet long enough" and is not now the time for her to "spend [her] life as she will?" (784). Aragorn points out, "Did [she] not accept the charge to govern the people until [Théoden's] return?" to which Éowyn bitterly replies, "Shall I always be chosen? Shall I always be left behind when the Riders depart, to mind the house while they win renown, and find food and beds when they return?" (784). This passage clearly positions Éowyn as a woman desiring to be a part of the world of men, but cannot because she is expected to fulfill certain roles due to her attributed female identity. Some might argue that this is not the case, and instead highlight that Aragorn argues Éowyn must stay behind in order to fulfill the duty she took upon herself. We must remember, however, that the only reason Éowyn stayed behind to lead the people is because Háma spoke for her, suggesting her leadership to the king without even asking her first. In her description during that scene, Éowyn is prepared for battle, donning mail and a sword. Her expectation was that she would be included in the war party, but she is excluded.

As the conversation continues, Éowyn's expected compliance to her attributed female identity becomes even more plain:

> 'A time may come soon,' said [Aragorn], 'when none will return. Then there will be need of valour without renown, for none shall remember the deeds that are done in the last defence of your homes. Yet the deeds will not be less valiant because they are unpraised.'
>
> And she answered, 'All your words are but to say: you are a woman, and your part is in the house. But when the men have died in battle and honour, you have leave to be burned in the house, for the men will need it no more. But I am of the House of Eorl and not a serv-

ing-woman. I can ride and wield blade, and I do not fear either pain or death.'

'What do you fear, lady?' he asked.

'A cage,' she said. 'To stay behind bars, until use and old age accept them, and all chance of doing great deeds is gone beyond recall and desire.' (Tolkien 784)

Aragorn's responses to Éowyn's claim that she can match any man in both courage, strength, and wisdom on the battle field, suggests his attempt to quell her demands to join the men. He attempts to equate her homely work in the city with the men's glory on the battlefield, but Éowyn scoffs at this remark. Furthermore, we see that Aragorn completely dismisses Éowyn's attempt to justify her abilities on the battlefield, amplifying her gender construction through his complete rejection even of her attempt to try. Thus, it is clear that up to this point in the text, the language describing Goldberry, Galadriel, and Éowyn suggests construction of a specific kind of female gender identity, with its own set expectations regarding how women should act and who they should be.

Subtle Subversion: The Possibility of Gender Identity Subversion through Variations on Gender Performativity

As mentioned earlier, much *Lord of the Rings* criticism pertaining to Éowyn revolves around questions of her female agency, such as whether she exhibits the characteristics expected of a strong, feminist character, or why her story ends with her seemingly limiting marriage to Faramir and her choice to become a healer. In their analysis of Éowyn, critics Candace Fredrick and Sam McBride, in their article "Battling the Woman Warrior: Females and Combat in Tolkien Lewis," rely on traditionally constructed gender identities rooted in a heteronormative perspective in order to show that Éowyn does not live up to her full potential, but instead, settles for the happy home and marriage expected of the females in her position. Thus, when Éowyn desires to ride to battle alongside the men in the novel, Fredrick and McBride claim that Éowyn must make herself a man by disguising herself as Dernhelm, in order to achieve her goal. In this position, she completely defeminizes herself and shuns her place as woman, making herself "ugly" in order to participate in battle with the men. Upon her return to the Houses of Healing in Gondor, she recovers from what Fredrick and McBride call "a malady deeper than a mere physical ailment" (35). "She is sick to her soul," they argue, "due to an unwillingness to accept her lot in life: living as a female who, as such, is disbarred from a life of glory on the battlefield," and "had she not been so healed" of this malady, surely, "she would have died" (35). Their final analysis of Éowyn's situation culminates in their saying, "Tolkien's choices for a would-be woman warrior: submit to your allotted role as wife, or die" (35).

Now, that is a strong claim for Tolkien's Éowyn, and one that reveals the deeply embedded and problematic heteronormative frame from which Fredrick and McBride are working. Due to these assumptions, Fredrick and McBride cannot conceive of Éowyn outside of the masculine/feminine binary; she is either a wife or a warrior, she cannot be both. In one way, Fredrick and McBride are right; returning to Butler, she too acknowledges the impossibility of dismantling the construction of these gender identities. They are too entrenched in our society. As we saw in the previous section through Aragorn, Goldberry, Galadriel, and Éowyn, the text constructs specific gender identities and expects the characters to fulfill these constructed identities through performance.

Though Fredrick and McBride saw Éowyn's disguise as making herself ugly and dis-identifying with her womanhood in order to participate in battle, an understanding of Butler's theories, however, conceives of the possibility for agency *within* this binary through variations on the performativity of these gender identities. One significant example of this is when Éowyn meets the Nazgûl at the Battle of Pelennor Fields.

When Éowyn first appears in the text, she is presented as a traditional woman fulfilling expected female gender roles. The moment Éowyn disguises herself as Dernhelm, however, she demonstrates a conscious choice on her part to create her own identity, concealing herself in a way that works within both gender categories at the same time. When Dernhelm first appears, Merry is riding along behind the king and his men to battle. He watches the "long ranks of waiting men with stern and unmoved faces" when "almost to the end of the line one looked up glancing keenly at the hobbit. A young man, Merry thought as he returned the glance, less in height and girth than most" (Tolkien 802-3). As readers, we know that this young man is Lady Éowyn, but Merry is clearly fooled by her disguise, even though he notes this "young man's" lesser stature compared to the other men around him. Merry's commentary suggests that Éowyn successfully performs the masculine gender identity through her attire. Merry and all the men around him, even King Théoden, who knows Éowyn best, are fooled by the disguise.

By constructing a masculine gender identity for herself and literally wearing it, Éowyn's actions reveal gender identity to be what it truly is: socially constructed and performed by people every day. The scene where Dernhelm challenges the Lord of the Nazgûl further illustrates this, through the Nazgûl's reaction when Dernhelm removes his disguise. When the Nazgûl descends upon Pelennor Fields, Dernhelm challenges him, "'Do what you will; but I will hinder it, if I may!'" The Nazgûl roars, "'Hinder me? Thou fool. No living man may hinder me!'" Then Dernhelm mockingly responds, "'But no living man am I! You look upon a woman. Éowyn I am, Eomund's daughter. You stand between me and my lord and kin. Begone, if you be not deathless! For living or dark undead, I will smite you, if you touch him'" (Tolkien 842). The Ringwraith, in response to Éowyn's remarks, makes "no answer, and [is] silent, as if in sudden doubt" (842). The Nazgûl is struck dumb by the revelation and his silence suggests disbelief in what has just happened. More importantly, though, the scene points to the nature of socially constructed gendered identities, demonstrating that one who looks like a traditional, heteronormative male could, in reality, identify as female.

Additionally, not only does this scene reveal the unstable nature of gendered identities, but it more importantly reveals the possibility for agency, the ability to play upon the performance of the identities to disable them. After Dernhelm reveals himself to be Éowyn, the narrator focuses in on her, describing her appearance and demeanor in the text:

> A little to the left facing them stood she whom he had called Dernhelm. But the helm of her secrecy had fallen from her, and her bright hair, released from its bonds, gleamed with pale gold upon her shoulders. Her eyes gray as the sea were hard and fell, and yet tears were on her cheeks. A sword was in her hand, and she raised her shield against the horror of her enemy's eyes. Éowyn *it was, and Dernhelm also*. (842; emphasis mine)

This final sentence is the key phrase in this entire scene. The text reveals the possibility of both

identifying and dis-identifying with both gender identities at the same time, what Butler conceives of as agency. It is noteworthy that this line appears after "but the helm of secrecy had fallen from her," because without that phrase, the scene could initially be read as Éowyn simply hiding her womanhood for a time until she reveals it again. The fact that the text describes Éowyn and Dernhelm as one and the same person, however, dismantles the option of this kind of reading, pointing to the possibility of agency Butler believes occurs when one crafts "variations" within the process of gender performativity. In the end, Éowyn is ultimately and finally described as Éowyn and Dernhelm simultaneously, both with the final phrase in the quote and the frequently interchanging he/she pronouns, showing that *The Lord of the Rings*, through Éowyn, is ultimately arguing that gender is performative in nature, and the only way to subvert this incessant gender construction is through variations on performativity.

Conclusion

The heteronormative feminist perspective we analyzed in the beginning of this essay offers readings of Éowyn that view her as either a strong, feminist character, or an object of the male characters in the novel. We saw, however, that these readings present a very limiting idea of agency, with Éowyn not choosing to simply identify with one gender identity or the other. Similarly, *The Lord of the Rings* constructs most of its main characters as identifying with either masculine or feminine gender identities. However, by constructing her own gender identity through performing Dernhelm on the battlefield, Éowyn, in contrast to the other characters, reveals both the instability of gender identity categories and the possibility of "agency" by performing gender identity categories in different variations. Éowyn's gender fluidity disrupts some critics' strong interpretations of her gender and agency because their views assume a specific definition of her gender identity. Her performance ultimately disables their ability to define her gender and highlights the freedom and power one can achieve when working within defined gender identities. Éowyn's performance complicates traditional understandings of gender in the text and opens up possibility for new and exciting readings to come.

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“To Rente the Flessch Fro the Bone”: Saint Margaret, Mutilation, and Ungendering Divinity

Gitana Deneff

The story of Saint Margaret, juxtaposed with the other pieces in *Codex Ashmole 61*, illustrates how a female saint, through Imitating Christ, breaks away from her female body to become an ungendered soul. While she does embrace the mutilation of her body, saying “Thys peynes that I soffer ... They [are] full suete, ... sueter to me than thing[s] of lyve” (376), it is not in order to root herself deeper into her female body, as some scholarship suggests. Instead, I argue that Saint Margaret embraces and encourages her mutilation as a means to literally be torn from her physical, gendered female body. She performs acts that can be seen as masculine, aiding in her desires to be non-female, such as bursting out of a dragon and beating up a demon.

Some scholarship argues that Saint Margaret exists on the border between genders. However, the literal tearing away from her body, as shown by the words “ren[d] hyr [life] fro[m] the flessch” (377), as well as her baptism in the boiling water, followed by the bidding to proceed with her own beheading (the head female features like the eyes, mouth, blushing cheeks, etc.), show that Saint Margaret desires a divine ungendered soul, severed from her earthly female body. She also does this in an effort to correct the fall of mankind. Correcting the fall is not an inherently female thing to do, at least not according to the other stories in *Codex*. In *The Northern Passion*, for example, Christ is hung on a cross whose wood is traced back to the tree of knowledge in Paradise, so his death on that cross for people’s sins corrects the fall. Saint Margaret exorcises demons, an antonym to Eve giving in to the snake’s temptation, but this exorcism, a symbolic correcting of Eve’s scene with the snake, exists in stories of male figures such as Solomon and Christ in which they both battle demons and dragons. This shows that correcting Eve, or the fall in general is not a gender specific act or description. Through *Codex*, there are many examples of correcting Eve, by males as well as females. There are also stories like “Ypotis” in which Adam is blamed alongside Eve for the fall and they are both corrected by Christ’s crucifixion. This gives an ungendered view of divinity, instead of males only being allowed to correct Adam and females only being allowed to correct Eve.

Scholarship surrounding Saint Margaret paints a different picture of her than the story in *Codex*. Perhaps this is due to multiples stories that have been produced in the late middle ages. Most of the other scholarship draws from a different Saint Margaret story in which Margaret “succumbs” to her beheading. By saying that she succumbs to her beheading in other stories, the authors don’t give

Saint Margaret as much agency to her own death as the story in *Codex* does. In *Codex*, she orders the executioner to behead her, even though he tells her he is on her side and doesn't want to behead her. By having agency over her own death, demanding that she be killed, and not merely succumbing to her beheading (like in other female saint stories of martyrdom), she becomes severed from her earthly female body to achieve ungendered divinity.

The idea that ungendering oneself is ideal for divinity of the soul is supported by other characters in this book who are removed from gender altogether through their actions. Even though in one story, the Virgin Mary is seen lamenting for her dead son she is then shown beating up demons in another story, illustrating her severance from gendered norms. Christ, in "The Northern Passion," is clearly male, but is given descriptions that are typically given to females, such as "meke," "myld," and "feyr." Saint Margaret actively embraces being brought to Olybryus and mutilated, even though her allowance of the mutilation could be argued as submissive. When she defeats the dragon and the demon, these can be seen as non-feminine acts that ungender her further. Note that Christ, Mary, and St. Margaret are all virgins as well, and virginity can be seen as an ungendering of one's self, making the decision to not utilize the sex organs that one was born with. The desire to tear away from one's gendered earthly body can also be seen as a tearing away from earthly material things in general, with a desire for divinity in Heaven.

Jennifer Borland agrees that defeating demons makes Saint Margaret more complex than a typical virgin resisting temptation story. However, Borland also thinks that Margaret merely oscillates between gendered realms. While she does perform or display actions that are masculine, this does *not* mean she desires to occupy or straddle both genders. This can give the *appearance* of straddling both gender roles, but this is not what Margaret is concerned about. Instead I see it as a way for her to be non-feminine, rejecting and pushing away from her female gendered body.

The scene in the prison cell is where Margaret performs actions that are masculine (that is, non-feminine). She bursts out of a dragon after it swallows her, and her actions can be seen as penetrative and invasive. She also defeats a demon by bludgeoning him with a hammer, a physical act of violence, instead of passively resisting temptation. Dresvina suggests that in the killing of demons, there is always a formula: 1. the appearance of the demon 2. the question and answer of "Who are you?" and 3. the exorcism. Saint Margaret is one of the few female saints who uses this formula to defeat a demon. Aside from Saint Margaret, the Virgin Mary in *The Jealous Wife*, also exorcises demons and sends them to hell. Margaret's breaking out of the dragon can be viewed as a kind of masculine, aggressive penetration, and the fighting of the demon, where she utilizes the exorcist formula "Who are you?" can be seen as another masculine act. However, in using the word masculine to describe her actions, we risk being misunderstood as saying that she either wants to be masculine like Christ, because Christ was a man, or wants to embody both genders. Therefore I will suggest that instead of viewing the demon and dragon defeats solely as masculine actions, we can view them as actions that seek to be non-female, actions that tear her away from gender roles and the expectations we place on her as a female saint in Middle English literature.

Michelle Sauer says that male mystic authors, when describing women, fear eroticization and alienate them from their whole through a fragmenting of their bodies. She considers women rooted solely in the body through these male writers, depicting them as spiritually and intellectually lax. In reference to female saint stories, she says that male writers make saint's bodies the "objects of a dissecting gaze" through bodily fragmentation in descriptions where they are being objectified by their eyes, hair, mouth, skin, and other features that enhance femininity. This, Sauer says, gives these female figures "little agency of their own, and [they] serve as mere vehicles for theological debates

or social reinforcement" (6). In discussing how female mystic authors responded to this, Sauer says that they used the fact that they couldn't escape the objectifying of their earthly female bodies to achieve divinity instead of remaining fragmented by male authors. Elizabeth Robertson is in agreement with Sauer, saying that sanctity is not a gender-neutral concept, and that a woman cannot escape her body. She says females only have spiritual potential through their bodies, not their intellect.

But by encouraging her torture, where she is literally ripped from her skeletal bones, Margaret starts this process of tearing herself away from Sauer and Robertson's "rooted" erotic female body, and propels herself toward her eventual goal of divinity. Additionally, the exposure of her blood, veins, etc., become abject and gruesome because they are outside the body, further rejecting the eroticization of the intact female body. Saint Margaret not only gets torn from the body, but uses her spiritual intellect to defeat a dragon (through her faith) and a demon (through the formula of exorcism). This challenges the previous notions of academics like Robertson and Sauer, who say she is rooted in the body and has no choice but to use eroticism to achieve divinity. Saint Margaret's masculine actions, instead of making her embody both male and female spaces, is an additional action in this process of tearing away from her female body, in essence, being non-female, and approaching an ungendered divinity.

I believe that the state of being a virgin, as Saint Margaret, the Virgin Mary, and even Christ, embody, allow one to alter their virtual gender. However, I don't think that through this, Christ projects being a female, or that Mary and Saint Margaret seek to be male figures, but that this altering of one's virtual gender is the process of transferring from male or female gendered earthly bodies, to an ungendered divine soul. A refusal of temptations of the flesh illustrates this wanting to break away from one's gendered body, and Saint Margaret shows this through her non-female action of defeating a dragon, exorcising a demon, and even refusing to marry King Olybrius (the act that initiated her mutilation in the first place).

In the end of the story of Saint Margaret in the *Codex*, the executioner says that he sides with her and doesn't want to behead her, further delaying her eventual death. This is similar to Christ's dilemma in *The Northern Passion* (found in the same *Codex*) when numerous events almost comically prevent him from being crucified, an act that he knows needs to take place. It needs to take place explicitly to save the souls of mankind, but implicitly, he is correcting the fall of man in Genesis. It's hard to determine, after reading *The Northern Passion* and *Ypotis* (both in *Codex*) whether the fault is given to Eve or Adam for the fall of man. Perhaps in providing both understandings of the fall, the *Codex* makes this fact unimportant, further reifying the ungendered nature of divinity. Correcting the fall of mankind then, is not necessarily a correction of Adam or Eve, but of the general fall. Saint Margaret, in order to fulfill her Imitating Christ progression, tells the executioner that he can't delay her beheading, that it must to be done.

This is in conflict with other readings of her story where it is said that she "submits" to her beheading, as if she didn't have a choice. But Margaret isn't a submissive character because she gains power and divinity through active participation in the mutilation of her flesh and the ripping away of her erotic female features. The power Saint Marageret has over her execution is shown by the language used in the story that says "[s]che bad hym" and "Sir, do as I thee byde:/Take and smyte of myn hede" (384). The beheading not only kills her, giving her access to heaven, but is a public display of literally cutting off the features that makes a female erotically beautiful. All the parts to be objectified by the male gaze (the eyes, hair, mouth, and skin) are removed from her body and mutilated in her beheading. This further reinstates her desire to be severed from her femininity. However, it is not because she wants to exist in the masculine realm, but because she wants to be in

a non-feminine, ungendered space that will earn her soul divinity in heaven.

Now the question remains: Is the story of St. Margaret didactic? If so, in what way? In approaching these questions, AnneMarie Fox thinks that this text has patriarchal overtones. Keep in mind that this is not necessarily the same story of Saint Margaret that I read, but they are similar. Fox says that the text encloses the female reader within physical, spiritual, and theological boundaries due to the male-dominated church that was in the business of instructing women. She thinks that the story of Saint Margaret instructs women to achieve divinity "through maintaining her physical intactness," in essence, preserving their virginity (134). Fox says that "bodily bounding and enclosure" was instructed by the male-dominated church "as central to female piety" (135). What does this say about Margaret, who Fox thinks is the perfect example of this physical intactness, when she embraces the torture of her body?

Well, Fox says the other type of virginity that Saint Margaret portrays, and therefore instructs to female readers, is that of spiritual intactness, which I agree is illustrated in the story as Margaret rejects temptation from the king as well as the demon. However, being spiritually intact doesn't have to do solely with being a female, as Christ is also a virgin and imitating him can be performed by males as well. Therefore, the intactness of the female body is not something I agree is being taught in the story of Saint Margaret found in *Codex*.

I believe that this story of Saint Margaret in *Codex Ashmole 61*, when read alongside stories such as *The Northern Passion* and *Ypotis*, in which the fall is blamed on males as well as females, teaches something very different than what Fox proposes with her Old English reading of Saint Margaret. The Saint Margaret story I'm speaking of is also found in the same book in which Christ is given a previously feminine descriptor such as "meke and myld" and the Virgin Mary is shown lamenting for her son in a maternal and feminine nature while, in a separate story, she's shown battling demons. I think that the story of Saint Margaret, in the context of *Codex Ashmole 61*, is didactic, but is teaching something that is not an act of the patriarchy instructing or restricting women's bodies, as Fox asserts. Instead, through Margaret's rejection of her female-gendered body through mutilation and non-feminine actions, the story is teaching readers that in order to achieve divinity, one must willingly give up earthly bounds (like their gendered body) and remain spiritually intact to achieve heavenly bliss with the other ungendered souls of Christ and the Virgin Mary.

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(Un)Safe Spaces: An Examination of Violations of Space in *The Changeling*

Erika Gavitt

After the experience of watching or reading Thomas Middleton and William Rowley's 1622 play *The Changeling* for the first time, it might be difficult to pinpoint what makes it so disturbing. On the surface, it bears standard themes of a stereotypical modern drama: lust, deception, murder. All of which might be enticing, but none of which necessarily demand a visceral reaction from an audience. Yet this Jacobean play contains a uniqueness that, as the critic Norah Williams points out, led to a revival and surge in popularity and canonization all within the last one hundred years (30). What is it then, that makes this play stand out? Why is it relevant now, and why does it get under the skin of an audience in the year 2016? Using the work of modern gender theorists as well as theory and criticism from theater studies, I would like to explore the ways in which *The Changeling* crosses boundaries in order to achieve the effect of captivating and unsettling broad audiences. The theme of crossing boundaries and thresholds manifests both literally and figuratively in this work. Thinking strictly about the plot, the action revolves around the violation of bodily boundaries in the form of rape and murder. In the nature of its performance, the play is written in a way in which the performance crosses the literal boundaries of the stage in order to mix with the audience and reality. Oscillating between the boundaries of stage and audience draws attention to the metatheatrical qualities of the play, but subtly so. Ultimately, the violations of space that are played out continually throughout the play lead to the audience feeling disturbed. The sense of discomfort caused by the unwelcome crossing of these boundaries reveals and reflects anxieties of identity and ownership that are still relevant today. Finally, the way in which the violations of space affect audiences reveals fears of the past, and illustrates through its popularity that those fears are still preoccupations that are concerns today.

The Changeling is preoccupied with bodily boundaries being violated which reflects anxieties about social hierarchy and purity. In the seventh chapter of her book *Purity and Danger*, the anthropologist Mary Douglas analyzes different cultures and the way they react to bodily excretions. She puts forth the argument that "the body is a model which can stand for any system" and further asserts that "we cannot possibly interpret rituals concerning excreta, breast milk, saliva and the rest

unless we are prepared to see in the body a symbol of society" (115). With this in mind, it is useful to look at the ways in which the body is treated and becomes a representation of society in *The Changeling*, with a specific emphasis on the way in which those who are physically marked as others are considered to be threats.

In the world of the play, the settings reflect the characters' concerns about their state of purity. The opening scene is strategically set in a church, a place where morals are reinforced and purity is highly valued. This choice in setting creates false expectations of structure. While the church implies the notion that morality will be upheld, that illusion fades as Beatrice and De Flores challenge the established hierarchy. It is also important to note that the play takes place in Alicant, "a Valencian seaport on the E[ast] coast of Spain" (Dramatis Personae17). The larger setting of the play reflects purity through a sense of isolation from the rest of the world. Instead of being surrounded by other populated towns, half of Alicant borders the ocean which makes it difficult for others to enter. In another symbolic setting, being near the ocean might make Alicant more susceptible to being visited by strangers which is why Beatrice's father, Vermandero, has a moment of defensiveness when meeting Alsemero for the first time. Alsemero is a stranger to the castle and, therefore, poses a threat to pollute Vermandero's land and the system he has established in his court (I.i.170-75). Vermandero's negative attitude towards outsiders reflects the value of purity in the form of containment. As opposed to welcoming people from beyond the castle's walls, Vermandero would rather keep his "secrets" and his kin to himself. The play itself also reflects a sense of containment in the sense that the plot never moves beyond the castle walls. Unlike Early English plays like *The Arden of Faversham* where characters travel to different locations, the plot and characters in *The Changeling* are comparatively sedentary and remain within the castle walls. Through both the church as well as the coastal setting, there is a sense that purity must be contained internally with the main characters who uphold a religiously devout lifestyle, and externally through the isolation of the main characters, possibly leading to a quarantine effect.

The value of purity within the world of the play inversely reflects a fear of impurity which is acted out through anxieties about the body, namely in the characterization and actions of the main antagonist, De Flores. From the outset, the audience is made aware that De Flores looks different from the other characters through the hostility that Beatrice shows towards him. Despite the fact that she acknowledges that he is a gentleman "in good respect with [her] father" (I.I.138-39) she also compares him to the basilisk (I.I.119), a mythical reptile that has the power to kill with a single glance. The comparison to a basilisk reveals many key points about De Flores' appearance. Foremost, Beatrice implies through this comparison that De Flores is so ugly that his looks have the power to kill in the same way a basilisk can destroy a human through a look. Through several other indications in the play, it is made clear that De Flores suffers from a condition that affects his skin; therefore, the reptilian comparison draws attention to the repelling texture of De Flores' skin. This is where Beatrice's disgust of De Flores comes from. Beatrice goes out of her way to avoid De Flores even refusing to touch a glove that he has touched and instead requests that he "draw" his own skin off with the glove instead because his appearance is so disturbing (I.I.238). Because De Flores represents impurity through his malady, he is placed in the lowly position of serving the king, but he is treated as a visual threat and source of disgust for Beatrice.

The danger of contamination becomes a threat through the act of De Flores violating Beatrice's body. De Flores' presence becomes a physical threat to Beatrice's well-being through the first instance in which Beatrice touches De Flores' skin. In order to manipulate De Flores into killing Alonzo, Beatrice pretends to care for De Flores and in doing so, offers to take care of his appearance (II.ii). Upon touching his skin in line 82, Beatrice becomes contaminated in a way where De Flores takes begins to take over her physically as well as figuratively. It is important to note the way in which De Flores forces himself upon Beatrice through the act of rape. In considering Mary Douglas' criticism about purity and contamination, she points out that: "since place in the hierarchy of purity is biologically transmitted, sexual behaviour is important for preserving the purity of caste" (125). Through Douglas' observation, one can interpret the act of De Flores raping Beatrice as an act of contaminating the hierarchy of the society within the play. De Flores is beneath Beatrice both physically and socially which is why Beatrice finds him repelling in the first place. This sense of contamination progresses as De Flores works his way into Beatrice's psychology. The most notable example of the extent of villain's effect on Beatrice is when he offers to kill Diaphanta by starting a fire in her chamber to which Beatrice responds that she is "forced to love" De Flores (V.I.47). Through this line, Beatrice illustrates a transformation in which she starts by loathing the sight of De Flores to convincing herself that she loves him. A significant part of the reason why *The Changeling* is so disturbing is because of the way that a character who seems insignificant at the start of the play has the ability to work his way into the entire plot. Ultimately, the characterization of De Flores and his resemblance to a virus which, when compared to the other characters in the play, has the most agency and the ability deeply affect and manipulate those above him to touches on the argument that Mary Douglas puts forth about societies and their anxieties in regard to their inability to maintain purity. The way De Flores crosses bodily and social boundaries with ease symbolizes the fear of outside influences and the threats that they pose to English society.

Outside of the anxieties triggered by the crossing of physical, bodily boundaries, the crossing of the boundary between stage and reality through the use of intervals reflect the way in which the play stirs problematic psychological tensions. As Mark Hutchings points out in his articles "De Flores Between the Acts" and "Interval and Indoor Playmaking," *The Changeling* has the unique potential of utilizing the time and the space between acts. Hutchings begins both of his works by explaining that Jacobean Drama introduced a tradition in which plays started to be performed in indoor venues. Prior to the sixteen hundreds, the tradition of watching plays indoor was reserved for the elite or public indoor performances were otherwise held in "civic space" (Interval 264) like guild halls which were not designated as spaces built specifically for theatrical performances. Plays were often performed in these public venues or otherwise at outdoor amphitheaters like The Swan and The Globe. Hutchings argues that with the development of indoor theater playwrights, like Middleton and Rowley, began to adapt their work and created "drama written specifically for these new conditions" (Interval 264). For instance, with plays performed indoors, there was a need for the artificial light of candles to be used in order for the audience to be able to see. Along with needing candles came the necessity to designate time to trim candles. Knowing that there would need to be time designated for trimming candles during a play that is performed indoors, playwrights "had to adapt to accommodate the new technology" and strategically determine "their precise number and placement" (266). The logistical necessity of trimming candles gave way to new conventions like us-

ing the interval to signal the end of each act or foreshadow the following act. Hutchings speculates through his work that one of the ways in which writers filled the "spatial/aural 'gap'" between acts was to fill it with music which had a "practical as well as a 'decorative' function" during the interlude (De Flores 96). With *The Changeling* in particular there are moments that imply that the use of music is necessary which would lead naturally into the music from play potentially being carried over into the interlude.

Of importance is to consider the way in which the "Dumb Show" is played between Acts three and four. The Dumb Show is marked to be played at the beginning of Act four, but holds "metatheatrical possibilities" for the actors to cross the boundaries of the stage in a way where the spectators become part of the play (268). Hutchings examines the way in which the dancing of the fools at the end of the fourth act could "have spilled over into the interval" creating a "trespass across the act/interval boundary" (274). The same trespass could also be committed as Act 4 opens with the Dumb Show, bookending the entire act with performances from the madhouse subplot of the play and blending the connection between the audience and the madhouse much in the same way that the madhouse subplot can be connected to the primary plot. The dumb show spilling into the interval may allow for a moment of "recalibration," as Hutchings would propose, where the audience pauses the experience of watching the play to return to reality. On the other hand, the spillage of music might also cause the audience to interact with the madhouse subplot of the play. That is to propose, that if the music from the Dumb Show was started during the interval, "musical effects across the interval were surely symbolic in their subliminal suggestiveness" and could imply that the audience becomes part of the Dumb Show itself while moving freely to the music throughout the duration of the interlude (275). It is also important to note this specific interlude between acts three and four because, as Hutchings points out, this is the moment after De Flores insists on taking his "recompense" for killing Alonzo de Piraquo. Shockingly, the recompense he demands is Beatrice's virginity (III.iv.117-18). In other words after De Flores demands to be paid for his trouble with sex from Beatrice, "the rape of Beatrice takes place offstage in effect during the interval" (Hutchings 274). While Hutchings explains that "some modern productions show De Flores' rape of Beatrice onstage" knowing the implication of what is happening offstage also has the power to be unsettling. The audience is prompted by this discomfort to reflect on the preceding play while also attempting to recalibrate despite the fact that the writers make it challenging to do so by leaving the audience with such a disturbing scene (274). In one sense, the understanding that the boundaries of Beatrice's body are being violated through the act of rape has the potential to create discomfort in the audience. Another sense of discomfort from this reading of the interval comes from the audience's role as a bystander in Beatrice's rape. With an understanding of what is happening during the interval, the audience is limited to pretending like the rape isn't happening and, furthermore, does not have the ability to prevent or stop the actions. Conclusively, the interlude between the third and fourth act have the ability to cause discomfort by diminishing the boundaries between the stage and the audience. Through the interval, the audience becomes bystanders in the rape of Beatrice, and then add to the madhouse scene at the beginning of Act four. It is also possible for the audience to be forced to participate in both depending on the way in which the interval is directed. These boundaries continue to be crossed through the way in which De Flores exerts his agency by acting during the interval.

In considering the way in which the boundaries between the play and the audience are crossed, it is also important to note De Flores' role in the interlude between Act two and Act three. With plans to murder Alonzo, De Flores plans to show him "the full strength of the castle" through a tour through the "straits" and "tedious" passages (II.ii.155-160). Alonzo happily agrees to this proposal in the final lines of Act two. Before the third act begins, it is noted that "in the act-time De Flores hides a naked rapier" (III.i). Hutchings argues in "De Flores Between the Acts" that this stage direction has "deeper implications" about how the action may have affected audiences. The "freedom with which [De Flores] moves through castle/stage space" is reinforced through his ability to challenge the traditional conventions of how the interval is used (Hutchings 102). In the same way that he is able to utilize the "tedious passages" and knows inner workings of the castle, De Flores is able to break the rules of the interval. He moves about as the audience while they are under the impression that as a "structural punctuation" the interval marks a point when the play "hesitates" and offers a break from the performance. The experience of watching as De Flores imposes his will upon the play by moving the plot forward during and interval and thereby disregarding standard conventions of early English plays in general might have disturbed and confused the original audience.

In addition to analyzing the use of intervals, it is also important to look at the way in which asides are written throughout the play to further blur the lines between the audience and the stage. Norah Williams critically examines the use of asides in *The Changeling* in her 2016 article, "'Cannot I keep that secret?'" Through her article, she takes account for the different ways in which directors adapt asides from the same scene. Williams begins her article by explaining that critics often focus on the way in which asides have the ability to be psychologically insightful because it allows for characters to explicate their thoughts and, therefore, gives the audience a better idea of the way the mind of a character works. The use of asides also exhibits *The Changeling's* metatheatrical nature; they show an awareness that the play is a production of fiction with an audience that is receiving the play. By initiating a direct, although one-sided, conversations between the players and the audience, asides acknowledge a relationship between those on stage and those off stage. In the case of *The Changeling*, this relationship deepens throughout the course of the play as several revelations about the plot are revealed through the thoughts and secretes orated as asides to the audience. By examining the way in which N.W. Bawcutt edits the asides in his 1958 production of the play, Williams concludes that Bawcutt uses asides to "replace the function of subtext" by having the characters "speak aloud internal thoughts" which works to fulfill the psychologically relevant role for including asides. More importantly, through other examples Williams moves on to argue that the asides bring the audience "into confederacy" with the character who is speaking the aside. It is important to note here that because a majority of the asides are spoken by either Beatrice or De Flores, the idea of being in "confederacy" with these characters leads to trouble. In a very literal sense, because De Flores and Beatrice walk through their inner monologues with the audience, the boundary between the characters and the audience are crossed in a way where the audience witnesses, and possibly becomes accomplices to, the lies and crimes that happens on stage. Some productions that Williams cites cement this connection between the play and the audience. In Stanley Baker's 1974 adaptation of *The Changeling* for BBC's *Play of the Month* series, for instance, there are several moments in which the characters look directly into the camera as they speak their asides which implies the character's awareness of the audience. Especially chilling is Helen Mirren's performance in Act four,

scene two after Beatrice has successfully tricked Alsemero into believing that she is a virgin. At the end of this scene, Alsemero embraces Beatrice in celebration of his renewed faith in her chastity. As Beatrice, Helen Mirren accepts the embrace, but stares into the camera with a melancholy ("BBC Play"). On one level, Mirren's expression signifies that she has failed the test because her melancholy comes about because she has been raped by De Flores. More importantly, looking at the audience reinforces and understanding between Beatrice and the audience. Because the audience knows that Beatrice is not actually a maid, the look that she gives to the audience augments Alesemero's obliviousness and also implies that despite the fact that she was able to act her way out of this trial, she just barely managed to escape. Although the stage directions do not call for the cast to look directly at the audience, this example of an interpretation is meant to illustrate the potential ways in which the characters can cross boundaries through their asides and their actions. In order to make the audience feel a sense of discomfort, the actors have the ability to interact with the audience in a way that suggests intimacy and frames the audience to be accomplices in the crimes that happen on stage. The same scene in which Beatrice's virginity is tested continues to be important when thinking about the way in which gender is used to critique performance and to further understand the way in which boundaries between fiction of the play and reality are dissolved and the two then intertwine.

The way in which gender is performed in *The Changeling* augments the disturbing tension between reality and performance. In her seminal work *Gender Trouble* (1990), Judith Butler made an impact within the field of gender theory by looking at the ways in which gender is constructed and reproduced through societal regulations. Butler argues through her book that because gender has the power to be considered essential to a person's identity, it becomes necessary to question the established binary and structures that determine, mold and limit our understanding of gender. Ultimately, Butler points out that while sexual orientation may seem as though it is a matter of nature, the way that people identify their gender as well as the gender of others is a product of social construction. One of Butler's main points revolves around the idea that gender is a performance. In the third chapter of *Gender Trouble*, Butler writes that a performance of gender, like drag, "fully subverts the distinction between inner and outer psychic space and effectively mocks both the expressive model of gender and the notion of a true gender identity" (2549).

The critique that is a result of performing gender can be applied throughout *The Changeling* but is especially relevant when the main character Beatrice Joanna must perform her chastity for her husband, Alsemero, on their wedding night. After it is implied that Beatrice is coerced into having sex with De Flores in the interlude between Acts three and four, she worries that, her then fiancée, Alsemero will discover that she is not a virgin. By chance, she find Alsemero's "physician's closet…set with round vials" (IV.I.20-21). Among the vials she finds the two that will allow for her Alsemero to determine whether or not she is a "maid," or virgin. Beatrice learns to act out her purity for Alsemero in three steps that reflect the process of an actor learning a role. First, she mimics the process of reading her lines from the "manuscript" within the closet, which describe how a maid will act upon drinking the medicine (IV.I.46-53). Then, she tests Diaphanta's chastity and studies how the symptoms look by watching and taking note of Diaphanta's reactions (IV.I.100-120). Finally, when Alsemero asks to test her chastity (as she predicts) she is able to successfully perform

her purity by reenacting the reactions she studied. Alsemero is convinced by this performance and Beatrice is able to regain his trust.

While it was successful enough to make Alsemero feel at ease, Beatrice's performance is unsettling in a number of ways. Thinking about Judith Butler's theories of performing gender, this scene can be read in a way where "the structure of impersonation reveals [a] key fabricating mechanism through which the social construction of gender takes place" (2549). Beatrice's performance is a critique of ideals surrounding feminine purity. In one respect, the actions that determine a woman's status as a maid highlight the arbitrary nature of such a serious test. If a woman is truly a maid she will prove to be so by yawning, sneezing, and laughing. The irony of these reactions is that in other circumstances, a woman is presumably responsible for controlling such actions in order to be polite and accepted within society. Furthermore, people do not go through a bout of yawning uncontrollably. In other words, in order to prove that she is in control of her body, Beatrice is required to temporarily suspend control of her body in order for her husband to deem whether or not she pure enough for him. Despite the fact that Beatrice is able to fabricate the actions involved with the vial marked "M," the tenets that are the foundation for the test are worth noting because they "reveal" the arbitrary and harmful "constructions" of a patriarchal society. Through the actions that prove purity, the test reveals the arbitrary constructions and measures of purity. On the other hand, this scene also points out the way in which patriarchal control arbitrarily controls the female body and also requires Beatrice to give up her agency in order to prove that status of her body.

To further reinforce the crossing of boundaries, Laura Mulvey's theories from film criticism can help readers understand the complicated blurring of lines between the a performance and its audience. In an excerpt from her essay titled "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" Mulvey uses psychoanalytic theory to analyze the way in which "the unconscious of patriarchal society has structured film form" (2084). Of essence to Mulvey's argument is the way in which she examines voyeurism. Society, she contends, is scopophilic: it finds "pleasure in looking" (2086). Using Freud's basic argument that scopophilia is "one of the component instincts of sexuality" she explains that the experience of watching a film fulfills this instinct and desire because it "portrays a hermetically sealed world" and allows for the audience to satisfy "their voyeuristic fantasy" (2086). In this way, there is a "narcissistic aspect" that the cinema speaks to as the screen becomes a "mirror" and encourages the audience to have experiences "of recognition/misrecognition and identification" (2087). In other ways the experience of watching a film promotes voyeurism, or deviantly watching others (typically with sexual connotations) without being noticed. "Voyeurism," Mulvey writes, "has associations with sadism: pleasure lies in ascertaining guilt" (2091). With this in mind, it is relevant to consider the historical context of the play in order to consider the psychological effects that a performance of *The Changeling* might have had on its original audience. In the introduction to *The Changeling* in Alfred Kinney's anthology of Renaissance Drama, Kinney notes that the instances in which characters like Beatrice and De Flores subvert and challenge Spanish systems of power have the effect of "mirroring the unsettled attitudes toward Spain in 1623" (788). As Kinney writes, the play can be read as a reflection of English fears towards Spain, but the outcome of the plot (with Mulvey's text in mind) can also be read as a way to fulfill voyeuristic (and thereby sadistic) desires. As the play ends in dramatic ruin with the death of both Beatrice and De Flores (with Diaphanta

and Alonzo in tow) (V.iii.179), the play ends with tension. In one sense, one might feel pleasure from watching the bloody downfall of an evil pair of Spaniards. On the other hand, the effect of the performance being a mirror of the audience implies that there is a connection between what happens on stage and the audience's reality. This blending between the audience and performance through reflection has the potential to ultimately cause the audience to be uncomfortable in a number of ways.

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Made in Turkey: The Nostalgia of Time and The Search for Authenticity in Orhan Pamuk's *Museum of Innocence*

Eva Louise Grant

"Real museums are those places where Time is transformed into Space."

~ Kemal, Museum of Innocence

The search for the authentic self in Turkey has become largely international, as the country navigates a unique space between EU bids, refugee crises and the remnants of its own past. This globalization has been linked to changing conceptions of time and place. As Jenny White points out in *Guardians of the Regime: Youth and the Nation*, the "future-oriented modernist concept of time, (White, 416)" is being replaced by a dualistic "orientation in the present" and an orientation to the past through memory (White, 416).

In what I view as transition from the "time of the nation" to the "time of the self," we are allowed a glimpse into the polarizing views on and of some of Turkey's most well-known thinkers. The "time of the self" is more focused on individual opinions and viewpoints than on a sweeping, commoditized praise for public figures.

Pondering the relationship between representations of citizens by an author, and similarly, how those writers are represented by their citizenship, my mind immediately turned to Turkish Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk. Pamuk is as well known for his sustained engagement with identity and memory as for his the public controversy of whether said explorations were an insult to "Turkishness[1]." One of Pamuk's most recent novels is the *Museum of Innocence,* which deals extensively with the clash between East and West and the pathos we ascribe to objects because of memory. In 2012,

1 In a May 2009 Guardian article, Alison Flood describes how, after a 2005 interview with a Swiss magazine, Pamuk was charged and subsequently put on trial for "public denigration of Turkish identity" under Article 301 of the Turkish penal code. While the case was dropped, widespread contempt towards Pamuk in Turkey lingers.

four years after the publication of the novel, he inaugurated an eponymous museum, with every chapter from the novel having its own exhibit filled with relevant objects that document both the fictional protagonist Kemal's obsessive love for his young cousin, and the life-sequences of the rich urbane of the 1970s. In the foyer of the museum, the eleven-point "Modest Museum Manifesto," penned by Pamuk himself, presents the key tenets for a postmodern vision of the way in which a contemporary citizenship should view the past along the axes of time and place. The last, and possibly most pithy point of Pamuk's Museum Manifesto forms the basis of my argument: "the future of museums is inside our own homes[2]."

In this essay, referencing Pamuk's *The Museum of Innocence* and *A Modest Museum Manifesto,* buttressed by other historical, literary, and cultural sources, I will argue that it is not a merging or a repudiation of, but simply a recognition of identities, which leads to true authenticity: a "time of the self" that finds its legitimacy across the ages. Pamuk, through his narrative and meta-narrative of the Zeitgeist of the Turkish nation-state, presents a vision that recognizes that in the novelization of Turkish history, and in the subjectivity of memory, there can exist many versions of "Turkish" identity.

Operating outside of an intersubjective framework that seeks to establish a common truth,[3] Pamuk's ethnographic oeuvre, and its objects, offer an individualist view that suggests two concurrent planes of existence operating beyond the framework of the reimagined history[4]. One is the intertextual sphere, where the protagonist from the 1970s feels nostalgia for the 1930s early Republican Era. The other is the extratextual sphere, where the author, writing out of the 21st century, displays a literary style indicative of a globalized cherishing of the Ottoman past.

Intertextual: The 1970s meets the Early Republican Era

In the intertextual reading of *Museum of Innocence,* both setting (time) and place (presence of multiple "presents") are crucial to understand in terms of Pamuk's novelization of society. The setting – when the novel takes place and identity is articulated -- is the 1970s. But the presence from which citizens construct this identity is in the 1930s, the "Golden Age" of Turkish modernistic culture.

There are few countries in the Occident where nostalgia for the 1930s is as innate a national condition as it is in Turkey. The 1930s are generally remembered in the West for single-party systems, toxic nationalism, and the beginning of the Second World War. But for Turks, the hope and bliss of the era is concisely expressed by Atatürk's famous declaration for the 10th anniversary of the Turkish republic: "ne mutlu Türküm diyene!" or "happy is the person who says 'I am a Turk!'"

Operating within the framework of a crumbling Ottoman Empire[5], Republican interests

2 The entire manifesto (copyright Pamuk, 2012) is available here http://craftcouncil.org/magazine/article/modest-manifesto-museums.

3 Hyslop, A (2010). "Other Minds", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.) Accessed from plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/other-minds/

4 In Ethnic Literatures and Transnationalism: Critical Imaginaries for a Global Age, by Aparajita Nanda, page 52 (2014 edition), the author suggests this phrase came from French colonial writer Martinican Edouard Glissant, on the subjectivity of history within Western discourse.

5 With its religious expansiveness and cultural ambiguity tinged by arabesque influences of the Arab and Persian worlds

stressed the importance of a culturally, religiously, and linguistically homogenous collective consciousness. This demonstrated a view that "the individual becomes a genuine personality only as he becomes a genuine representative of his culture" (Akcam, 88, quoting Ziya Gökalp). Turkish "culture" was seen as being on the precipice of a grand redemption, reaching into the pre-Ottoman canon to build a "modern," fantasy identity to which all Turks were encouraged to subscribe on the grounds that this was the "natural" manner of catching up with modern Europe.

While in Paris, the protagonist of *Museum,* Kemal, thinks:

> I caught myself asking the questions that occur to every Turk who goes abroad (if he has some education and a bit of money): What did these Europeans think about me? What did they think about us all? (Pamuk, 2008)

Hasan Kayali's piece, "*Arabs and Young Turks: Turkish-Arab Relations in the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire*," addresses the Turkish awareness of the many ways their culture was still viewed as morally and culturally flawed by presiding European powers, and of the teleology present in their affirmation of an imagined pre-Ottoman aesthetic. He writes:

> Turks' retrospective designation of the period as the era of their national liberation affirms a teleology of national redemption with little regard to the constitutive role of unfolding political, social, military and international circumstances and contingencies. The transformation was more tortuous and pragmatic, and nation-ness more ambiguous, during this period than canonical accounts of Turkish history suggest (Kayali, 114).

As Deniz Kandiyoti and Ülker Gökberk point out, "recent scholars of Ottoman-Turkish history scrutinize such a linear teleological narrative that portrays the transformation of Turkish society as an evolution from 'rural' to 'urban,' from 'less developed' to 'more developed,' or from 'traditional' to 'modern'" (Kandiyoti, 21).

The fact of the matter is that the intense, expedited cultivation of a national memory of a past utopia characterized by state unity and secularism led to modern discontent around the new definition of identity foisted upon them by the European Union, the Kurdish issue, human rights violations, and the rise of political Islam, all of which were topical in the1970s (Turan, 216). To the staunchly nostalgic Republicans, the transition from single-party regime to democracy[6] paved the way for a country of factionalist, individualist interests (Özyürek, 44-69). Whereas before there had been one unifying goal for Turkey (a desire for progress, modernity, a cogent sense of national pride/identity), now there were countless visions for the future of the country, all underscored by divisions of class, religion, language, ethnicity, and gender. Essentially, citizens began putting private interests above the common good embodied by the state.

In his four-part essay series, *The Dialogic Imagination,* Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin contends that in history "society itself falls apart into class and intraclass groups; individual life-sequences are directly linked with these and together both individual life and subgroups are opposed

6 The first fair general elections of the 1950s saw the Democrat Party replacing Atatürk's Republican People's Party.

to the whole" (Bakhtin, 214). The Republican era of the 1930s saw individual narratives as being opposed to the progress of the state, and so a collective identity had to be formed comprising all of Turkey. This explains the push for cultural hegemony, for the pride in calling oneself happy for being a Turk.

As the decades rolled on and "modern Turkey" began interacting with a capitalist, globalized world, an interior aspect of public consciousness emerged. From the later Republican period into the democratized period, "the process of separating out and detaching individual life sequences from the whole reached its highest point when financial relations developed under capitalism". Here, "the individual sequence took on its specific private character and what was held in common became maximally abstract" (Bakhtin, 214).

This is the world of which (not *in which*) Pamuk writes, a world in which, with the commoditization of the state and of Atatürk,[7] the motifs used to build a nation (fraternity, secularism, cultural unity, and a loyalty to leaders) degenerated, lost their pathos and became a "petty private matter." "[The motifs] seem to exhaust all their significance within the boundaries of individual life" (Bakhtin, 214), leading to characters expressing ennui and discontent with the present state of their country.

But memories are not like fiction; they *are* fiction. An actual resurgence of a 1930s-style militaristic patriarchy would have been diametrically opposed to the contemporary ideals of the Euro-modernist canon, which promoted free will, state-citizen separation and spontaneity (Saint-Amour, 292). For those living in Turkey in the post-modern void, the idea of "modernity" was firmly grounded in the age that came before. If nostalgia is the sole tenet of the post-modern age, then, as Esra Özyürek, points out, the twentieth century began with a futuristic utopia and ended with nostalgia for the past (Özyürek, 284). If this is true, then perhaps the act of envisioning the future has become an artifact, and we now revert to visions, revisions, and divisions of the past.

In Pamuk's *Museum of Innocence,* Chapter 54, entitled "Time," the author invokes Aristotle's distinction between "Time and the single moments he describes as the 'present,'" (Pamuk, 395) acknowledging that single moments, while indivisible, are linked by the concept of Time itself. Pamuk writes: "clocks and calendars do not exist to remind us of the Time we've forgotten but to regulate our relations with others and indeed all of society, and this is how we use them" (Pamuk, 2008). However, he then challenges the reader to stop viewing Time in this collectivist manner, "treasuring time instead for its deepest moments," rather than as the link that connects all lives to each other. What for the nostalgic Republican meant selfishness might actually mean independence. Pamuk chronicles his protagonist's dissatisfaction with an era where time is only a way in which citizens regulate their interactions with society, an era in which present humanity is crushed in an attempt to recreate an unattainable collective past. What should be focused on instead are the individual, human moments, to which only one who has experienced them can lay claim.

Pamuk echoes this in the first point of *A Modest Museum Manifesto*:

Large national museums such as the Louvre and the Hermitage took shape…alongside the

7 This notion can be credited to an in-class reading of Esra Özyürek's essay, "Miniaturizing Atatürk."

opening of royal and imperial palaces to the public. These institutions, now national symbols, present the story of the nation – history, in a word – as being far more important than the stories of individuals. This is unfortunate, because the stories of individuals are much better suited to displaying the depths of our humanity (Pamuk, 2012).

The stories of individuals is an important theme in *Museum of Innocence*. Since the 1970s, a national indicator of widespread interest in the past has been the establishment of *privately funded* museums. These museums, like *The Museum of Innocence* and the Gökalp House[8], provide an ethnographic window into the past, which is more widely accessible for a diverse audience.

In her article, "Stories in Three Dimensions: Narratives of the Nation and the Anatolian

Civilizations Museum," which studies the meaningful effect of history on ordinary people, Asli Gür argues that social cleavages and class differences affected a patron's identification with the ethnographic objects *displayed by the Turkish State.* From the "Turkish state, archaeologists, villagers, New Age groups, artists, and producers of artifacts for tourism" (Özyürek, 44-69), Ayfer Bartu Candan suggests that it is the unequal power relations among these diverse groups that influence the "persuasiveness of different narratives" (Candan, 2008).

A privately-funded museum like *The Museum of Innocence* tries to level the playing field by tackling the discontinuity "symptomatic of the Turkish experience" (Seyhan, 137), focusing not on the linear chronology of history, which only appeals to a certain sect, but on the diversity of Turkey's citizenship. Allowing that citizenship to interact with emblems of nationhood in a pluralistic manner promotes an intimacy of the past free from the confusion resulting from a "narrowly conceived project of modernity" (Seyhan, 137) and a banning of the Ottoman past. In light of what Bakhtin called a "degeneration" of symbols, Kemal attempts to reintroduce pathos to objects in the collective sphere via private, intimate memories.

Pamuk chooses to situate a literary reimagining of the Ottoman past in cosmopolitan Istanbul -- the same Istanbul early Republicans saw as corrupting "Turkish essence" (BBC News. 2005). Through this work, set alongside a museum that exhibits the private lives of citizens and interacts with the state in a privatized and commoditized fashion, Pamuk articulates a humanistic intimacy, rather than a propagandized national intimacy. In *Museum of Innocence,* intimacy is shown through the near-obsessive collection of memorabilia the protagonist amasses to remind himself of his lost love. This cleverly mirrors the way secular neo-Kemalism, itself born out of a "lost love" for days past, found its way into the home, becoming ingrained in all facets of public and private life within various life-sequences.

The past serves as the defining aspect of identity, and the present the way in which identity is articulated. As notions of the present (and thus performative identities) are deconstructed, transformed, and even disappear, it is important to stress that the "authentic self" lies not in imagined "citizens of the nation-state" but in true people's creative imagination, in the duality of the histories that formed them. Its posterity is preserved by its mutability and enduring humanity, rather than its

8 Gökalp's childhood home in Diyarbakır was turned into a museum, displaying a panoply of regional ethno graphic artifacts as well as Gökalp's personal belongings.

status as historical memorabilia or pop-cultural ephemera.

Extratextual: The 21st Century meets the Ottoman Archive

In the extratextual sphere, Pamuk, writing from the 21st century, through meta-narrative declares the collapse of the idea of the infinite momentum of national progress. By means of multiple points of view, ironic depictions of Republican history, pastiche, and "injection of doubt" into realism (Seyhan, 184-196), he criticizes the authoritarian turn nationalism has taken in his country, while subverting the binaries that seem to construct Turkish national identity.

Pamuk comments extensively on Turkey's Ottoman *and* Republican past, using the former to provide commentary on the latter. Take, for example, the fad of Turkish melodramas of the 1970s, which to Pamuk quite accurately reflected the unique brand of existential and realist Turkish literature coming out of an Ottoman tradition[9]. These "Yeşilçam movies[10]" used to fill theaters to the last seat, and patrons often left the establishment in tears. But then, after the military coup of 1980, and the subsequent socioeconomic transformation of the 80s and 90s, fueled by globalism, a new generation grew up mocking those arabesque films. Such disdain ignores the collective subconscious of the post-Ottoman Turkish generation, forced to give up the cultural modes of their ancestors. *The Museum of Innocence,* written in the mid 2000s, comments on such a development, on the "innocence" of that age which was lost by society. This facet of society, which echoes Pamuk's characterization of 1970s Turkey, at once presents stereotypes of the collective sincerity of the Republican Era and of the arabesque reimagining of the Ottoman cultural tradition.

Of course, this sentimental sincerity is tempered; irony abounds in such representation of the self in *Museum of Innocence.* In what can be construed as a stylistic critique of both the legacy of secular modernity and the rising tide of Islamism, the author-figure, "the voice and expression of post-Kemalism" (Göknar, 239), becomes a cataloguist for symbols of a reimagined Ottoman (and Islamic) past.

In this true post-modernist fashion, Pamuk challenges currents of empirical history by setting out a paradox and then developing dialogue. In both novel and museum, as stated by writer Presca Ahn in *Review: Orhan Pamuk and the Innocence of Objects,* "Pamuk's admitted yearning for the Turkey of his childhood fuels his portrayal of Kemal's monumental obsession with the past[11]." Pamuk, as a character in the novel, is much younger than his friend, the protagonist Kemal, who is in his seventies, in the present, when he asks Pamuk to help him curate the Museum. This positions them not as contemporaries but as commentators on one another's eras. Thus, Pamuk's observations are colored by nostalgia. Kemal complains to Pamuk that Pamuk only takes such an interest in the museum because they remind him of the beloved Istanbul of his childhood.

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9 Acknowledgements are owed to Umutcan Gölbaşı, Stanford Class of 2019, and self-proclaimed "Bad Movie Guru."

10 A term he did not use, but which I found later in "Humour in Middle Eastern Cinema," by Gayatri Devi, chapter 12

11 http://theamericanreader.com/review-orhan-pamuks-the-innocence-of-objects/

Pamuk's self-awareness thus humanizes him by recognizing that, since identity is constructed out of a fictional past, its very existence is liminal, subject to revisions, divisions, and transformations. What makes Pamuk's argument unique is that he does not impose a new identity within the void he creates; to Pamuk, Turkey's "unifying current" of identity should be its lack of one. The diversity and paradox of this nation-state undermine truth, yes, but they also underscore the individual.

The implicit assertion that "Western modernity" is only one facet in time and place is important in the context of Turkish self-hood. Whereas the Republican era advocated a displacement of linear chronology in favor of a sort of expedited history indicative of a country "racing to catch up with" the modern world (Göknar, 127), Pamuk allows for an authentic self which sees culture as "a synthesis of national culture and international civilization" (Davison, 90).

Much of Pamuk's self-hood derives from his hyper-awareness of his position as an author in Turkish society. In the second point of his *Manifesto*, he references the shift from epics to novels in Turkish society:

> We can see that the transitions from palaces to national museums and from epics to novels are parallel processes. Epics are like palaces and speak of the heroic exploits of the old kings who lived in them. National museums, then, should be like novels; but they are not (Pamuk, 2012).

In a TED talk on the intersection of fiction and identity politics[12], Turkish novelist and academic Elif Šafak corroborates the idea of the epic-to-novel transition as being important to the power of the state, presenting the historically-based idea that culture became the foundation upon which the modern nation-state of Turkey was built, and that literature was a cornerstone of that shift in Turkish society[13]. Šafak declares that in an attempt by the Republic's new elite both to distance themselves from the state's Ottoman past and to bolster support for the "progress" engendered by such a regime change, it was imperative to depict that a fundamental shift had taken place from "east" to "west" through novelization. This shift, while concerned with the common life of the Turkish people, does not, as Pamuk points out, accurately reflect the way life changed for them.

This unambiguous and expedited version of history has been generally forsaken in favor of focusing on the "messiness and complexity of social transformation" (Gökberk, 3) that has characterized Turkey from 1920 to present. Pamuk recognizes this, and incorporates it into his literary sphere. His nostalgia for the single-party state epoch is what Özyürek has called "a new kind of relationship citizens have established with the founding principles of the Turkish Republic." (Özyürek 179). Pamuk as an author – a career that prizes the sort of aesthetic-affective communication often relegated to the fringes of the public sphere in favor of dispassionate political discourse – mediates between disparate realities by firmly grounding his work in a present space "governed by ambivalence and fluctuations of meaning" (Gurses, 36).

In the novel, which embraces a post-modern state of ambivalence, it is the pathos of "things"

12 Elif Safak: The Politics of Fiction | TED Talk | TED.com
13 http://www.ted.com/talks/elif_shafak_the_politics_of_fiction?language=en

which offer a window into Turkish self-hood. Nationalist marching songs of industrial progress and devotion to the leader are remixed in popular discos, competing with the calls to prayer from the mosque next door. Glamorous advertisements for Efes Beer display modern, happy families in a lavish European setting, while outside the bay windows the ultra-nationalists struggle with the Islamists, the urban bourgeois struggle with the rural peasants, and the leftists struggle against the military. For Pamuk, this paradoxical identity is key to his narrative, as he seeks not to reimagine the national, but to display fully the cultural diversity and confusion that made up, in one form or another, every human in Turkey at the time. A signal quote from *The Museum of Innocence* concerns itself greatly with the pathos of objects. The protagonist deems the power of things to lie in "the memories they gather up inside them, and also in the vicissitudes of our imagination, and our memory" (Pamuk 2008).

Pamuk, whose body of work arguably draws the most influence from Ahmet Tanpınar[14], displays a metaphysical understanding of the binaries of East/West, Old/New, Modern/

Traditional, Public/Private and Legitimate/Contrived, without prioritizing "the authentic self." As regards a national text or ethos, the search for a "pure" Turkish identity removed from the machinations of the Ottoman Empire is inherently fallacious, and, as Venkat Mani points out, constitutes a "manifest omission of the… cultural diversity" of the Empire (Gurses, 143). Moving from Republic-era modernity and its ideological constraints, Pamuk's oeuvre closely observes the Kemalist program's repudiation of the Ottoman past, associated with religious obscurantism, vacuous cosmopolitanism, and a "corruption" of the "Turkish essence" (Sener, 357-58). As Akturk Sener points out, "[The Kemalist vanguard] turned to pre-Islamic Central Asia and Anatolian History" to find, or rather create, its roots (Sener 357).

Through his character's individualistic obsession with the careful collection of objects (produced by the state as an even more careful attempt to construct a perfect national identity), Pamuk parodies the selectiveness of memory and meaning-making of the Turkish state. He posits that large national museums, "with their wide doors," play into this monopoly on truth by narrowing the view of Turkish society and self-concept, as leaders are prioritized over humanity. Pamuk articulates in his *Manifesto* that "we don't need more museums that try to construct the historical narratives of a society, community, team, nation, state, tribe, company, or species. We all know that the ordinary, everyday stories of individuals are richer, more humane, and much more joyful" (Pamuk, 2012). This focus on the humane is a repudiation on the part of Pamuk of the homogenous definition of Turkish identity constructed by the state, and which is indicative of a fantasy of 'presence' as symbolized by Western modernity. Pamuk's goal in *Museum of Innocence* -- especially in choosing a setting almost "out of time," in that it is so focused on a past built out of a fictional past and a pre-conceived future – is to deconstruct the ideal image of Turkish identity that can be distilled into three words: singular, homogenous, and sharply-delineated.

This blanket identity, fueled by the state's attempt at modernization through discontinuity with its own legacy, could not possibly have appealed to every Turkish citizen. The dislocation, born

14 "Orhan Pamuk Puts Tanpinar's Tale Of Two Continents Back On The Map | Maya Jaggi | The Guardian Books Blog | December 1, 2009

of the attempt to construct a single national identity upon the grounds of a panoply of ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural variables, can still be felt in the way today's diverse Turks interact with yesterday's stories, particularly those of the Ottoman past. This can, in the context of Pamuk, most clearly be seen in the way his readership has reacted to his body of work. Accusations of "Orientalist," "Western sympathizer" and "fake Turk," fly freely[15] when Turkish audiences interact with Pamuk. What Pamuk may not be getting across is his dedication to resurrecting the dichotomies of East and West, parodying them with an Ottoman flair, only to knock them down in a display suggestive of the grey space in which modern Turkey finds itself, unable to turn to opposing stereotypes to construct a vision of self-hood.

Pamuk creates multiple "presents," erecting an expansive duality in *Museum.* This duality combines a protagonist living in the 1970s - an era characterized as suffering from an intense nostalgia for the early Republican period - with a strong authorial presence writing from the 21st century, but with Ottomanist literary predilections. Pamuk's literary reconstruction and critique borrow heavily from this "Ottoman archive," and are made up of odds and ends, including "mystic romance, Qur'anic-style parables, philosophy of Islamic text and image… and allegories of the modern Middle Eastern nation-state" (Göknar, 134). Taking into account setting and style (the time in which it is set and the cultural place in which it is oriented) Pamuk presents, through himself and his protagonist, a vision of the self that "vacillates between the profane first-person every day and the sacred omniscience of the divine" (Göknar, 134).

To conclude, Pamuk is able, through carefully-crafted inter and extratextual spheres which explore the grey area between historical settings, to demonstrate the importance of personal narratives in constructing a national identity that is humanistic, rather than idealistic. Pamuk achieves this through the posthumous elegance of the personal and the mundane, and by using meta-narrative to borrow from the Ottoman past, which had been superseded by the Kemalist state. Pamuk's oeuvre does flirt with Orientialism in terms of invention of tradition and history, simultaneously characterizing aspects of Turkish culture as being distinguished from Western nations and inventing tradition via ideological concepts that arose in 19th century European consciousness. He also plays with the form of the "authentic self" by offering a pastiche of the reimagined history. His saving grace is his unique post-modern construction, which suggests many modernities, rather than one nationalist, homogenous sequence. Grounding his reflection in the theorized modernity of the Tanzimat era, Pamuk ascribes to Turkish selfhood the quintessential subversive facets of post-modernity in order to expose the grey spaces of the mapping of identity. Rather than searching for a unifying identity, he is perhaps suggesting that the nation-state's one "unifying current" is its lack of one.

While their differing viewpoints are never reconciled, both the protagonist and the author-figure of Pamuk, stalwart patriots in the most elemental sense, chronicle, detail, deconstruct, reimagine and reconfigure their national history and place in the world. Just as an authentic self-concept requires representation by every facet of Turkish identity, together these characters are able to create dialogue that delivers a complex deconstruction of the dichotomies which Turks have

15 The New Orientalists: Postmodern Representations of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard, by Ian Almond, 2007 edition, I.B. Tauris

tried for decades to harmonize: those of East and West; Modern and Traditional; Secular and Islamic; Turkish and Other; Individual and Collective (Gurses, 39). Pamuk's Derrida-like philosophy of history, in dialogue with, rather than in diametrical opposition to, a globalized definition of modernity and Turkish collective self-hood[16], conceives of a world not in terms of oppositions proliferating inexorably, but of a humanity which finds reconciliation and self-hood because of, rather than in spite of, the paradox.

To Pamuk, the novel acts as preserved culture, but it is not an artifact; it is a dynamic, synthesizing, *lived experience.* It is informed, much like critical augmentation in the Habermasian public sphere, by discourse, questioning, and change. In the world of multiple modernities, Pamuk's focus rests in the humanization of a nation, and with it an acknowledgment of both the Ottoman and Kemalist influences that constitute its reality.

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16 See the Gökalp quote: "and if international civilization, that is modernity was irreducibly Christian/ Western, then Muslim Turkey, no matter how secularized, categorically could not participate," from Mediterranean Frontiers: Borders, Conflict and Memory in a Transnational World By Dimitar Bechev and Kalypso Nicolaidis (page 68)

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Roses and Thorns: The Poetics of Connection and Conscious Raising in Valerie Martínez's *Each and Her*

Anthony A. Jaime

"Poesis…[is] the creation of disclosure, the difficult bringing of things to birth through seemings, through words or images or whatever. If there is a mystery to things, it is not the mystery of the hidden, it is the mystery of the absolutely obvious, what is under one's nose. The labor of the poet or artist is the difficult elaboration of the openedness within which we stand"

– Simon Critchley

Critchley's definition establishes poetry as a medium that brings to the foreground the material reality of the present, that which is "absolutely obvious," but otherwise, "hidden" from sight. As such, Critchley's definition extends to documentary poetry, a hybridized medium that draws from the "documentary" form of the 1930s, and modernist poetry, two concepts similarly invested in the interpretation of facts via images. The poet approaches the subject matter through an emphasis on language; on words drawn from a variety of historical, cultural, and literary documents that are pieced together and imbued with sight and feeling on the page. In doing so, the poet appeals to his readers emotions, revealing the otherwise hidden connections with the subject.

Since 1993, the border town of Juárez, Mexico, has become infamous for the much-publicized and unsolved murders of poor, working-class women and girls. Kathleen Staudt contends that the murders are a direct result of the broader, global neoliberal economy, an industry marked by free-trade and an unregulated market that foster economic growth at the expense of the exploited and disenfranchised working class (2, 29-31). Brad Evans and Henry A. Giroux concur, adding "[t]he regime of neoliberalism is . . . organized for the production of violence" (17). In *Each and Her*, Valerie Martínez pieces fragments of historical and social documents and poetry in order to emphasize the materiality and interconnectivity of the social, political, and economic devastation that neoliberalism manifests through femicide. Martínez's symbolic extension of the gendered rose artic-

ulates the "hidden" history and complexities of the border economy and its debilitating and deadly effects on women. Her treatment of the rose image counters the graphic spectacle of femicide, of the finality and irreplaceable loss of life, with a promise of renewal and rebirth. In creating a space where "*something kindred / umbilical / numinous*" (16) forms between the "[reader] and each and her," Martínez's work lays the foundation for readers emotional connection with the victims, bringing them to a social consciousness that can potentially bloom toward action and change.

I

"Gray Matter": The Normalization of Gender Violence and the Spectacle of *Maquila* Femicide

Martínez opens *Each and Her* with her speaker's indictment of the media as an outlet that renders the *maquiladora* murders as spectacle, manipulating the viewer or reader's response to the acts, while simultaneously disabling the space for the victim's memorial. The speaker of the poem notes the "highlighting / clipping / filing" of "the newspaper / gray matter" (8). The first three lines refer to the words printed on the newspaper, and how they are "[clipped]" or "[filed]" in an organized sequence in order to convey specific images to the reader. This is similar to Martínez's own role as a poet crafting a work composed of archival documents that together with poetry bring awareness to the Juárez femicides. In contrast, the media predominantly publicize how the victims are "raped/ strangled/ beaten/ shot/ burned/ right breasts severed/ left nipples bitten off" (9)—images that convey the viciousness and brutality of their deaths, disregarding their personal history. The reference to "gray matter" denotes both the newspaper form and a neurological component in the central nervous system found specifically in regions of the brain that control one's emotions. In combining color-coded references to the newspaper as a media form and gray matter, Martínez underscores the media's ability to inform the public's emotional response to a particular event or individuals through its presentation of facts and images.

The media's emphasis on the gruesome details of the murders rather than the victim's lives creates spectacles of them. Indicative of this is the way the media reports the victims as *maquiladoras*, a term that Elvia R. Arriola contends "is a misnomer; not all victims have been workers for the vast number of American companies lining the two-thousand mile border that secures the interdependent economic bond between United States and Mexico" (26). The term, *maquiladora*, denotes the archetypal victim, one rendered spectacle and commodified through her economical exploitation. The accounts propagated by the media become less about the women themselves and more about their graphic and gruesome deaths, an aspect that translate as profitable headlines for consumption. This consumption informs what Staudt notes is an embedded acceptance of normalized violence against women (17). Pervasive exposure to such graphic violence against women normalizes the behavior and desensitizes the viewer and reader, disabling any potential for connectivity in the process.

The normalization of this violence through the media unconsciously creates a space where misogyny continues to pervade and enforce its control through the written text. Martínez highlights this notion explicitly through her sourcing of Teresa Rodriguez's newspaper citation of an anonymous man relating how "'Sometimes, when you cross a shipment of drugs to the United States, adrenaline is so high that you want to celebrate by killing women!'" (49). The explicit nature of the statement hinges on the reader's unsettled response to it, particularly when taken into account that

the source is an "unidentified man" (Martínez 49). His anonymity not only affords him the privilege of protection, which is not extended to *maquiladora* workers struggling to survive in Juárez, but it also absolves him from answering to the repercussions of gender violence that his statement suggests. The brutality behind his printed words has real-world implications, as indicated by the growing number of unsolved murders and missing person's cases of young women and girls. This harrowing reality, coupled with the anonymous man's appalling words, merge to normalize and substantiate an environment of violence that specifically targets vulnerable women.

II

Fashioning Femicide: Rodarte and Martínez's Diverging Depictions of Commodified *Maquiladoras* through Roses

Roses are one of the dominant images that resonate throughout Martínez's *Each and Her*, implemented as extended symbols of women as commodified objects under capitalism. In poem 20, the speaker cites a brief historical record of roses, highlighting the gradual course by which their popularity spreads throughout different parts of the world. Roses become commercially harvested for their use as "confetti, tincture, and perfume" (20) and also as commodified objects to be possessed and fashioned as decorations in lavish gardens. The speaker specifically notes that "repeat bloomers" (20) become important hybrids as they represent a continuous surplus of product that can be harvested and turned into profit yearlong. Similarly, the *maquiladora* workforce is marked as an overflowing supply of labor that is "produced" yearlong, with workers migrating to Juárez from poorer regions of Mexico in hopes of working in the industrious city and making a better life for themselves. These workers are exploited under a capitalist system that disenfranchises them, creating a turbulent and deadly environment that ultimately renders them as both expendable and disposable.

The speaker extends the parallel between the commodified roses and the *maquila* workers in poem 44, through a listing of the victim's names. Martínez employs the listing of the victim's names in her work as a way to both memorialize them and to create a space that forces the reader to directly engage with the dead, with the human cost of femicide, with the intent potentially to spark a moment of connection through the page. Michael Dowdy notes that Martínez's intertextual listing "pressures readers to pronounce each name carefully in an act of patience and humility rather than to skim for the gist of things" (226). This particular list, however, specifically features victims named after flowers. "Rosa" is the dominant flower featured, but the list is also comprised of "Airis," "Dalia," "Violeta," "Lilia," "Veronica," and "Deisy": flowers that are predominantly "repeat bloomers" (20) and thus harvested for commercial use. The victim's alignment with these types of flowers signals their shared status as commodities of capitalism.

The speaker also depicts commercialized roses as products of "the bridal district" (24), produced by exploited *maquila* labor. The speaker notes "*the bodice is corset-like, exquisite / intricately adorned with tiny roses / stitched by little hands* (25). The artificial representation of roses fashioned on the wedding gown's bodice by the exploited worker broadens Martínez's overarching linkage between roses and the *maquiladoras* as consumable products. Martínez augments the complicit role of the consumer in the transactions that propagate the conditions of abuse experienced by disenfranchised *maquilas* under capitalism. Arriola concurs, adding "[t]here is irony in knowing that

females continue to dominate as ideal workers in export-processing zones while females are also the consumers most often targeted by ad campaigns to buy the goods coming from these exploitative zones" (31). As commodities, the labor of the *maquila* worker, along with the economic and political circumstances that foreground their exploitation, is effectively erased in the final transaction with the consumer. The abusive economic system under which *maquiladora* workers struggle to survive relies on this erasure and the crucial role of the consumer that fuels the system in the first place. In highlighting the image of commercialized roses through the context of fashion, Martínez aims to establish the reader's sense of social consciousness while also putting into context their own complicit role as consumers, thus bridging the gap between them and the *maquiladoras*.

Fashion and roses converge more directly in Rodarte's Fall 2010 collection[1] as it epitomizes a modernized commodification of the *maquiladoras* and femicide through spectacle. Encompassing thirty-six individual looks, the collection is split into three distinct acts. Act I focuses primarily on a romanticized representation of the *maquiladoras* back breaking labor, with the models dressed in layers of mismatched and distressed patterns and textures of clothing, conveying the look of one having dressed herself with scraps of fabric from their factory jobs. Act II, aestheticizes the explicit sexual violence and femicide of the *maquiladoras* through a fashioning of the models in a range of dark and light colored rose patterns. Act III concludes with the models dressed in flowing white gowns of lace, organza, and pearls, evoking an image of the victim's earth-bound spirits.

Like Martínez, Rodarte utilizes the rose theme in its collection as signifiers of femininity. Still, while Martínez endeavors to bring awareness to the objectification and commodification of the *maquiladora* workers through the intertextual overlaying of roses, Rodarte employs them specifically to exploit and aestheticize the real threat of sexual violence and femicide that looms over the *maquila* zones in Juárez. Rodarte's intent is not to bring awareness to femicide, to highlight the broader capitalist system that exploits vulnerable women in the workforce. The fashion industry is hardly the platform that can adequately make such a bold statement about capitalist exploitation of its workforce, given that it directly benefits off of this system in the first lace. Rather, Rodarte exploits the horror of femicide to make a provocative fashion statement in order to garner media attention and publicity, thus ensuring that their clothes will stand out against their competitors and potentially be featured in high fashion editorials. The more exposure the fashion house receives for its collection, the more clothes they sell through the final transaction with the consumer, one that erases of the capitalist exploitation of *maquila* workers and the tragedy behind femicide.

The rose theme dominates Act II of the collection through its utilization of a Castilian rose pattern, tinted in a garnet color, creating the effect of blood soaked fabric[2]. The paler flower pattern achieves a sharp contrast to the darker rose pattern, further accentuating the blood-red accents of the roses. The collection hinges on the optical illusion that it deploys through its mix and overlay of different rose patterns that alters the viewer's perception of individual looks. From afar, the models look as if their skin has been stripped apart, exposing the body's underlying muscle tissue, a morbid image drawn directly from police reports and accounts that attest to the discovery of some femicide victims in a similar state of desecration.

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1 See https://youtu.be/XNY5D6nh5Ow for Rodarte's complete runway collection.

2 See Madeira Marcio's runway photographs of Rodarte's Look 10 and 14, on http://www.vogue.com/fashion-shows/fall-2010-ready-to-wear/rodarte#collection for visual context in the analysis that follows.

Furthermore, the collection's morbid cohesiveness also stems from the way different flower patterns and fabrics are draped on the silhouette of the female body, fragmenting and erasing its contours, while simultaneously signaling certain parts of undefined spaces. These spaces point to regions of women's bodies that denote gender and femininity: above the torso, marking the region of the breasts, and below the waist, signaling the genitalia. The latter draws from the cultural and artistic symbols and representations of flowers as female genitalia. This visual notion, when interpreted through the coupling of the underlying *maquiladora* discourse and fashion, evokes an image that harkens back to the gruesome, sexual nature of the victim's deaths, an image that also implicates Rodarte's disturbing and insensitive exploitation of the femicide victim's final ordeal and suffering.

Martínez and Rodarte's implementation of the rose theme is striking, particularly considering that both the collection and book of poems were released in 2010. Both poetry and fashion rely on image to convey and execute a specific vision. Martínez's poetic form is invested in feeling, in emotions drawn from bringing the speaker to a heightened awareness and consciousness of the commodification of *maquila* workers, of the conditions by which Juárez becomes an environment marked by violence and death. In this sense, Martínez's poetry directly engages with the reader. Rodarte's collection, by contrast, is devoid of the historical context and understanding of the *maquiladoras* commodification, a notion made painfully obvious by the line's appropriation of their labor and death through a medium and global industry that profits off of the exploited labor of *maquila* garment workers to begin with. The collection intensifies and extends the commodification of the *maquiladoras*, moving from the site of production to the sites of consumption, creating a space devoid of the potential to bring real awareness.

III

Studded Vines: The Specter of Colonial Violence through Commodified Roses

Martínez's utilization of rose imagery link the facet of the *maquiladora's* commodification under neoliberalism with the history of colonial violence. Poem 56 utilizes the journal form—a literary medium traditionally gendered as feminine—through the speaker's diary fragments where she depicts a "dream" of:

> [R]ose vines shouldered by women in a ship's hold. Like those quinqereme drawings—Romans in rows, heaving their giant oars. Vines studded with dollar bills and Mexican coins. Pricks on their necks like stigmata. Through the apertures, not ocean but desert, a riverbed utterly dry. (56)

The speaker's dream presents a surrealistic depiction of women as commodified roses through their portrayal as slaves entangled by piercing "rose vines" for chains. The locality of their claustrophobic setting within the dark "hold," or belly, of the Hellenistic-era warship—the "quinqereme[3]"—marks them as conquered spoils whose slave labor is exploited to maintain the crucial operations of the conqueror's ship.

Writing in the context of Greek naval warfare, Stefan G. Chrissanthos notes that the quinquereme was one of the largest and striking war vessels during the fourth century B.C.E. (45). Given

3 The word is misspelled in Martínez's publication. Unless directly quoting from her text, subsequent references in my analysis will use the correct spelling, "quinquereme."

its sheer size in length and width, the quinquereme is an emblematic symbol of colonial enterprise; a gendered vessel marked by a history of conquest and pillaging since antiquity. Visually, the quinquereme resembles a phallus, an imposing image that articulates the incentives of the Roman conquerors to assert their patriarchal dominion over foreign lands. As a formidable example of war weaponry, the quinquereme was designed to pierce smoothly through ocean currents (Chrissanthos 45), culminating into its climactic penetration of the land. The hull of the ship, as the head of the phallus, was equipped with an extended shaft designed to effectively thrust and penetrate into the land itself, securing the ship in place and allowing it to expel its retinue of armed militia, the representative seeds of power.

Anne McClintock contends that early imperialism's gendering of foreign or unchartered land as feminine posits the appropriated role of women "as mediating and threshold figures by means of which men oriented themselves in space, as agents of power and agents of knowledge" (24). For McClintock, the imperialist is marked by a deeply seeded apprehension and anxiety over these "virgin" spaces of land that are otherwise devoid of the normative social and gender discourses of power (24). As such, these empty "spaces" articulate the threat of patriarchal displacement and loss of power and identity for the colonizer, a notion that they must rectify through a vicious display of imperial violence articulated both metaphorically and literally through a violation, or raping, of the land and its indigenous inhabitants, thus enacting their colonization in the process.

Similarly, the femicide in Juárez speaks to the need for patriarchy to reassert, through violence, its power and dominance in spaces that present a threat to these aspects of its social and cultural identity. Staudt notes a correlation between the "border economic context" and the "changing gender power relations" (10) in the region. The implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990's created an open and unregulated free market between the U.S. and Mexico, and it allowed U.S. companies to "produce goods south of the border [and] to take advantage of reduced taxes and abundant cheap labor" (Luévano 25). The speaker refers to this mutually beneficial relationship between the U.S. and Mexico through the description of the vines that constrain the anonymous women in the hold as "studded with [American] bills and Mexican coins," signifiers of economic value established through an exchange of goods and services.

The commodified workforce that emerged under NAFTA was overwhelmingly made up of young, lower-income women who were willing to work for lower wages than men. In a country like Mexico, whose social and cultural foundation is marked by normative patriarchal values and power relations within the family dynamic, women's move from the realm of domesticity to the once male inhabited workforce enacts a symbolic form of social castration for men. The presence of women in a space traditionally defined and inhabited by men disempowers them, stripping them of the socially sanctioned identity of the provider, hence "giving rise to [violent] male backlash" (Staudt 10). As such, the violent nature of the *maquiladora* murders through the violation and destruction of their bodies mirrors the imperialist perception and feminization of foreign lands as threatening sites where patriarchal notions of meaning and identity collapse. Like colonialists "raping" and destroying the land, cultivating a sense of identity and meaning through the act, the male perpetrators of the *maquiladora* murders employ sexual violence against women, against the terrain of their bodies, in order to validate once more their power and dominance over them.

Notably, some of the victims have been found with mutilated or missing genitals altogether, a gruesome act that gestures an equivalent to men's symbolic social castration. The act can be interpreted as a sadistic form of punishment for these women who challenge the normative discourses and ideologies of gender and power by entering the workforce and displacing the traditional role of men. Jane Caputi adds that the femicide in Juárez "ritually reflect and serve a much larger purpose: the theft of female energy and the consolidation of patriarchy power, achieved via the ongoing and systemic rape, mutilation, contamination, and murder of women" (288). The murders articulate a crude methodology by which these disempowered men combat the trauma of displacement under an economic system that disenfranchises and disempowers them just as much as women. In appropriating the violence and nature historically attributed to imperialism, the perpetrators replicate a cycle of trauma whose effects are felt by the broader society and is permanently marked by it.

The speaker concludes her journal entry with the reference to the "aperture," the circular opening from which the quinquereme's oars extend out of the ship. What the women see from inside of their confinement is an extension of suspended reality: a desert setting where a body of water should be. What they see is a graveyard—their own—"in the desert of Lote Bravo," marked by "a trail / in scraps / of women's clothing" (43). This desolate site is where the bodies of many of the feminicide victims of Juárez are discovered, often in shallow graves or left in full display. The implication of "a riverbed utterly dry" (56) ends the speaker's journal fragment for "July 10" on a pessimistic note. The image counters the later intertextual invocation of Rudolfo Anaya's *Bless Me, Última*, with the image of the river as a feature "throbbing with [a] secret message" (qtd. in Martínez 66). Whereas Última's river suggests a continuation or transcendence of what has been lost—the victims of femicide—through the image of water as a symbol of renewal and rebirth, the dryness of the riverbed in poem 56 hinders the potential for any life to be preserved, solidifying a nihilistic loss of these women in the process.

IV

"rosa ruidosa": Renewal, Rebirth, and Connectivity Through Notions of Motherhood

Poem 56 expands the speaker's journal with two alternative entries, "July 11" and "July 29," both of which put forward a more hopeful culmination of roses beyond their commodified representations. The former continues an earlier thread in Martínez's collection that focalizes the image of individuals tenderly nurturing the roses, "tending them as if [the speaker's] life" (11), with the incentive of restoring them to health. The roses are plagued by several biological threats: "botrytis cinerea" (11), "Aphids," "Beetles," "Borers," and "Downy mildew" (48). These enemies "blight" (11) the beauty of the roses, causing their delicate petals to whither and fall off until all that is left is a "huddled knot" (56). Just as the victims of femicide are symbolically represented throughout *Each and Her* as roses, these biological threats can be interpreted as the patriarchal power that pervades the dangerous and insidious environment of Juárez.

The entry for "July 26" suggests a potential for rebirth and rejuvenation. The speaker ends her entry with the discovery of "one new cane, caterpillar-green, stunned with two pale-pink blossoms" (56). The discovery is a culmination of the speaker's endeavor to restore the sickly roses to health, tending to her roses in the same way a mother would tend to her child. The image of motherhood that resonates broadens Martínez's endeavor to initiate an intimacy between readers and

the women who fall prey to femicide. Such initiation is evident through the emotive images of the "*umbilical*" (16), and "roundness" (18, 68), language that denotes motherhood. These references are grounded through the maternal figure of Amalia, who first emerges in poem 17 as a caretaker for the speaker and her sister. The speaker becomes personally invested in articulating Amalia's maternal presence and influence in her life, educating them on the need and importance of sisterhood and solidarity.

The figure of Amalia is also linked with the figure of La Virgen de Guadalupe. As the "the Blessed Mother" (29), la Virgen resonates as a figure that articulates the matriarchal mythology of her indigenous predecessor, the Aztec mother goddess Tonantzin. Both venerated figures embody notions of power and strength associated with fertility and its potential to create and restore life. La Virgen is notably depicted dressed in a flowered tunic accentuated by a high waisted, black tasseled ribbon, a detail that marks her as a woman with child. La Virgen represents Mexico's veneration of both motherhood and womanhood, which stands as a sharp contrast to the femicide that defines Juárez and is directly invested in the destruction of women and their own potential for creation. The violence and savage destruction of many of the victim's bodies, in particular their genitalia, explicitly points to a loss of the site of birth, a theme that Martínez's poetry underscores through its evocation of renewable motherhood.

These depictions of motherhood inform the speaker's own maternal investment to the preservation of the rose, laboring to convey the seemingly impossible in a space marked by death: the potential for rebirth. Extending the symbolism of the rose as the silenced victims of femicide, the speaker concludes with the optimistic image of the "—rosa ruidosa / continua / rosa espina de la boca— (71). The "rosa ruidosa" evokes the image of a vibrant and revitalized rose, reborn from its near destruction in the earlier poems. As such, the image denotes a preservation of the victims of femicide. The rose image serves as a conduit from which Martínez vis-à-vis the speaker brings together the victims in sisterhood. This union extends through the veil of death, touching and potentially affecting the living through an evocation of the consciousness that conceives "*something kindred / umbilical / numinous*" (16) between the reader and the women. As Thich Nhat Hanh notes, "We are not separate. We are inextricably inter-related" (38). The horrors of femicide must transcend borders, must be felt deeply and intimately, in order to enact some sort of change that can stop the senseless murder of innocent women.

This very change begins with Martínez's reader. It is through the development of an intimate connection between the reader and victims of femicide that the rose "continua"—continues—to exist, to persevere. The "rosa espina de la boca" connects the notion of a puncturing and emotive voice through the image of the "espina"—the thorn—a feature of the rose that can pierce one's skin, draw blood, and initiate real feeling. The thorns placement in the mouth of the rose suggests a bestowing of voice to the silenced victims of state sanctioned and economic violence. However, considering that throughout *Each and Her* Martínez labors to bring her reader to a moment of social consciousness about the horrors of femicide, about the broader economic system that disenfranchises, exploits, and destroys women, the penetrating voice that emerges through poem 71 is that of the reader. The reader's journey through the course of Martínez's poetry and layers of documentary culminates with the birthing of a collective voice, of the ability to articulate the reality and injustice behind femicide, and to speak in place of those who cannot. The full articulation of this voice hing-

es on the reader's emotional connection to the victims, with the anticipation that it can bloom into action that potentially "remake the world" (72) for the better.

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Sodomites, Satire, and Swift: Re-constructing Homosexual Identity in Eighteenth Century England Through Social Attitudes In Jonathan Swift's "The Lady's Dressing Room"

Jordan Khajavipour

In 1760, two judges presiding over the Old Bailey claimed that among the 83 offensives a man could be hanged for in England, "sodomy was the worst" (Goldsmith 183). This authoritative rhetoric suggests that people in the eighteenth century believed that it was better if a man murdered another man, than to have sex with him (183). As the reformation of manners materialized in English society, legal rhetoric of this nature may appear to reflect common public opinion during this time, but proclamations of this nature were often exclusively associated with the narrow beliefs of "prominent politicians and religious leaders," with the intent of persuading the British court system to punish vices that the Catholic monarch deemed lewd (Innes 62). Despite the prevalent "legal and popular opposition" to the reformation of manners, its attempts to suppress any behavior that could be deemed as sinful created a negative stigma about the attitudes and opinions towards sexuality in eighteenth century literary studies (64-65). Although scholars of queer and sexuality studies have produced a great deal of research on homosexuality in the eighteenth century, limited access to non-authoritative texts during this period have led the dominant academic discourse to favor the late nineteenth century in pinpointing when homosexuality developed as a socially recognized identity. Like many aspects of life during this period, sex between men seemed much more scrutinized by the public if only read through the context of legal documents, like the aforementioned statements by the judges of London's central courts, which equates sex between men as nothing more than sodomitical behavior. Therefore, a clearer sense of non-heterosexual male identity can be established outside of legal and public documents in the eighteenth century through close readings of non-authoritative texts. The dominant theoretical framework (led by Michel Foucault), that places homosexual identity as a social phenomena in the late nineteenth century, developed from the period's emerging practices of categorization and record-keeping by medical institutions. However, Charles Upchurch's recent call-to-action for scholars to consider

the “broader social attitudes toward sex between men” (430) suggests that the function of the ‘sodomite’ in social spaces can offer significance to the development of identity politics in the early eighteenth century. By examining social attitudes towards homosexual men (labeled as sodomites) through literary text such as pastoral poetry, there is evidence to suggest that the eighteenth century played a fundamental role in constructing homosexual identity as both an individually and socially recognized subject.

The challenge in constructing a narrative about male sexuality in the eighteenth century that opposes the discourse of nineteenth century scholarship is positioning the identity of the homosexual male on the same plane as modern homosexual males. This essay will establish a connection between these two forms of male identity by building upon the work of Randolph Trumbach, whose scholarship on homosexuality in the eighteenth century has been marginalized by the dominant discourse in homosexuality studies. This paper will engage with Trumbach’s critical dialogue about how the emergence of the sodomite as a “third gender” (Trumbach 106) functioned, with distinct sexual patterns alongside conventional male and female identities. Furthermore, this paper will briefly examine historical patterns in behavior to contextualize how social attitudes about non-heterosexual men played a crucial role in legitimizing the construction of the sodomite as a new, recognized identity for males. To support these claims, this paper will turn to literary analysis to understand the relationship between social attitude and identity formation. This paper will then consider Bridget Keegan’s research on queer identity in eighteenth century pastoral poetry to perform a close reading of Jonathan Swift’s “The Lady’s Dressing Room.” In doing so, new meaning will be uncovered in Swift’s critique in regards to social attitude towards homosexuality in his satirical poem. The aim of this paper seeks to examine the social attitudes towards non-heterosexual men in literary texts in order to re-establish the discourse of homosexuality in favor of eighteenth century scholarship led by Trumbach, which asserts that the ‘sodomite’ signifies the first instance of a socially recognized identity that resembles the contemporary view of male homosexuality.

Establishing scholarship on the construction of sexual identity has often been a long and arduous task. The very notion of individual identity, in relation to its contemporary context, grew out of England’s materialist culture in the early eighteenth century. People became consumed by fashioning their physical, natural bodies with not only material goods, that became increasingly available to the middle class during this period, but material notions of the self. As England indulged in materialism, notions of the self formed out of a need to signify one’s wealth, class, and power. Eighteenth century males and females externalized their identities by materializing rhetorical labels grounded in social practice, placing social value on religious (‘virtuous’ ‘moral’) and classist (‘noble’ ‘plum’) terms one could fashion themselves with. This extended the constructions of identity to vain, external attributes. But materializing one’s sexual drives and desire, in relation to social identity, proved to be more difficult (and more dangerous). Instead, materialism became a gendered concept that defined masculine and feminine characteristics. In recent years, tracing the developments of masculinity heightened scholarship of the eighteenth century more than any other topic, allowing alternatives to the dominant discourses in sexuality studies to emerge.

To preface how these alternative methods came about in eighteenth century research, I must construct a narrative of homosexual studies. Curiously, one of the most intriguing goals for literary

scholars over the last few decades is to trace and understand the construction of homosexual identity, particularly in males. Homosexuality, as a study of sex between males, has cultivated a vast field of scholarship that has led to a great deal of theoretical frameworks aimed at contextualizing the development of the homosexual subject in English culture. In recent decades, the majority of this scholarship has echoed Michel Foucault's seminal work, *The History of Sexuality*, by asserting "the importance of the late-nineteenth-century moment [that] identified" the homosexual as a distinct, socially constructed category of identity (Upchurch 410). Foucault's framework emphasizes that institutional power became "an alternative site for the development of identities" (Upchurch 410), allowing males to incorporate their same-sex desire into a psychological development of identity. The consensus when approaching homosexual identity within this framework reduced any instance of sex between males in the eighteenth century to simply a superficial practice by sodomites (men accused or known to be practicing sodomy). Few scholars have argued or disputed Foucault's analysis. But recent analysis on masculinity by eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century scholars have become increasingly sophisticated. Although masculinity studies have developed separately from sex between men, it has suggested Foucault's argument, along with other supporting scholarship, remains underdeveloped, relying too heavily on impressionistic investigation (Upchurch 413).

The lack of debate outside of the now-disputed framework that couples the development of homosexual identity with the late-nineteenth century has become the concerns of recent eighteenth century scholars. Thus, this paper will seek to establish an alternative theoretical framework in order to position its argument within a larger context of academic investigation. This objective echoes the observations Charles Upchurch presents in "Liberal Exclusions and Sex between Men in the Modern Era: Speculations on a Framework," where he argues that the "task at hand" for scholars who study the construction of the homosexual subject "should be neither to dismiss nor wholly accept Foucault's theoretical framework but rather to use his observations as a potential starting point for the more rigorous investigation of available evidence" (410). Access to "available texts" outside of authoritative texts continues to present a barrier for eighteenth century scholars, but, as Upchurch acknowledges, one's approach must require "a new body of evidence" to reach "new conclusions as a result" (411). Upchurch accomplishes this by deconstructing texts from the nineteenth century, where he poses new questions about the role of homosexuality, independent of Foucault's work. To expand on his work, this paper is interested in how recent threads in masculinity studies have invited eighteenth century scholars to return to theoretical frameworks, which once asserted the 'sodomite' as a "distinct and socially recognizable group within society," (412) to produce new meaning in texts in relation to non-heterosexual male identity.

Taking a constructionist approach in the study of homosexuality over the last three centuries has proven valuable in terms of developing a methodology and discourse that could be applied to textual evidence that offers new perspectives to a time period. In order to reconstruct discourse, one must consider how the strength of Foucault's theoretical framework marginalized contemporary eighteenth century scholars who led the discourse on the subject of the sodomite (as the first instance of homosexual identity). These scholars, led by Randolph Trumbach, insisted "the sodomite, [as] a distinct type of person defined by his desire for other men, was a product of the early eighteenth century" (Trumbach 412), more than a century before Foucault's claim. Although the

abundance of new insight from scholarship on masculinity during this time period has complicated the claims in Trumbach's seminal work, many of Trumbach's arguments can be reinserted into contemporary sexuality studies to reignite the subject of homosexual identity during the restoration period. Studies on masculinity only challenge Trumbach's ability to categorize different types of sodomites (where terms like "fop," "molly," and "beau" opened up new insight to identifying roles when engaged in sodomy, as well as signifying masculine or effeminate performance, similar to how "top" and "bottom" complicate identifying same-sex desire in contemporary males who identify as "homosexual"). Philip Carter notes how, although masculine scholarship has contested public understanding to these categories, "Trumbach and others are correct in identifying the emergence of a new type of male sodomite" (34) after 1720. This suggests that Foucault's ability to pinpoint the moment of "invention" (Upchurch 411) could be explained by the abundance in available texts about sodomites in the nineteenth century. As mentioned, the strength of Foucault's claim came from an impressionistic approach he generously applied to understanding sex between men. Such an approach would not be possible a century before due to the lack of available texts that offered insight to the social attitudes towards sodomites.

This paper, like the majority of other scholarship on homosexual identity in the eighteenth century, focuses its argument on the first half of the century due to the noticeable shift in social attitudes that emerged alongside the reformation of manners. While the reformation of manners sought to suppress immoral behaviors on religious grounds, early eighteenth century society also experienced a shift into a material culture, as stated earlier. These forces played a significant role in the development of one's individual and social identity. People began taking an inventory of their behavior, leading to the formation of new socially recognized identities. This contests Foucault's claim of the same moment of invention taking place in the late nineteenth century. In his closing reading of love letters during this time period, Michael S. Kimmel advocates this argument, initially started by Trumbach, about homosexual identity in the eighteenth century. Kimmel adds how "interestingly, the fear of homosexuality and its link to effeminacy men is also articulated with several large-scale structural changes in early modern English society. For example, urbanization loomed large in the public mind as both an enervating and a sexually corrupting force; the city was the center of vice, uncontrolled and possibly uncontrollable" (4). In this moment of transition, the collective consciousness of the public began to view males differently by no longer describing sodomy as an adjective, but rather a noun when "describing a type of [male] individual" (5). Kimmel regarded how the "early 18th century witnessed the transformation of homosexuality from a set of behaviors to a type of individual," which offers the most significant contribution to modern scholarship on male sexuality. This aligns with the claims of this paper, in that the public witnessed the transformation of non-heterosexual males into their own recognized social category, but documentation of this remains scarce within research on literary texts of the eighteenth century.

The most valuable aspect of Trumbach's seminal work on the role and reputation of sodomy in the eighteenth century is its revelation that sexual desire in men did not operate within a limited binary of heterosexualiy vs. sodomite. Constructing a male's identity relied on a complex system of categorization that appeared to consider a man's sexual desires and behavior as secondary to his physical attributes and degree of masculine performance. Trumbach examined this complex system

by tracing the commonly used terminology that the public associated with all non-heterosexual men, dating back to the mid-1600s (Trumbach 105). This helped challenge the majority of scholarship on homosexuality in the eighteenth century, which relied heavily on the limited resources of textual evidence, such as court documents, street ballads, and newspapers. These didactically represented sodomy by offering only extreme cases of prosecution. Trumbach introduces a critical review of love letters, literary works, and individual trials to dismantle decades of critical analysis that relied on the limited available texts to create a framework of understanding how homosexuality functioned in the eighteenth century. What is missing from this framework, Trumbach reminds us, is the power of categorization that existed in the early eighteenth century. A male deemed to be a sodomite could no longer be used as a blanket term to describe men who committed acts of sodomy, because the emergence of a sodomite carried a distinct definition: a man who exclusively desired sexual relations with men (106). This generated new terminology, such as fop or rake, for males who committed acts of sodomy while still being interested in women (107). These factors primarily focused on how males performed masculine traits.

Sodomy did not carry the negative social condemnation that was once presumed; in fact, courts rarely prosecuted acts of sodomy. The rhetorical condemnation of sodomy in the criminal court system was more prevalent than actual punishment, where charges against sodomy resulted in less than one execution every ten years. Even then, these cases were later described as serving a functional purpose for the Catholic monarch (in order to make an example out of sodomites as sinners), and occurred in combination with other crimes or social prejudices about the accused, independent of their sexual behavior (Goldsmith 183). Goldsmith reveals class, race, and masculine traits played a significant role in court cases and general social attitudes towards sodomites. The act itself was secondary to one's social status and gender performance, suggesting men of better social standing possessed privilege to practice sex between men freely (192). This raises the question to whether sodomy or 'the sodomite' was actually regarded as "immoral," "offensive," "abominable," "vile," "perverted," or even "shocking," as it was once believed. Considering how proclaiming a heterosexual male who engages in sex between men was used as an insult, to perhaps claim they are "weak" "effeminate" or "misogynist" (Norton "The Women-Hater's Lamentation"), the stigma surrounding non-heterosexual men seemed to be less scrutinized than some literary critics suggest.

Most importantly, Goldsmith reveals that the negative attitudes toward sodomites exist only in rhetoric. In print, homosexuality seemed to be regarded as one of the worst acts one could commit. Most of this appears in court documents, quotes from officials, and newspapers. Print culture fostered oppression of 'mollies,' with repetitive diction meant to persuade and maintain pious-based negative attitudes, which, in turn, constructed a negative stigma around social spaces associated with known sodomites. It is important to acknowledge that print culture, in its infant stages, did not represent everyday life in eighteenth century England, and often felt compelled to follow Christian narratives in order for the publication or author to appear virtuous (a highly regarded characteristic during the period), thus maintaining their status as a publisher. London was an oppressive society during this period, and there are many behaviors that were regarded as "sinful" across all classes under the moral code enforced by Christian ideology. Rhetoric and practice operated in very different ways (McCormick 51).

As a result of these theorists, literary characters have been given a new lease for interpretation in their function at the social level. The purpose of establishing visibility to the sodomite as an early agent of homosexual identity, rather than a sexual deviant attempting to satisfy material desire, is to argue that, despite the lack of homoerotic elements in eighteenth century literature, attitudes about homosexuality can be realized through literary analysis that seek to: (1) acknowledge the sodomite as its own self-actualized identity of personhood, with a distinct social position independent of the normative hegemonic male/female modes of identity, when available; (2) perform a liberal reading of sexually ambiguous characters, while considering the legal or financial ramifications to authors who explicitly engage in overt homosexual themes.

In order to approach sexual themes in eighteenth century texts, this paper will draw upon Bridget Keegan's study on "Queer Labor: Genius and Class in Eighteenth-Century Pastoral," in which Keegan highlights how male pastoral poets would focus on:

> "...men of feeling, homosocially promoting each other's interests via intellectual and financial support. Although there is absolutely no external evidence of homosexual relationships among these men, as Elfenbein notes, "A man who had feminine traits, never married, and preferred the company of men possessed all the visible signs of a man who had sex with other men. Even if the visible signs were not an accurate index of his sexual practices, they were enough to be suggestive." (215)

Keegan offers a persuasive argument about pastoral poetry that invites scholars to re-examine texts under the context of her claims. She emphasizes that "pastoral is where sexuality of any kind is most likely to be found," (211) which later supports her claims on pastoral poetry's "primary interest is its participation in fields of sexual deviation and, by extension, its encoding of social responses to deviation" (214). Applying Keegan's analysis requires scholars to focus on works by pastoral poets to expose the "potentially transgressive sexuality" that "invited a blurring of class-based and gender-based social divisions" (215). The "potentially transgressive sexuality" that Keegan describes can be tied to Trumbach's assertion that the early eighteenth century experienced a "transition from one sexual system to another--from a system of two genders of male and female, to a system of three genders of man, women, and sodomite" (106). Trumbach claims, "this transition can be document[ed] at all levels of society" and explores how men "knew they could not desire men," (106) thus linking a definition of "male" with a heterosexual man. This suggests that the role of the sodomite would likely blur the "gender-based social divisions" (Keegan 215) in poetic works during the early eighteenth century.

Jonathan Swift, a leading literary figure who produced pastoral and satirical works, seems to be a good place to start when examining identity. The power of Swift's work can be found in his ability to poke and prod at the fallacies and paradoxes of what is means to be 'civilized' in eighteenth century England. He accomplishes this with verses of buoyant and seemingly harmless cultural commentary that entertains the reader at the surface and instructs the scholar at its core. Carol Flynn argues that "Swift represents in his fictions a system of sexual strategies that allow repressed juvenile fantasies to be both explored and contained" (88). This system of sexual strategy lead to poems that echoed pastoral poetry, but added new "systems" of language. In order to produce new

meaning for homosexuality studies, the paper claims that Swift's satire became the perfect vehicle for a poem to satirize the behavior of a sodomite, in which his English audience would have been able to recognize such a representational strategy in satirizing a "third gender" male (or sodomite); but, due to his careful use of satire in a period that punished overt homosexual content, this meaning has been lost by modern readers in the twenty-first century. What better poem to accomplish this than "The Lady's Dressing Room," published in 1732 as what seemed to be a satirical attack on the extreme beauty standards females faced in the rise of a material culture. Before closely looking at this poem, a modern reader could describe it as simply a text about a man who runs away in disgust after entering a woman's private area, leaving him permanently void of sexual desire for females. It is surprising that this serves as the first queer reading of the poem, given its focus around anality and male desire.

To contextualize a close reading of this poem, a brief dialogue with the scholarship about Swift and the poem will help set up a close reading within the theoretical framework regarding male sexuality, initiated by the work of Trumbach, that acknowledges social attitudes towards homosexuality as a common instance in eighteenth century life. Reading "The Lady's Dressing Room" within this context will assert the recurring character of Strephon as an eighteenth century sodomite, that Swift uses to satirize the extreme standards placed on new identities under the heterosexual male gaze of an increasing material culture. Strephon's overtly feminine behavior, through dramatic disgust of Celia's natural bodily functions, offers a character that possesses the signs of a homosexual male. In "What Not to Avoid in Swift's 'The Lady's Dressing Room,'" Laura Baudot asks a series of critical questions that compels the reader to consider what's missing from the poem. She asserts that Celia's absence creates a void that, if explored, "permits a glimpse beyond the satirical fabric of the poem" to consider how Swift responds to life in the eighteenth century, which provided a space for writers to consider the very nature of poetic creation (638). If we consider Celia's absence from the poem, readers are left with two men: Strephon and the narrator. The narrator recounts Strephon's tale as Strephon is presumed to be nearby, recovering from a traumatic experience. As Keegan points out, poems of this nature present "no external evidence of homosexual relationships" on the surface, thus suggesting that Strephon characterizes the visible signs as "a man who had feminine traits, never married, and preferred the company of men," claiming this is "enough to be suggestive" (215). The only characteristics Swift informs us about Strephon is that: he's presumed a bachelor, he appears to be comfortable in the company of the narrator (established later as a heterosexual male in line 131 when he sarcastically questions if he should refuse "the queen of love"), and he just revealed a story that drew attention to behaviors that mimic feminine hysteria.

Swift was very likely to be aware of the formation of homosexual identity through the sodomite. Because the "attacks against the male sodomitical subculture" were made by "the societies for the Reformation of Manners launched in the 1720s" (Trumbach 26), Swift would have be aware of the nature of Trumbach's assertion that "in the first decade of the eighteenth century, England became a society with three genders [that] occurred because of a reorganization of the nature of male sexual desire" (23). Before these attacks (and publication of this poem), Swift published a response to the reformation of manners that many scholars claim was also satirical (Curry, J. B. "Arguing About Project"). His work documents his understanding of English society, and the con-

trasting influence of materialism and the reformation of manners over the average individual. In the poem, by eliminating the image of the ideal women, Strephon's discovery serves as a performance that disassociates him with the practices of heterosexual mating. Although both Strephon and the reader know nothing new or truly shocking would be discovered before Strephon even invades Celia's space, the act of revealing the nature behind heterosexual relations allows Strephon to enter a space that rejects heterosexuality entirely, as if one must prove himself by revealing its "secrets," thus allowing him to engage in non-heterosexual acts in a sympathetic light. Swift depicts Strephon as a victim, traumatized by admitting to what he and the reader already know. The poem's narrator warns its male readers to refrain from such honesty, as it seems to be the only thing supporting the foundation of heterosexuality. If anything, Swift reveals just how slippery the notion of male-to-female romance and sex are. All one would have to do to no longer practice heterosexual behavior is declare his disgust for bodily functions of the female body in using somewhat biological terms. What Swift satirizes here is that the only thing enforcing heterosexuality is silence, and breaking this silence allows one agency to disaffiliate with its practice and seek alternative sexual behavior in its place.

Similarly, Flynn furthers her argument through "Dressing Room" by noting how "Swift's consciousness of the absurdity of his position produces an ironic detachment that serves to protect him from the hysterical implications of his misogyny. Strephon, silly Strephon, is the cracked one, he blandly reassures the gentle reader, not me. I stuff rue up my nose. Indirectly, he displaces the burden of sexual detection upon the reader" (88). Claims of Swift being misogynistic in "The Lady's Dressing Room" after publication appeared to be an attack against Swift's character that seeps through his satire. But misogynists of the time were also associated with sodomites, rakes, and mollies. Although many critics of the poem denounced Swift's artistic merit by highlighting the overtly misogynistic tone, social attitudes about misogyny could lend a new meaning to the text. It would be not uncommon for Strephon, as a sodomite, to be criticized for being misogynist. Women would proclaim sodomites as misogynists, as their sole interests appear to rely exclusively with satisfying males. Swift's misogynistic language in describing Strephon could have been misread by lending too much interpretation into Swift's personal life, and not enough in setting up Strephon's social role. Strephon is placed under the same heterosexual male gaze as women in the poem. The poem's language reinscribes the oppression that subordinates both women and non-heterosexual men. Strephon's invasion into the private space of a woman makes him aware of the social constraints of gender that he shares with his female counterpart, whose absence can be read as a "refusal to internalize cultural ideologies that insist upon her own objectification and subordination" (Weise 719). If Strephon operates on a similar (but not equal) level as females in eighteenth century culture, where a "third gender" sodomite is subjected to the male gaze, his behavior would be concerned with its own objectification from the heterosexual male. Misogynistic behavior towards women could be caused from a "third gender" sodomite's "refusal to internalize" the subordination to the heterosexual male's dominance in English society.

The significant moment of invention in the poem occurs when Strephon looks into Celia's mirror:

> The Virtues we must not let pass,
> Of Celia's magnifying Glass.
> When frighted Strephon cast his Eye on't
> It shew'd the Visage of a Gyant.
> A Glass that can to Sight disclose (Swift 59-64)

Reading Strephon as a sodomite calls for his character to be concerned about visibility and virtue in a time where sodomy was a capital offense. Strephon becomes frightened to cast his eye on a glass (or mirror) that can disclose something to both him and the reader. If Strephon is alone in Celia's room, experiencing hyperbolic disgust in learning the inner functions of the female sex, why would he be frightened to look in the mirror? Swift offers "the smallest worm in Celia's Nose" (line 65) as an explanation of the surface layer of the poem's satire, to entertain his more conservative readers who overlook reading Strephon as a sodomite. As stated earlier, Baudot reminds us to consider the void in the poem, through the lack of Celia's presence, in order to unravel the multilayered meanings Swift simultaneously employs. Through this lens, readers must consider how Strephon would know that the mirror is used for "the smallest worm" if the root of his disgust stems from ignorance to Celia's beauty process, and the following lines fail to note this discovery is rooted on any empirical evidence, but rather, presumed behavior by Celia. In "Remembering in Swift: 'The Lady's Dressing Room,'" Melinda Rabb describes the shewed visage (or by definition, clear valid appearance of a human face) that reflects a "Gyant" (signifying an abnormal human quality in relation to most other humans) as "images [which] the poem implies that female physicality and sexuality will merely reflect back on male identity and desire" (Rabb 384). Celia's magnifying glass symbolizes how identity is viewed from a social perspective, which, in the eighteenth century, was dominated by the male gaze. When Strephon casts his eye into the mirror, his "physicality and sexuality" reflects the same social identity and desires as a women--placing him in Trumbach's eighteenth century sexual system as the "third gender:" a sodomite who "was exclusively attracted to males even though he thought he might actually marry a woman to protect himself from public contempt" (Trumbach 106).

The narrator questions if he should refuse "the queen of love" (131), after he pities "wretched Strephon blind / to all the charms of female kind" (129-130). The narrator's ignorance to anything but his own sexuality help make Swift's satire more complex in establishing social views of non-heterosexual men. The narrator laments, "He soon would learn to think like me, / And bless his ravished sight to see" (141-142), presuming "He" is the male reader who doesn't want to end up like Strephon, and yet thinks Strephon will adopt heterosexual desire, despite Strephon's sight being ravished (by definition means to force someone to have sex against their will). The narrator ends with Strephon in opposition "to all the charms of female kind" (130) after being punished by the goddess of Vengeance. What's interesting is how her punishment fails to affect Strephon. If all it did was force Strephon to associate each women he encounters with her nature "stinks," or at the very worst, the "unsavory odors" of fresh feces, what's stopping him from still pursuing sexual relationships with them? Are we to believe that the smell is so vile he can no longer sexually interact with women? The goddess of Vengeance links Strephon's "foul imagination" with "each Dame...with all her stinks" (124). Furthering this punishment, whenever Strephon encounters an "unsavory odor"

flying by, the image of a lady will "jump like wits" (126), meaning directly into his consciousness.

The male narrator asks himself "should I the queen of love refuse / because she rose from stinking ooze?" (131-132) to emphasis that he, or no man, should refuse sexual contact with females. By stating "to him who looks behind the scene" will find "some pocky queen" (133-134) the narrator simply reminds us of the vanity behind the expectations for beauty placed on women, who all have "pocky" imperfections hidden by "ointments, daubs, and paints and creams" (138). But Strephon still chooses to refuse. Even though his punishment exists only in his imagination, the narrator reminds us that he just needs to "stop his nose" (136) in order to return to the heterosexual order, but immediately after he associates women with shit, a "vicious fancy coupled fast" (127) in his imagination, leaves him "still appearing in contrast" to all women. Vicious, meaning immoral, and fancy, relating to his sexual appetite, imply a condemnable vice formed quickly in Strephon's "wits," one that resembles the social position of the sodomite. The narrator points out how easy it would be for Strephon to see "Celia in her glory" again, but Swift offers a sense of refusal: "If Strephon would but stop his nose." Strephon's rejection for female desire is asserted as a choice.

If the poem's humor centers around the ignorance of men, is the narrator's ignorance of Strephon's identity part of the poem's satirical humor? If the narrator believes that Strephon "soon would learn to think like" him and "bless his ravished sight to see," it appears Swift is implying that heterosexual men may believe that sodomites have not matured yet to realize they must look past the flaws of females in order to engage in sexual relations. The narrator describes Strephon as "the rogue" (line 13) in the beginning, suggesting Strephon carries a social reputation. Before revealing his punishment from the goddess of Vengeance, he describes Strephon's imagination as "foul," suggesting that it was 'immoral, wicked, and offensive to the senses' before even entering Celia's dressing room. One must wonder what Strephon was doing in Celia's room in the first place. We receive the story through our narrator, who performs what Strephon reveals to him, but Strephon's actual voice, like many homosexual voices of the period, is silenced by the heterosexual man who edifies Strephon's story. Swift leaves us with an image of Strephon "in contrast" to the idea of women, and although he could simply "stop his nose" to regain his sight "to all the charms of female kind," he "impiously blasphemes" nearly every intimate thing he knows about his female lover after a "vicious fancy" has emerged in his wits while in the company of another man.

Deconstructing the poem's imagery provides another way to explore how the elements in Swift's satirically pastoral verse reflects "sexual deviation and, by extension, its encoding of social responses to deviation" (Keegan 215) in the eighteenth century. Swift's poetic imagery often alludes to classic Greek and Roman mythology to supplement meaning with some of the themes and characters enjoyed by educated audiences. Greek references were commonplace in nearly all eighteenth century literature, but it's possible that Swift presents such allusions to mythical characters, like a female goddess, to return the reader's subconscious to a time unacquainted with patriarchal discourse; a time where women were revered as goddesses, and same-sex love between men was explored without scrutiny or associations with rigid, contemporary conventions of identity and gender performance. In "The Lady's Dressing Room," we learn Strephon is punished by the Goddess of Vengeance for invading a private space belonging to Celia. The name 'Celia' literally translates to 'heavenly' or 'of the heavens;' whereas the Greek name 'Strephon' was defined as 'one who turns'

("What Is Meaning Of The Name"), and although this name often appeared in pastoral poetry, Strephon was dominantly gendered as a girl's name.

It is no coincidence Swift used these names in presenting a satirical poem that aims to expose how materialism has distorted the notion of constructing one's identity around satisfying hegemonic male heterosexual desire. Reading through Swift's layers of Greek allusions in "Dressing Room" furthers the metaphoric narrative of Strephon's homosexual identity by adding religious satire to the poem's critique. Virtue, as a material characteristic superimposed onto one's identity, became an obsession in the eighteenth century. Therefore Strephon, as a sodomite, was expected to inherently lack virtue to readers who picked up on his literal name. Swift satisfies this pious expectation, as we witness a male operating under the epithet of a female, prone to 'turn', infringe upon a 'heavenly' space. What he experiences disgusts him, and upon discovering what lies at the core of this symbolic space, he flees, and is later 'turned' into a male who rejects the sexual desires of females. The reader confirms what they expected all along: Strephon lacks virtue to begin with. What sits at the symbolic core in this reading is perhaps the most relatable function of the natural human body: bowel movements. Unlike all other behaviors, gestures, and movements of the body, the act of excreting remains the same across gender, race, class, culture; all material and natural occurrences possess some degree of variance in habit or meaning, except bowel movements. Swift's satire reveals, oddly enough, that this is the only repeated behavior we share, and its execution holds no material value nor signifies anything in the construction of identity. Swift uses Strephon's hysterical rejection of this wholly natural act, completely void of discrimination, as a means to satirically poke at religious claims that separate 'natural' men with 'unnatural' by condemning sex between men. For if Strephon was a 'natural' man, meaning, as Trumbach states, "an individual who never felt interest in other males" (105), he would likely have found the natural function of excretion normal. What I'm asserting here is that Swift's ability to layer his poetry using satire enables him to critique the "grounded...Christian understandings of the nature of man as corrupt at its core and driven by base desires" for other men. Upchurch reminds us that this thinking served as "the basis from which to conceptualize sex between men...a notion [that] did not die out" (Upchurch 428-429) throughout the eighteenth century. Essentially, Strephon fails the test of virtue embedded in Swift's satire.

Reading the poem through the limits of Greek definitions and religious aptitude in the earlier stanzas serves only as an exercise in beginning to understand the complexity of creating a literary character in a time where endorsing homosexual practices in one's work could have significant repercussions. But Swift maintains his ability to offer a poem that strengthens the critical conversation concerning sexual identity in the eighteenth century as an integral element of English society. Swift offers this as a dual perspective to social attitudes towards homosexual men. By acknowledging Strephon's existence as the subject of his satire, he affirms that sodomites were recognized as independent of the male/female binary. Swift also satirizes the archetype of a sodomite through Strephon poking fun at how alienated they are in the limited space that material culture had created for anyone outside of the gendered concepts of identity. Strephon's overdramatic rejection to female beauty places him outside the boundaries of what it means to be female, and his resemblance with female desire is pitied by men ("I pity wretched Strephon blind" [line 129]) who view him "so foul a Rout" (line 140), suggesting that his social status as a sodomite made him more of an outcast to be

laughed about than condemned (outside of the courthouse).

The role sexuality plays in constructing individual and social identity seems just as problematic in contemporary culture as it was in the eighteenth century. How does one adequately measure the reciprocal relationship between an individual's symbolic character to their complex inherent drives, like desire and sexuality, when the tools for this very exercise were forged to determine one's material value within a social context? And what good is it to determine the role of one's sexuality, in contemporary culture, if the primary outcome still seems to simply superimpose material value over one's natural body, either limiting or awarding agency in society? Although these problems are often associated with the wake of materialism in early eighteenth century culture, they continue to persist as contemporary culture continues to indulge in the vice of materialism. This may explain why notions like identity and sexuality remain at the forefront of many rigorous academic investigations. Although the claims I present in this paper help widen the academic discussion on identity formation and literary analysis, they rely on an ideology of identity that places value in materialism over nature as a means to understand personhood in a social context. Further investigation will hopefully no longer need to argue the validity of same-sex desire in men as a natural element to identity, as the frameworks of identity formation discussed in this paper indefinitely abandon the association of sex between men with simply superficial or deviant behaviors.

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Subjectivity in Narrative Space: The Lack of Female Agency in Daniel Defoe's *Roxana*

Christopher Maye

It is difficult to read eighteenth-century texts without connecting its strategic plot endings and revealing character dialogues to notions of character subjectivity and agency. While these ideas seem in opposition, is it possible to appear as an agent but actually be a victim in a much larger framework? Principally, an individual can be in control of his or her actions but still be victimized and controlled by social constructs allowing some individual freedom but in accordance with societal expectations. Allison Case extends this concept in discussing the difference between the male and female voice in narratives; women must assume a heightened form of submissiveness and impotency, and overall, their voice and narrative is either directly or indirectly shaped by men and male expectations of femininity (5-6). This observation of the discrepancy between these gendered narrative voices prompts us not only to understand how eighteenth-century English society functioned and what it deemed as acceptable but also to surmise that its delegation of patriarchal power existed in seemingly private textual spaces. Through this, it is necessary to view eighteenth-century English women as existing within a confined space where notions of agency are dictated by a hegemonic patriarchal society.

Daniel Defoe's *Roxana The Fortunate Mistress* alludes to these observations through the novel's heroine. While current scholarship primarily views Roxana's supposed self-prescribed prostitution as a form of empowerment, Roxana's femaleness and Defoe's depiction of his protagonist survey diverse but convergent aspects of confinement. The selling of her body connotes a material existence and her seducing men for status and financial security limits her to the male gaze. From a broader perspective, Roxana's actions stem from the very social ideas that characterize the historical ideologies of that time: the commodification of the female body, male domination, and the inability to escape social expectations. In having her continuously determine her next move, Defoe gives Roxana the appearance of an agent, yet I argue she is more accurately a paradigm of Defoe's overarching didacticism and a victim of male dominated social forces.

While the novel focalizes Roxana as a seductress, Defoe's juxtaposition of Roxana's status as

a merchant's daughter with her seductive qualities elicits not a woman but rather a product of exchange. In the beginning, Defoe introduces the concept of business:

> My Father and Mother being People of better Fashion, than ordinarily the People call'd Refugees at that Time were; and having fled early, while it was easie to secure their Effects, had, before their coming over, remitted considerable Sums of Money, or, as *I remember,* a considerable Value in *French* Brandy, Paper, and other Goods. (37)

Because Defoe begins with Roxana's acquaintance with trade, it suggests a foreshadowing of trade's importance throughout the novel. Through the phrase "*as I remember,*" Defoe creates a female character whose memory is founded on notions of worth, which suggests a conflation of value and what is worth remembering: the fact that the goods were of a "considerable Value." Principally, this problematizes Roxana's identity as a character because the text induces readers to view Roxana as an amalgamation of products; even so, she is quite literally a "product" of her education, and the difference in value between French and English products allows Roxana the ability to witness the source of the commodity's power. Yet, in italicizing the word "*French*" and through the quotation "and these selling very much to Advantage here…" (37), Defoe places value on not the product itself but its foreignness to suggest an extrinsic value associated with imported products, which signifies the status or significance of the exotic. In part, this serves as a characterization of Roxana.

Not only is she a witness to her parents' mercantile success, but through Defoe's design, she is also compelled to assess her own value as a French girl. The text extends this claim in Roxana's statement: "Being French Born, I danc'd, as some say, naturally, lov'd it extremely, and sung well also…it was afterwards some Advantage to me…" (39). Despite the mentioning of Roxana's English education and customs, Defoe's use and capitalization of the word "Advantage" with Roxana's French qualities strategically links Roxana to the "*French* Brandy, Paper, and Other Goods" (37) he writes prior. Their "Frenchness" proves advantageous, and it appears Defoe conflates the two subjects to allude to an intrinsic relationship and understand Roxana as a commodity to be both controlled and contained. This apposition allows for a broader understanding of Roxana's exoticism and how it functions within the text. Felicity Nussbaum opens the concept of exoticism to analyze it historically; in questioning the masculine desire for empire and conquest, Nussbaum states: "Some rather questionable claims have been made that the impulse for empire is a masculine sexual impulse that can be quelled only by the conquest of territory and peoples" (3). Even though Roxana is not exotic in eighteenth-century standards, her status as "foreign" grants her the position as someone to be conquered. Later, Nussbaum claims: "In the logic of empire these formulations imply that for men to satisfy women sexually, they must participate in raiding foreign countries to prove their manliness" (3). Because Defoe creates a narrative where a French-born woman serves as his character, Nussbaum's assertion resonates through the relationship between Defoe and his Roxana. In being foreign and a woman, Roxana is a symbol of the "Other", but this same otherness allows Roxana to be a valuable and significant means of domination. While Nussbaum primarily dissects the reasoning for eighteenth-century Englishmen's propensity for imperialism, her analysis does help expand our understanding of control within Defoe's text and Roxana's role within the text as tele-

ological. The ability to control and dominate her reinforces and proves the masculinity that Nussbaum alludes to. Roxana's existence is more than an object of exchange but also a tool to support the text's moral premises of virtue. Here, Defoe's "raiding" comes in the form of authoring a text with a female protagonist or gendered other. In a sense, this male centered perspective of a supposedly female narrative reveals the extent of Defoe's control. The very fact that he has the ability to penetrate these female spaces underscores and gratifies patriarchal masculinity and its tenet on female propriety. Rather than concretely "[satisfying] women sexually" (3), Defoe grants another form of satisfaction in educating English women what constitutes virtuosity and its counterpart.

After marrying, Roxana's husband disappears, and she and her children fall into a state of financial and emotional destitution; nevertheless, in this portion of the text, Defoe coalesces Roxana's economic upbringing and subsequent hardship and brands notions of the material and commodity through and onto her body, which Ann Kibbie extends this analysis in observing the transformation of capital from the external to the internal:

> As she sees her body gradually consuming itself, Roxana despairs: "little remain'd, unless, like one of the pitiful Women of Jerusalem, I should eat up my very Children themselves" (50-51). This image of the mother eating her offspring, an act of cannibalism that is also devouring of the self, anticipates the horrific language of consumption that comes to dominate Roxana's disintegrating narrative. (1028)

While Defoe introduces the commodity as a singular object, the text, like Roxana, undergoes a metamorphosis. In exploring Roxana's existence, Kibbie forces readers to visualize how the commodity is no longer a separate entity but a representation of the female body and, from a broader scope, female dependence on men for economic stability within the eighteenth-century. Because marriage was the only definitive source of financial security for eighteenth-century women, Roxana's extreme behavior compels readers to visualize the importance of marriage and thus the benefits associated with the male sex. In turn, Roxana's hyperbolic consumption can be read as a surrogate husband; the absence of an actual husband results in attributing forms of love and dependence on the very thing that a man could offer: sustenance. Thus after falling into economic disrepair, Roxana's pawning goods for money suggests something further, as evidenced in Kibbie's statement: "Pawning is a wasting away of the material self, as is evident when Roxana moves immediately from a description of her changed physical state—'thin, and looking almost like one Starv'd, who was before fat and beautiful'" (1028). Here, Roxana's body begins to embody the material. In stating "I should eat up my very Children themselves" (51), Roxana is unconsciously showcasing the commodity's status as a valuable resource.

The change from Roxana's beginnings as a merchant's daughter to an object raises key issues pertaining to the text as a whole. It disrupts Roxana's sense of agency within the novel. Despite her later actions of seduction and sexual debauchery, it is clear that they stem from past experiences and her victimization within a male controlled space. As Defoe's novel progresses, she appears to have power over her exploitation; however, the fact that she resorts to self-exploitation after her husband

abandons her shows how, while being separate from men, they indirectly control her actions within the text. Additionally, in having a skill set that gives her certain advantages in men's eyes, Roxana is equipped with the ability to be an object of desire. However, as I have argued that Roxana's modes of consumption simultaneously replaces and functions as her husband, Roxana soon realizes her dependence on material goods and similarly to marriage; the two become organically linked. Kyung Eun Lo's discusses the issue of consumption within the text to argue:

> If Roxana depends on the close connection between the individual and the world of goods for her survival, she also exploits this marketplace logic by consciously presenting herself as a commodity. When she finally decides to become the landlord's mistress, she successfully controls her transactions with careful calculations. (266)

Lo's assertion assumes a broader scope of Roxana's position as a commodity to observe the free credit based system that Defoe's novel projects; as Lo later states: "the language of business dominates the novel, in which terms like 'business,' 'advantage,' 'profit,' and 'loss,' are insistently deployed to describe people and their relationships" (266). This deduces Defoe's novel into a work where finance and business serve as a means of accurately depicting the novel's characters; Roxana and Amy both act as products and merchants, while Roxana's landlord and the prince serve as recipients of the transaction. While Lo's essay notes the freedom associated with this consumerism, her observation overlooks the oppressive aspects of a consumer based society and the possible oppression and subjectivity within it. Despite the freedom to sell her body, Roxana is caught within a cycle of materialism and consumerism. In spite of her financial affluence, Roxana continues to consume and be consumed. Not only is she an object in terms of her association with the commodity, but in also being a victim of consumerism, this positions her as an object to be obtained through the male gaze. To read Roxana's exploitation of "marketplace logic" and her commodification as self-inflicted (266) is difficult in that while it provides a thorough perusal of Roxana, it does not trace how it is male influenced.

In depicting the narrative as a man's report of Roxana's story, Defoe underscores notions of masculine control and Roxana's consequent victimization. The preface states:

> If it is not as Beautiful as the Lady herself is reported to be; if it is not as diverting as the Reader can desire, and much more than he can reasonably expect; and if all the most diverting Part of it are not adapted to the Instruction and Improvement of the Reader, the Relator says, it must be from the Defect of his Performance; dressing up the Story in worse Cloaths than the Lady, whose Words he speaks, prepared it for the World. (35)

In spite of the fact that the story is meant as a retelling of Roxana's memoir, it is necessary to note that a man is telling it, which questions both Roxana's agency and the narrative's authenticity. Defoe's repetition of "if" calls us to interrogate the story's validity and equates it to a disclaimer in that the Relator discusses the possibility that the story may not live up to fact. The phrases "adapted to the Instruction and Improvement of the Reader" and "Defect of his Performance" extend this

claim by characterizing the Relator as more of an actor performing as a storyteller. As a result, how much control could eighteenth-century and modern readers say Roxana actually has? If Roxana is not in control of her narrative, does she even have agency? Even so, the inherent didacticism in "Instruction" and "Improvement" concomitantly justifies this claim and point to the ways in which eighteenth-century texts were more than narratives by informing women on social and sexual propriety.

This analysis resonates heavily in Alison Case's observation of female voices in eighteenth-century texts. While Case discusses the concept of the female narrator and male master narrator through Defoe's Moll Flanders, her observation of Defoe's preface in his earlier novel precedes and overlaps with his later text:

> The status of Moll's narration after such a preface is ambiguous in important ways. While the reader is assured that the actual experiences on which the narrative is based are Moll's own, the mass of silent emendations to which the preface confesses leaves open the question of how much hand Moll has had in shaping of that experience into a meaningful narrative… (20)

Similarly, Roxana lacks the ability to create her own narrative; her voice is under the control of a master narrator, which, as Case's word "shaping" suggests, depicts the extent of Roxana's position as a female narrator. Her voice is severely limited. As evidenced by the culmination of Roxana's immoral actions and the terms "Instruction" and Improvement" in the preface, Defoe's novel defines virtue and the definition a virtuous women. Moreover, Defoe's use of Roxana as the female narrator gives him the ability to "construct a narrator with access to all the tantalizing experience of female deviance" (Case 20). The novel works as this palimpsest where the reader sees Roxana but also glimpses a much larger and influential male voice. While moving through the novel, Roxana is under the supervision, control, and gaze of Defoe, the master narrator.

Largely, this foregrounds the conflict between male dominance and female subjectivity within Defoe's Roxana. When she ponders whether to sleep with her landlord, Amy lays bare Roxana's choices in the statement: "Your Choice is fair and plain; here you live pleasantly, and in Plenty; or refuse him, and want a Dinner, go in Rags, live in Tears" (74). Even though Amy's statement is hyperbolic, she does present a genuine truth. In conjunction with products serving as a proxy husband, the text connects significant forms of sustenance, here represented through eating and living, to the patriarchy. Roxana has the power of choice, to decide between two alternate lifestyles; however, the pronoun "him" reveals how the outcome is tied to men. Her fate is dependent on her submission to male desire, and in refusing the male gaze, Roxana would be pulling herself from under patriarchy's umbrella into ostracism. To live in accordance with male expectations means a life of acceptance, and it is all a means for survival within a male-dominated social structure.

When discussing her views on marriage, Roxana discloses such ideas: "That the very Nature of the Marriage-Contract was, in short, nothing but giving up Liberty, Estate, Authority, and ev-

ery-thing, to the Man, and the Woman was indeed, a meer Woman ever after, that is to say, a Slave" (187). This explains Roxana's desire to remain unmarried. In singlehood, Roxana finds the ability to operate as an agent; she is in control of both her body and her financial status. Yet, Roxana's words "Liberty, Estate, Authority, and every-thing" exemplify what women must sacrifice when marrying men is conflicting because these are precisely the things she depends on men to obtain. In juxtaposing Amy's statement, "Your Choice is plain" (74), with Roxana's phrase, "nothing but giving up," I observe that both lifestyles, the wife and the whore, are delegated by a patriarchal influence. By remaining unmarried, Roxana seems to convince herself of her own agency by willingly placing herself on the outside. She mentions that "[she] thought a Woman was a free Agent" (187); however, because her freedom is restricted to male desires, Roxana's belief is not an actual but rather an idealized truth. The differences between a wife and a whore are few and far in between. Similarly to the wife, the whore is free from the confines of a direct form of male control but is still governed by man's solicitous eye.

The novel builds on this in Roxana's testimony: "But, I say, I satisfy'd myself with the surprizing Occasion, that, as it was all irresistible, so it was all lawful; for that Heaven would not suffer us to be punish'd for that which it was not possible for us to avoid" (105). In being "lawful" and "irresistible" along with "not possible for us to avoid," Defoe presents Roxana's choices as unavoidable and her immorality as seemingly fatalistic. In essence, for someone who has prostituted herself throughout the novel, this is the end result. However, Roxana's quotation proves interesting in that it further articulates women's inability of choice within the eighteenth-century. While her statement correlates with forms of iniquity, it does provide a larger vantage point of female subjectivity within the text. As Amy previously stated, "Your Choice is fair and plain" (74), Defoe centers the staticity of Roxana's predicament. She finds herself between a rock and a hard place and must choose a path society has created for her.

This perspective of the text and Roxana's function within it compel us to reorient our analysis of the ways in which Roxana performs. While the text does present aspects of Roxana's free movement throughout the plot, I endeavor to examine the ways in which her movement is ascribed to preconceived notions of what eighteenth-century society believed was "plausible" for the female sex. In this sense, Roxana works within, as Caroline Levine discusses, the realms of a gendered whole (25). In Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network Levine evaluates the concept of bounded wholes, both gendered and aesthetic: "For Irigaray and many others, the trouble with form is precisely its embrace of unified wholeness: its willingness to impose boundaries, to imprison, to create inclusions and exclusions" (25). In light of Levine's observation, Roxana's femininity joined with her control over her finances exudes a sense of bisexualism or a breaking of the bounded whole. Roxana alludes to this in: "that it was my Misfortune to be a Woman, but I was resolv'd it shou'd not be made worse by the Sex; and seeing Liberty seem'd to be the Men's Property, I wou'd be a Man-Woman; for as I was born free, I wou'd die so" (212). Roxana explicitly mentions the dichotomy between the male and female sex or, as Levine states, "inclusions and exclusions." Through Roxana, the reader is able to see the boundaries between male and female expectations and possibilities; however, given Roxana's characterization of "Liberty" as "Men's Property," this explains the concept of freedom and

the state of liberty as essentially material and masculine. Consequently, she is working in a non-gendered space, and through this, Roxana assumes an identity that lies outside of the social tenets of eighteenth-century society; her idealized identity is seemingly beyond form and patriarchal definitions of femininity

As Carl Jung notes in the chapter "The Importance of Dreams: Approaching the Unconscious" in Man And His Symbols:

> …it was said that 'every man carries a woman within himself…This 'feminine' aspect is essentially a certain inferior kind of relatedness to the surroundings…which is kept carefully concealed from others as well as from oneself. In other words, though an individual's visible personality may seem quite normal, he may well be concealing from others—or even from himself—the deplorable condition of 'the woman within.' (31)

The phrase "deplorable condition" highlights society's conception of gender as distinct; its "deplorable[ness]" showcases a uniquely patriarchal desire to separate the masculine and feminine spheres. In addition, the fusion between these two genders would not only disrupt definitions of gender but demarcate and destroy various patriarchal constructions. From this, Roxana is more than simply a "Man-Woman" but a threat to hegemony, which adds layers to Defoe's control over Roxana and the narrative; while Roxana's eventual tragedy serves as a symbol for Defoe's definition of morality and immorality for women, it also works in constructing and solidifying the boundaries of a gendered whole, in preserving the separation between masculinity and femininity. In conjunction with Levine's words "boundaries" and "imprison" (25), Defoe strategically illustrates the limitations for the female sex by structuring Roxana's life as a parabola: she moves in an arch exceeding the "boundaries" of her own sex and then falls. Yet, this accentuates the "trouble" that Levine mentions (25); form consists of boundaries, which suggests that gender itself is simply a construct or a means of patriarchal control. Essentially, Roxana works as a liminal space character whose very liminality, while at moments pushes the very pinnacle of prominent eighteenth-century ideologies, serves to exemplify Defoe's possible intent: that the novel and Roxana are a teaching moment for women not to assume more than their sex. In the end, Defoe stabilizes the hierarchy by showing the misfortune of a "Man-Woman" who took on what was possible but not plausible

What can be said of Roxana or Defoe? While my argument aims to highlight the inherent didacticism within Roxana, it is difficult to understand this and not align this novel with the tradition of education texts that were prevalent in the eighteenth-century. As evidenced in Samuel Richardson's Pamela and Charlotte Lennox's Sophia, the absence of female virtue indicated an absence in morality, character, and reputation, and would eventually lead to the female character's demise. While these eighteenth-century writers do not overtly preach what is deemed virtuous or immoral behavior, the ways in which they frame their plots indicate important lessons to be learned. Nevertheless, this compels readers to understand that the binary between virtue and morality, while seeming tenuous, relies heavily upon the various social tenets in which women were and are held. As Levine mentions the various "inclusions" and "exclusions" (25) to discuss ideologies pertaining

to particular genders, these restrictions betray a sort of anxiety: the need to add structure to something truly nebulous. From this, I project that we must observe Roxana's tale as not singular or spectacular but general. Roxana signifies more than a character but serves as a microcosm because truthfully, her tale is much more than her own. While Defoe draws an arch to case Roxana's exploits, he is simultaneously tracing the many stories and fates of women who jerked the very limitations that society had imposed. Yet, even though this tale may seem period specific, it does raise important points for modern readers. While foreign in some respects, the restrictions in Roxana do prompt us to examine the issues with our current social ideologies that, like eighteenth-century England, negate the idea of being a Man-Woman.

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Caught in a Bad Romance with Patriarchy: The Monstrous-Feminine, Desire, and the Abject Female Body in Lady Gaga's "Bad Romance"

Stephanie Mendez

As a song that continually expresses intense lacking with phrases like, "I want your love," "I want your everything," and "I want your vertigo shtick," Lady Gaga's "Bad Romance" is an endless repetition of a woman's fervent yearning for male attention and validation. A superficial glance identifies "Bad Romance" as an avant-garde dance hit centered on the lustful reverberations of a seductive woman; however, the music video's depiction of desire poses problematic portrayals of feminine identity, which propagate patriarchal ideologies about the female body. Criticism on Lady Gaga acclaims her with empowering marginalized bodies and challenging identity politics through the aesthetics she incorporates into her performativity.[1] Lady Gaga's use and celebration of everything peripheral has consequently enabled her commercial success in mainstream media. "Bad Romance" in particular achieved vast recognition and garnered numerous awards, winning "Best Female Pop Vocal Performance" and "Best Short Form Music Video" during the 53rd Annual Grammy Awards. A search on YouTube demonstrates that the song/music video has over 795 million views[2], and a search on the Recording Industry Association of America's website shows that the song has been certified 11x platinum[3]. Given the massive circulation and influence that "Bad Romance" has projected over pop culture, an examination of the video's female protagonist and the feminine identities she represents is critical. Although Lady Gaga's character in "Bad Romance" appears to achieve empowerment at the end of the music video, one must ask, at what cost does her character seemingly acquire this newfound "power"? Moreover, is this agency truly one that successfully subverts patriarchal power, or one that operates within it? In analyzing "Bad Romance," I reveal a setting consisting of the female body as a sight of horror, which Lady Gaga perpetuates through the roles she performs. This analysis follows the plot that director Francis

1 See Jack Halberstam's *Gaga Feminism* and Michael A. Peters' "On the Edge of Theory: Lady Gaga, Performance, and Cultural Theory."

2 This number is accurate as of 3/10/17.

3 This information is also true as of 3/10/17.

Lawrence establishes in the music video: Lady Gaga awakens in her "Bath Haus of Gaga" along with her human-like monsters, when she is kidnapped to serve as a Russian sex slave (Vena). Lady Gaga then seemingly subverts her subjection by becoming a murderous femme fatale (Vena). While Lady Gaga's intention for "Bad Romance" is to present the "tough female spirit" (Vena), she ultimately reinforces patriarchal ideologies about the female body by depicting motherhood as the monstrous-feminine, desire in relation to male castration anxiety, and the castrated abject female body as a sight of horror.

Lady Gaga's role as a mother is made evident through the inclusion of the "Bath Haus of Gaga," which serves as the main setting in the music video's opening scene. At the beginning of "Bad Romance," a slow and steady light spreads in a bare white room where pod vessels appear completely still. Light strikes the room and the pods start to hatch, revealing clenched hands that reach out in a newborn-like manner, as if beginning to coordinate for the first time. Unlike the other pods in the scene, Lady Gaga's vessel is distinguished by a cross symbol along with the word "Monster." When the strange figures hatch out of the pods, they are depicted as anomalous; while appearing to be human prototypes, these Othered creatures are largely faceless and possess heads shaped as crowns. The uncanny life forms then perform a ritualistic dance, with candid close ups demonstrating their monstrous and animalistic qualities. At the center of this pack is the presumed alpha, Lady Gaga, whose physical form is similar, but unlike the other hatched figures, she lacks eyes and sight. In one fleeting frame, Lady Gaga is hunched over a pod, moving primitively in front of it as if guarding it from a predator.

That Lady Gaga is a mother figure to these monstrous prototypes is not merely an imaginative observation, but an interpretation drawn from her performativity as "mother monster," a role she plays in relation to her fan base. The caricature of "mother monster" transcends Lady Gaga's music, and it is an act so prevalent in her career, that scholarship on Gaga addresses this as crucial to her overall performativity. One example of such criticism is Melissa A. Click, Hyunji Lee, and Holly Willson Holladay's article "Making Monsters: Lady Gaga, Fan Identification, and Social Media," which specifically explores this performativity by analyzing the cult of Lady Gaga and the use of monstrosity in her art to generate influence. The article reveals that, "Gaga's brief Twitter bio ('Mother Monster') efficiently sums up her relationship with fans: she is both a maternal safe haven and an eccentric symbol drawing on the current cultural preoccupation with the monstrous" (361). Further affirmation of Lady Gaga's role as "mother monster" in "Bad Romance" is found in Victor P. Corona's "Memory, Monsters, and Lady Gaga," which underscores that Lady Gaga's performativity is intended to be universally static within and outside of her music. Corona writes that Lady Gaga's performativity calls forth questions of authenticity, but that ultimately, "Gaga has avoided the authenticity dilemma by affirming that she is the persona she inhabits on stage" (734). Consequently, we are meant to perceive Gaga as "Mother Monster" 100% of the time, and as such, this role manifests into her music, with "Bad Romance" being an explicit example of her performance as a monstrous maternal figure.

Although Lady Gaga's objective to serve as a maternal figure is well meaning (albeit through monstrosity), the music video's portrayal of motherhood in relation to desire reveals deeply rooted

phallocentric notions of the female body as the monstrous-feminine. Barbara Creed's "Horror and the Monstrous-Feminine: An Imaginary Abjection," examines the way horror films showcase the female body as a sight of horror by drawing from Julia Kristeva's theory of abjection. Since Lady Gaga is concerned with monstrosity and has adopted it in her performativity and art, examining "Bad Romance" as an extension of the horror genre is appropriate. To further establish the relevance of the horror genre, I draw from Corona, who details in his examination of Lady Gaga that, "[Bad Romance] was made by the film director Francis Lawrence, whose movies include *Constantine* (2005) and *I Am Legend* (2007), both of which feature ghoulish characters" (735). Lady Gaga thus depicts her role with aid from a film director dedicated to the horror genre, and this is intentional. In describing the monstrous-feminine, or, "what it is about woman that is shocking, terrifying, horrific, abject" (35), Creed details why this becomes a prevalent representation in cinema, specifically, the horror film: "…the concept of the monstrous-feminine, as constructed within and by a patriarchal and phallocentric ideology, is related intimately to the problem of sexual difference and castration" (36). Since the monstrous-feminine is directly linked to the female body, motherhood, by extension, becomes central to this horror. Creed explains:

> Although this study is concerned with literature, it nevertheless suggests a way of situating the monstrous-feminine in the horror film in relation to the maternal figure and what Kristeva terms 'abjection,' that which does not 'respect borders, positions, rules,' that which 'disturbs identity, system, order.' In general terms, Kristeva is attempting to explore the different ways in which abjection, as a source of horror, works within patriarchal societies as a means of separating the human from the non-human and the fully constituted subject from the partially formed subject. (36)

By using Creed's explanation, we see how motherhood then, as a form of female identity, becomes directly associated with the horror of sexual difference. Creed's analysis of the monstrous-feminine is critical to my examination of the pod scene in "Bad Romance," as I underscore Lady Gaga's presentation of motherhood as one that is abnormal.

Maternity in the video is prominently depicted by representing birth through the white pods in the opening scene; motherhood becomes unnerving since the hatching creatures blur the line between human and non-human, which constitute the maternal body as abject. Moreover, Lady Gaga's own "motherly" behavior is not illustrated as one grounded in a humanistic and loving capacity, but rather, as one in which she assumes a disturbing authority over the strange creatures. Lady Gaga appears to use containment in order to keep her creations trapped with her; she does this to prevent her monsters from escaping her maternal hold. Creed describes the significance of this type of relationship by drawing from Kristeva: "[Kristeva] sees the mother-child relation as one marked by conflict: the child struggles to break free but the mother is reluctant to release it" (41). Lady Gaga utilizes containment through the pods and the bare white room with no exit; this containment is a means for Lady Gaga to achieve power and control over her monstrous children. Creed's writing affirms this problematic relationship: "The position of the child is rendered even more unstable because, while the mother retains a close hold over the child, it can serve to authenticate her existence—an existence which needs validation because of her problematic relation to the symbolic

realm" (41). As "Bad Romance" plays over the video, Lady Gaga reiterates lines such as "I want your love" and "you know that I need you," blatantly depicting her desire and lacking. Because of Lady Gaga's lacking, her manifestation as the abject mother becomes more realized, since her pre-Oedipal position causes her to obstruct separation; she needs the child(ren) to validate her. Creed writes, "By refusing to relinquish her hold on her child, she prevents it from taking up its proper place in relation to the Symbolic" (42). Since entrance into the symbolic realm results in the individual's indoctrination into language, it is appropriate that when the pods hatch, Lady Gaga sings lines of inarticulate gibberish, "Rah rah ah-ah-ah / Ro mah ro-mah-mah / Gaga oh-la-la." The intro then, is an example of Lady Gaga's pre-Oedipal relationship with her monstrous children, made prominent by the incoherence in language. Anne-Marie Smith's book *Julia Kristeva: Speaking the Unspeakable* describes this type of maternal abjection: "Abjection lies between the pre-verbal infancy we associate with the imaginary and access to language, identification and the fixed forms of the objective world" (32). Lady Gaga and her hatched creatures lie somewhere between the imaginary and the symbolic realm— not quite articulate, but not quite fully formed as subjects. It is only through Lady Gaga's forced separation that her maternal hold over the monsters will be broken.

Moments after this blatant depiction of the monstrous-feminine and the abject mother, Lady Gaga experiences forced separation from the monsters, marking the moment when she experiences abjection, as well as the moment her identity comes at odds with patriarchal power. Lady Gaga transitions into the second mise-en-scѐne by performing in a bathtub filled with water. Lady Gaga continues to portray monstrosity (manipulating her hands in a claw-like manner and demonstrating large abnormal eyes), when she is overpowered and forced out of the tub by two women. Lady Gaga struggles against them, and as the women drug her by forcing vodka down her throat (Vena), she reacts with horror and retches the fluid. Abjection becomes critical once more, as Kristeva explains in *Powers of Horror* that retching is meant to refuse that which threatens the "I," or, the self, and that retching "shatter[s] violence of a convulsion that, to be sure, is inscribed in a symbolic system, but in which, without either wanting or being able to become integrated in order to answer to it, it reacts, it abreacts. It abjects" (3). Essentially, this reaction is meant to be a type of safeguard. Since Lady Gaga's female captors work for the Russian men (rendering them tools of patriarchal power), Lady Gaga attempts to reject this power. However, Kristeva emphasizes that abjection is not a successful means of denying entrance into language and meaning, as it is caught in a "border," a geography of "in-between":

> We may call it a border; abjection is above all ambiguity. Because, while releasing a hold, it does not radically cut off the subject from what threatens it—on the contrary, abjection acknowledges it to be in perpetual danger … Abjection preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-objectal relationship, in the immemorial violence with which a body becomes separated from another body in order to be… (9-10)

Lady Gaga's maternal role consequently comes to an end, as the rupture of the mother-child relationship initiates the positions that each individual must assume: the child in the phallogocentric symbolic realm, the mother as the passive non-phallic entity under the authority of patriarchy. Smith enhances this understanding by writing that, "The beauty of this example is that, avoiding

abstraction, it relates the abject to the body and in so doing illustrates the power and importance of visceral reaction as a representation of what is happening in the psyche" (33). Although Lady Gaga attempts to expel what threatens her "I," momentarily placing her in-between the music video's scenes and in-between the imaginary and the symbolic order, she is overpowered. The abjection of the self ultimately establishes a realization of loss and absence, which in Lady Gaga's case can be understood as both maternal and phallic: "The abjection of self would be the culminating form of that experience of the subject to which it is revealed that all its objects are based merely on the inaugural *loss* that laid the foundations of its own being" (Kristeva 5).

After Lady Gaga is separated from her monstrous children, she showcases her sexuality in an attempt to gain control over her body and depict newfound empowerment. Lady Gaga is kidnapped and forced to perform for a group of male Russian mobsters while they decide her value in order to bid for her. At the beginning of this scene, Lady Gaga struggles to cover her body with a shawl, as she fights against the dancers to conceal herself. When the shawl is removed, she cowers and expresses apprehension at being exposed and having to perform for the men. Moments later however, Lady Gaga accepts her body and by extension, she accepts her position. Her body language changes and she dances with illusory power, crawling towards one of her prospective buyers and voluntarily grinding on top of him. As Lady Gaga moves her body and performs with newfound power, she sings "You know that I want you, 'cause I'm a free bitch baby!" The word "free" in this context clearly signifies her perception of autonomous sexual power, which she believes to possess and be in control of. However, the juxtaposition of such lyrics with the auction of her body in the video dismantles this problematic perception. The prospective buyer that Lady Gaga singles out ends up bidding for her and purchasing her. Lady Gaga attempts to subvert her kidnapping/auction by seemingly choosing her buyer, but she ultimately continues to perpetuate the commodification of the female body as goods for transaction. Gayle Rubin's "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex" notes such transactions of the female body, and includes that marriage is a type of "…systematic social apparatus which takes females as raw materials and fashions domesticated women as products" (534). Such an apparatus manifests in the final scene, as Lady Gaga is shown fully covered in white walking towards the male buyer, who is dressed in the traditional black of a groom. The presumed groom sits on a bed waiting for his new bride to reach him, essentially waiting to consummate his marriage and reify the transaction; Lady Gaga has played into the traffic of women.

Lady Gaga's final attempt of subversion is through the depiction of the femme fatale, a figure with illusory power who ultimately ends up upholding fear of difference and castration anxiety. In the final scene, Lady Gaga walks towards the bed of her buyer while her body is fully concealed in a prominent white bear skin fur. When Lady Gaga takes the fur off and reveals her body to the groom, he appears to combust and is quickly killed off. Why does this sight prompt the groom's death? Sigmund Freud's "Fetishism" helps address this question through his explanation of male castration anxiety and fetishism's solution. Freud describes, "…the fetish is a substitute for the woman's (the mother's) penis that the little boy once believed in and—for reasons familiar to us—does not want to give up" (842). The bulging fur serves as a fetishized phallic representation that eases the groom's castration anxiety and allows him to accept his bride. As soon as Lady Gaga loses this phallic substitute, however, the sight of her non-phallic body destroys the groom. By causing her groom's death,

Lady Gaga becomes the femme fatale, which is marked in the video by her lingerie's change from white to scorched black. Mary Ann Doane's "Deadly Women, Epistemology, and Film Theory" provides a strong basis for the different ways patriarchal power permeates the identity of the femme fatale. Doane writes that the femme fatale "harbors a threat which is not entirely legible, predictable, or manageable" (1). Lady Gaga upholds this characteristic by posing a secret threat herself. In the final scene, it is Lady Gaga's body, marked by difference, which proves to be terrifying and deadly. The power that kills the buyer is not one that is consciously controlled by Lady Gaga; she is yet another tool of patriarchal power. Doane explains that the femme fatale "is an ambivalent figure because she is not the subject of power but its carrier … In a sense, she has power *despite herself*" (2). Since the visual of Lady Gaga's body prompts the death, Lady Gaga's body ultimately becomes a sight of horror, demonstrative of castration and sexual difference. Doane affirms this by explaining, "The femme fatale is an articulation of fears surrounding the loss of stability and centrality of the self, the 'I,' the ego. These anxieties appear quite explicitly in the process of her representation as castration anxiety" (2). The video's final shot, which features Lady Gaga next to the charred corpse of her groom, might intend to depict Lady Gaga as victorious, but ultimately, Lady Gaga's role as a femme fatale is not one of conscious power that succeeds, but one that further denigrates the female body as a sight of horror.

At first glance, "Bad Romance" appears to be an empowered expression of female desire, however, the video inadvertently (re)produces problematic representations of the female body in cinema. "Bad Romance" fails to depict a positive illustration of female sexuality and thus perpetuates patriarchal power and phallocentric fears. Lady Gaga is indeed caught in a bad romance, though not with a private lover, but rather, the dominant patriarchy that seduces our society.

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Muted Voices: Orientalist Discourse and the Silent Other in Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*

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Every story of creation is a story of power. In revisiting the story of creation in Genesis where God speaks the world into existence, we find that the most productive instruments of power, which manifest themselves materially, are knowledge and language. Such a relationship between power, knowledge, and language presents itself clearly not only in the Biblical account of creation, but also in Mary Shelley's fictional work, *Frankenstein.* The novel's preoccupation with knowledge, language, and power emerges in the form of Orientalist discourse. It probes at questions of Otherness and conquest via knowledge and language. To begin making my case for the operation of Orientalist discourse in *Frankenstein* I draw from Joseph W. Lew's essay, "The Deceptive Other: Mary Shelley's Critique of Orientalism in *Frankenstein,*" in order to highlight the extent to which Shelley was not only aware of Orientalist discourse, but directly entered into that discourse, animating her own Oriental creation in the form of the Creature. I will also draw from the work of Edward Said, Michel Foucault, and Gayatri Spivak in order to look closely at discourse, and trace the manner by which printed language forms the Creature into a subaltern Other whose "subjugated knowledge" necessitates the effacement of such knowledge. It is this forceful erasure of his subaltern subjectivity that speaks to what Spivak calls "epistemic violence." This term is borrowed from Foucault, and it refers to the violence of knowledge or the discursive nature of power to forcibly replace one structure of beliefs with another, and it is this violence which leads the Creature on a quest for knowledge and language (Spivak 2115). While this quest endows him with the ability to speak in the discourse of power, it simultaneously reaffirms his Otherness and steers him further out onto the margins. Moreover, in looking closely at the way power operates discursively, I argue that because he is formed by the very discourse that perpetuates his Otherness, the Creature ultimately does not speak for himself. In the end, knowledge and language function as the most potent vehicles of power. They not only create and rule over the Other, but ultimately demonstrate the extent to which the discourse of Orientalism reproduces the epistemic violence of imperialism and silences the subaltern Other's voice.

The discussion of *Frankenstein* and the Creature necessitates, firstly, a discussion of the external aspects that fueled Mary Shelley's production of the novel, particularly her vast-ranging Orientalist library and her knowledge of the Orient, and thus of the discourse of Orientalism. While it is Victor who animates the Creature, it is Shelley herself who authors and animates the Orient for her readers. In his essay, Lew reviews a series of Oriental works that Mary Shelley would have read around the time of writing *Frankenstein*. After establishing the link between these texts, Lew argues that Shelley's novel not only enters into dialogue with these romantic Orientalist texts but "is obsessed with the impact of Oriental texts upon western minds" (Lew 255-256). The Creature's primary books for education, *Volney's Ruins of Empire* and Plutarch's *Lives,* which depict "the effeminacy and degradation of the civilizations of the East," are texts that Shelley would have read early on in her relationship with Percy Shelley (256). Lew notes that her library also consisted of Sidney Owenson's *The Missionary: An Indian Tale,* Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe,* Southey's and Landor's imitations of "Hindu" epics, and Byron's *Manfred* and *Laon and Cythna* (256). One text to which Lew pays particularly close attention is Percy Shelley's "Alastor," a poem that he argues was the central model for Shelley's novel. Specifically, he links her husband's poem and her novel through the "themes of 'epipsychidion,' the denial of the mother, the allegorical journey, the crisis of differentiation, the dream-maiden, [and] the wasting away and ultimate death of the protagonist" (255). However, Shelley's investment in Orientalist discourse extends beyond her extensive Orientalist library. Lew also highlights her connection with the East India Company. He primarily cites her association with Charles Lamb, a servant of the company and one of Godwin's close acquaintances with whom he exchanged visits that Mary Shelley was accustomed to attending (257). That they shared intimate social gatherings reinforces Lew's argument that Lamb "became the Godwin circle's principal informant for the latest news from the East" (257). Thus, this connection to the East India House and the "ties with the East India Company's commercial concerns became part of Mary Shelley's intellectual Heritage" (Lew 257).

While a cursory look at Walton's, Clerval's, and Safie's careers reveals the influence of Shelley's intimate knowledge of the Orient, it is through the Creature's physical makeup that we see the extent to which such knowledge informs her text. And in fact, it does much more than inform. In *The Cambridge Introduction to Edward Said*, Conor McCarthy emphasizes that the discourse of Orientalism can be understood as "the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period" (71). Shelley, in writing the Creature into existence, participates in her own Oriental creation:

> It was already one in the morning; the rain pattered dismally against the panes, and my candle was nearly burnt out, when, by the glimmer of the half-extinguished light, I saw the dull yellow eye of the creature open; it breathed hard, and a convulsive motion agitated its limbs…His limbs were in proportion, and I had selected his features as beautiful. Beautiful!—Great God! His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed almost of the same colour as the dun white sockets in which they were set, his shriveled complexion, and straight black lips. (Shelley 83)

Like many postcolonial critics, Lew takes hold of this passage and argues that the Creature's "dull yellow eye" and "yellow skin" "physically links him to scores of millions of Bengalis, whom the British rulers called 'niggers'" (Lew 273). They, like the Creature, were also known to have "lustrous black, and flowing" hair and "teeth of a pearly whiteness," both of which displayed a strong contrast in their juxtaposition, especially as set against their yellow skin (Lew 273). Additionally, in his essay, "Education and Exile in Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein,"* John Bugg concurs with Lew in that the Creature's physiognomy hints at perhaps an Indian Descent (5). He also lends credence to Anne K. Mellor's suggestions that "most of Mary Shelley's *nineteenth*-century readers would immediately have recognized the Creature as a member of the Mongolian race" (Bugg 5). But, whether we read him as of Mongolian descent or as a Bengali, what is difficult to contest is the extent to which his difference in physiognomy speaks to all that is Oriental and Other.

Having established how Mary Shelley's Oriental knowledge weaves itself into the fabric of her text, it is only fitting to now look at the problematic nature of the type of knowledge the Creature acquires and the manner by which he acquires it. The aforementioned passage where Victor describes the Creature's "yellow skin" speaks to "the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient… by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, [and] describing it" in order to have authority over it (Said 3). However, statements made *about* the Orient only comprise half of the knowledge necessary to rule it; the other half resides in the knowledge that is forced upon the natives. According to Foucault, what underlies the production of knowledge is a series of "epistemes," or periods governed by a particular discourse or structure of knowledge (Norton Anthology 2115). Epistemic violence occurs when these epistemes are forcefully ended and replaced by another (Spivak 2115). For the Creature, his native episteme begins its demise the moment he learns to see himself as "Other." Cast out by his own creator and every human being he encounters, the Creature retreats to seclusion where his principal quest is the acquisition of knowledge in hopes that such an acquisition would result in his inclusion into the social world. This knowledge begins to germinate as a result of his meticulous observations of the cottagers in a series of scenes that culminate in what Foucault terms "a body of knowledge." Whereas in Foucault's *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* it is the job of the chiefs and deputies (those in power) to compile knowledge about the subjected inmates in order to better control them, in *Frankenstein,* Shelley inverts this plot (Foucault 1491):

> I Lay on my straw, but I could not sleep. I thought of the occurrences of the day. What chiefly struck me was the gentle manners of these people; and I longed to join them, but dared not. I remembered too well the treatment I had suffered the night before from the barbarous villagers, and resolved, whatever course of conduct I might hereafter think it right to pursue, that for the present I would remain quietly in my hovel, watching, and endeavoring to discover the motives which influenced their actions (Shelley 127).

In Foucault's text, the objects of the gaze are the prisoners whom the guards seek to control; in *Frankenstein*, it is the De Lacey family which is open to the Creature's gaze. It is he who engages in religious and meticulous observation in hopes of educating himself as to the motives that led to his exile. Although he builds up an extensive "body of knowledge" that ranges from social manners, issues of class struggle, physiognomy, and language, what he does not realize at this point is that this knowledge is directly tied to power. But, whereas in Foucault's carceral, the guards derive their power to rule over the inmates through that same body of knowledge they compile, for the Creature

this body of knowledge has the opposite effect. The knowledge he consumes does not only outline the ways in which he can enter into the dominant discourse, but also enforces his very exclusion by revealing that he does not possess their "gentle manners." So, despite his intense longing, he must remain excluded. As such, unlike the guards in the prison, the Creature does not "conquer" or render the De Lacey family docile by watching them; rather, in becoming educated on the type of knowledge possessed by the De Lacey family, the Creature comes to deem his own knowledge as an inferior type thereof; thus, he begins seeing himself as the inferior Other.

At the center of the acceptance of his subjugated knowledge and his status as Other is the Creature's engagement with language itself. Foucault's influence on Said's work with Orientalism is rooted particularly "in the French philosopher's stress on language, not simply as a medium for the representation of human ideas, but as an active and material force in the world itself. Along with this goes Foucault's constant recursive reflection on the grounds of possibility of knowledge itself" (McCarthy 54). What Said takes specific hold of from Foucault's work is the materiality of language, an idea that also intrigues the Creature. Reflecting on his first encounter with language the Creature says,

> By degrees I made a discovery of still greater moment. I found that these people possessed a method of communicating their experience and feelings to one another by articulate sounds. I perceived that the words they spoke sometimes produced pleasure or pain, smiles or sadness, in the minds and countenances of the hearers. This was indeed a godlike science, and I ardently desired to become acquainted with it. (Shelley 128-129)

What the Creature gathers from his discovery of language is not only that he lacks it, but that such a method of communicating has material effects. It has the capacity to produce "pleasure or pain, smiles or sadness, in the minds and countenances of the hearers." But while language triggers these immediate sensations for the De Lacey family, the material effect it registers on the Creature is his very subjection. It draws him further outside of the system that creates him and reaffirms his marginal status. In her essay, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" Spivak via Michel Foucault defines "subjugated knowledge" as "a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: native knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity" (2115). When the Creature deems the De Lacey's language a "godlike science" he demonstrates cognizance of the hierarchical nature associated with different types of knowledges. He automatically categorizes the De Lacey's language as knowledge located so high on the hierarchy that it is worthy of divine status. It is not simply a manner of communication; in comparison to the knowledge (or lack thereof) that he possesses, it emerges as a science of letters. These factors, then, force the Creature not only to acknowledge the superiority of the De Lacey's language, but consequently and simultaneously to acknowledge the deficiency in his own subjugated knowledge. Thus, it is at this point that the dominant discourse erects and confirms the Creature as a subaltern Other. Because of this confirmation, he determines to abandon his own subjectivity and obliterate all traces of his subjugated knowledge.

Yet in his quest for acceptance, it becomes clear that language is "both the first enabling condition of knowledge, and its final restriction" (McCarthy 54). Speaking on his desire and need to possess language the Creature says, "This reading had puzzled me extremely at first…I easily per-

ceived that, although I eagerly longed to discover myself to the cottagers, I ought not to make the attempt until I had first become master of their language…I had admired the perfect forms of my cottagers—their grace, beauty, and delicate complexions: but how was I terrified, when I viewed myself in a transparent pool!" (Shelley 130). The Creature never once questions the process of assimilation and the need to learn the language in order to gain admittance into human society. The cottagers' "grace" stands in stark contrast to the Creature's "unearthly ugliness"; their "beauty" stands in contrast to his Oriental countenance, "which bespoke bitter anguish, combined with disdain and malignity," and their "delicate complexion" stands in contrast to his "shriveled complexion" and his "yellow skin" (Shelly 83, 118). It is precisely because of this physical dissonance between the cottagers and himself that he concludes that the only way to gain entry into human society is by becoming "master" of their language. Yet, with his realization of the potential power that resides in language also comes knowledge of his Otherness. John Bugg speaks of the painful emergence of this knowledge, noting that "It is the utmost of poignancies that Shelley follows the passage on education with the Creature's realization of his own monstrosity, when he observes his reflection in a 'transparent pool.' Because the Creature has this realization directly after the passage on education, it seems that he has learned both language and the very system that names him monstrous" (7). This is the power of discourse that Foucault's work highlights; it creates "the very subject over which it then exercises mastery" (2111). Referring to Foucault and his view on the subject's formation through discourse, Connor notes,

> One of the most radical implications of Foucault's work, therefore, is the suggestion that man's accumulating knowledge of himself does not result in affirmation of the self-analysing rational and transcendentally free subject beloved of traditional post-Renaissance European humanism. The figure of 'Man' is not the creator of economic, linguistic, or biological knowledge; rather it is created by those discourses. (Conor 49)

Nowhere is this illustrated more than in the Creature. Though he is not a "man," the manner by which he comes to be speaks to the power of discourse and its capacity to materialize in the form of a being, in this case the Creature. He is created by discourse and does not have the ability to create knowledge for himself or even reproduce his own native knowledge since his engagement with the De Lacey's language obliterates any and all traces of it. As such, when he comes to the "transparent pool," what he describes is a product of the epistemically violent discourse that eliminates his subjectivity (Spivak 2119). According to Homi K. Bhabha, another leading postcolonial critic, "hegemony requires iteration and alterity to be effective, to be productive of politicized populations" (Bhabha 2363). When the Creature looks at himself in the transparent pool and is horrified by what he sees, the dominant discourse achieves hegemony. Rather than giving us a reflection of the Creature as he was before language, the transparent pool forces the Creature to iterate exactly what the Orientalist discourse of Victor, Walton, and Shelley tells us: he is nothing more than a terrifying foreigner who cannot be assimilated. And herein lies the bind in which the Creature finds himself: fully invested and capable, yet delegitimized.

Still, clinging on to hope, he embarks on a journey for education which, nevertheless, serves merely to further confirm the implications of his alterity. Not surprisingly, his initial exposure to education is laden with history of imperialism:

> The book from which Felix instructed Safie was Volney's *Ruins of Empires*... He had chosen this work, he said, because the declamatory style was framed in imitation of the eastern authors. Through this work I obtained a cursory knowledge of history, and a view of the several empires at present existing in the world; it gave me an insight into the manners, governments, and religions of the different nations of the earth. I heard of the slothful Asiatics; of the stupendous genius and mental activity of the Grecians; of the wars and wonderful virtue of the early Romans…I heard of the discovery of the American hemisphere, and wept with Safie over the hapless fate of its original inhabitants. (Shelley 134-136)

A much cited passage for postcolonial critics, it brings together a number of concerns, chief of which is the manner by which education serves the aims of imperial rule. In this passage, the text overtly establishes the binary between Occident and Orient, which is central to Orientalism and is, up until this point, only covertly expressed. If the body of knowledge the Creature acquires while observing the De Lacey's points to his Otherness and nourishes his resolve to emulate all that is European, it is his consumption of what Bugg calls "imperial education" that cements his subjection. Bugg comments on the implications of the kind of education he consumes saying, "By acquiring literacy he only becomes more familiar…with the terms of his own alterity…It is not until Shelley brings the Creature's education into the imperial realm that he will fully understand the 'effect' of his alterity" (7). At the heart of his increasing self-knowledge is the way imperial education molds the Creature into the very subject it describes in writing. In his book, *Orientalism,* Said argues that texts so heavily invested in Orientalist discourse "can *create* not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe" (94). Significantly indebted to Michel Foucault, Said sees Orientalist discourse as an instrument of empire that enables dominant groups to impose "specific knowledges, disciplines, and values upon dominated groups" (Ashcroft 35). The language and education the Creature imbibes is framed as part of a distinctly European ideology that elevates the "Genius and mental activity" of the Occident. At the same time, it identifies the Orient as the opposite: "slothful." In other words, he emerges as idle in comparison to the mental agility of the Occident. Shelley's text constructs both Victor and the Creature to meet these particular stereotypes. While the Creature is certainly not physically idle, his inability to move outside of the stereotypes designated for him does impose a level of metaphorical idleness on him. He is unable to move beyond the image of being monstrous. The text places such idleness, of course, in contrast to the mental genius Victor demonstrates in animating life. In addition, the fact that reading about the Natives in America evokes such an emotional response from Safie and himself, the two non-European characters in the novel, foreshadows the similar tragedy of his life as a subaltern Other. In this way, the very language inscribed in the books the Creature reads comes to constitute reality not only for the subaltern it appears to represent, but also for the colonizing power. Indeed, what is inscribed in these books actualizes in the body and in the life of the Creature.

What results, then, is the irreconcilable irony of colonial education for the subaltern Other: the more they know, the more they come to know about the helplessness of their subalternity. The Creature's mastery of the dominant discourse comes at a bitter cost, as he himself expresses in an inconsolable lament: "I cannot describe to you the agony that these reflections inflicted upon me; I tried to dispel them, but sorrow only increased with knowledge. Oh, that I had for ever remained in my native wood, nor known or felt beyond the sensations of hunger, thirst, and heat!" (Shelley 136). It is a lamentation that echoes so acutely Victor's plea to Walton earlier in the novel: "Learn

from me, if not by my precepts, at least by my example, how dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge, and how much happier that man is who believes his native town to be the world, than he who aspires to become greater than his nature will allow" (Shelley 80). Although the message is identical at its core, the implications of it for Walton and Victor are starkly different than for the Creature. First of all, nobody warns the Creature that his endeavor would not only be fruitless, but even more damaging than if he had remained in his "native wood." Secondly, while the increase of knowledge brings problems for Victor, it never destabilizes (at least for himself), his subjectivity or status as a human being. For the Creature, it does just so through the process of epistemic violence. As Spivak notes, epistemic violence begins with the project to construct the colonial subject as Other (Spivak 2115). Standing in proximity to power, the knowledge the Creature internalizes articulates to him that he is an Other and also makes clear the impossibility of speaking in a qualified voice, despite demonstrating mastery of the language. When he expresses his longing for his native clime, lamenting, "Oh, that I had for ever remained in my native wood, nor known or felt beyond the sensations of hunger, thirst, and heat!" he identifies the subjugated knowledge he initially possessed, which was limited to bodily reflexes. Consequently, it was beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity necessary to position him within the system. Yet, because the very language he learns invalidates his voice and confirms his subaltern position, he laments not having retained and been content with that subjugated knowledge. He thus realizes that the increase of knowledge only articulates more clearly his position as an Other. The tragedy lies in the fact that by the time he achieves awareness of the epistemic violence perpetrated on him, his native knowledge has long been replaced.

The last aspect that could potentially redeem the Creature is his narrative voice, which many critics have noted exudes eloquence and command. Yet, when the narration switches from Victor's voice to the Creature's voice, rather than suggesting a transfer of narrative authority from human to Creature, the change actually brings to the forefront the process of epistemic violence. In her book, *Romantic Literature and Postcolonial Studies,* Elizabeth A. Bohls rightfully points out that any reading of Shelley's novel must consider questions of narrative authority. She cites Ariel Winter who argues that throughout the novel, the Creature is incessantly denied a voice:

> All his violent actions result from his desire to be heard, his desperation to make Frankenstein listen to him…In *Frankenstein,* Shelley attempts to give voice to those people in society who are traditionally removed from the centres of linguistic power, people who are defined as alien, inferior, or monstrous solely because of physical features (such as sex or race) or material conditions (such as poverty). (Bohls 169)

What is key in this passage is the word "attempts." Shelley certainly undertakes the task of *attempting* to give the Creature a narrative voice. Nevertheless, the fact is that even when the Creature speaks, he does not speak as he was then—before he came to learn language—because he did not know how. Thus, when Shelley affords him the opportunity to speak, he does so through the dominant discourse. In his employment of that discourse, his identity as a subaltern is effaced. Referring to this effacement, Spivak asserts, "For the (gender-unspecified) 'true' subaltern group, whose identity is its difference, there is no unrepresentable subaltern subject that can know and speak itself; the intellectual's solution is not to abstain from representation. The problem is that the subject's itinerary has not been left traced so as to offer an object of seduction to the representing intellectual" (Spivak 2119). The intellectual, in this case Mary Shelley, does not abstain from representing

the Creature. The problem lies in the fact that the text fundamentally obstructs the Creature's "itinerary." According to the footnote in the *Norton Anthology of Literary Criticism*, "itinerary" refers to "the history of its constitution as subject—and hence the erasure of its heterogeneity—by epistemically violent discourses" (2119). This erasure is precisely why this analysis has set out to prove that Shelley's subaltern Creature ultimately does *not* speak. Of course, the text takes us through the process of the Creature's formation, and the Creature himself takes us through his own history (as he sees it now) of social observation, linguistic and educational acquisition, and futile attempts at assimilation. And while his acquisition of language and education bequeaths him with a voice with which he recounts his history, it is nonetheless a borrowed voice that silences, subjugates, and replaces his native knowledge (or subjugated knowledge) and his native voice. His narrative voice, therefore, originates from the very discourse that molds him and that perpetually excludes him. It erases all traces of a heterogeneity that under his former silence would not have been considered "Other." Thus, that he is not mute does not mean he speaks. Rather, it means that the history he recounts is filtered through the framework of the dominant discourse . The process obliterates "the trace of the Other in its precarious Subjectivity." What we are left with, therefore, is not a representation of the Creature, but instead a reproduction of the language he imbibes, which subjects him to the position of a subaltern (Spivak 2114). The Creature, as a subaltern subject, therefore cannot be represented without being perpetually violated.

Moreover, laden with questions of power, knowledge, and language, Shelley's *Frankenstein* captures the implications of Western control in the life of the subaltern Other. And while it is tempting to read Mary Shelley herself as complicit in perpetuating the discourse of Orientalism by authorizing her own Oriental fiction, her role as author points to a different direction. Rather than indicting Shelley for being "an employee of the imperial system," as Said did with Joseph Conrad, I would like to suggest a productive affinity between the Creature's voicelessness and the status of the female author (*Culture and Imperialism* 22). The initial reception of the novel was plagued by controversy about authorship and whether Mary Shelley had actually written it. W.D. Harding declared it "one of those second-rate works, written under the influence of more distinguished minds, that sometimes display in conveniently simple form the preoccupations of a coterie" (Harding 45). Today, this controversy remains just as poignant. In 2007, John Lauritsen released a book, *The Man Who Wrote Frankenstein,* where he argues that *Frankenstein* is not the work of Mary Shelley, but of her husband. Indeed, from the moment of its inception Shelley has been denied authorial power, as her novel has been seen as a text that came under the guise of others' influence, particularly men like Percy Shelley. Thus, as much as she puts herself in the position of author, a word that is etymologically linked to authority, she continues to be denied a voice by being deemed a subaltern. Much like the Creature who masters the language of the dominant discourse, yet is still spoken for by that discourse, Lauritsen and others insist on silencing Mary Shelley's voice by attributing it to Percy Shelley, whose identity as a man, inscribes him into the dominant discourse. According to Spivak, who sees the woman as "doubly marginalized," "if, in the context of colonial production and male dominance, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow" (Spivak 2120). Furthermore, reading the Creature as related to the female author reveals that the discourse of Orientalism does not only operate imaginatively and ideologically within the boundaries of the text, but in fact materializes externally. Like in the case of the Creature, the dominant discourse that Mary Shelley attempts to enter into by way of *Frankenstein* is in a per-

sistent battle to continually subject both her and her voice. In the end, Mary Shelley, too, emerges as a victim of the very subjection and epistemic violence that is at the heart of her novel and that simultaneously threatens to disqualify her knowledge.

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Construction of Jade Snow's Identity in *Fifth Chinese Daughter*

Arielle Paje

In her text, *Fifth Chinese Daughter*, Jade Snow Wong chronicles the gender-based difficulties she faced growing up as a daughter in a Chinese-American household, located in the heart of San Francisco's Chinatown. In order to find the power to confront her father and his beliefs, she must distance herself from the stifling domestic sphere of her home through education and through assuming a high position of responsibility over her male coworkers at a war- plant shipyard. She does this by using education to construct her own identity as an independent woman, as opposed to a subject in her father's household. In addition, she rejects the role of subservient homemaker that she has been groomed for according to her father's Chinese-influenced expectations of women. Although Jade Snow is as capable of claiming an individual sense of identity as her male counterparts, she finds she cannot achieve full independence outside of the domestic sphere because she is burdened by a home life that favors male dominance. Being raised in a Chinese household that has not been fully accepting of American culture, she has to actively fight the innate need to regress into female obedience. Jade Snow forges her own path in identifying herself as a progressive woman by transcending her Chinese upbringing through opportunities that are presented to her in education and the public sphere in order to construct her independent female identity, despite the oppression of women she faces in her father's male-dominated private sphere.

To understand this novel, readers must first consider the point of view that Wong frames her narrative in. Wong uses a third person narration to document her first twenty-four years of life, distancing herself from the character of Jade Snow in the text. As a result, Jade Snow narrates the story as a protagonist instead of a first-person autobiographical narrator. By analyzing herself as a protagonist instead of in the first person, Jade Snow recognizes that she cannot construct her own sense of identity because she would become a threat to her father's male authority in the household in the process. Wong's decision to approach her autobiographical narrative through a third person narrator has been criticized over the years since *Fifth Chinese Daughter* has been published. In the preface to the novel she writes, "[t]he third-person-singular style in which I told my story was rooted in Chinese literary form (reflecting cultural disregard for the individual)" (vii). Critics such as Shirley Geok-Lin Lim and Leslie Bow critique

the distancing of the author from the autobiographical text, noting that it renders Jade Snow's reduction from woman and subject to subject of her father's wills and expectations, negating notions of empowerment and entitlement that the novel could provide for Asian-American women. It is this judgment of Wong's narrative preference that makes it difficult to discuss *Fifth Chinese Daughter* through a feminist approach, because some arguments can be made that the subjugation of Jade Snow renders the novel weak in its feminist message. However, readers must look beyond this distancing of Wong from the text, and the objectification that comes with it, and focus on the syntactical creation within the novel of Jade Snow as an individual. Critics that focus on Jade Snow's identity construction assert that, "Jade Snow Wong writes the narrative biography of Jade Snow" and that the "singular 'I' dissolves and re-emerges transformed and re-created in the objective third-person 'she'" (Yin and Paulson 58). Readers should keep in mind that Wong's narrative is simply being acted out by Jade Snow, in an attempt to separate herself from the little girl with no voice that Wong was growing up. This narrative is still Wong's struggle with understanding the nature of gender inequality, but Jade Snow is the one that details it so that Wong's oppressed self can be kept in the past, while the discussion of the gender and identity can still be relevant in current feminist discourse.

As previously mentioned, Wong's text is the intersection of Chinese influences and American literature. The protagonist Jade Snow struggles to find a way to incorporate her desire to be independent from her father's power while also adhering to her Chinese cultural beliefs. For example, Jade Snow's family and family friends refer to her as "Fifth Daughter," giving her a generic identity through a numbered system and leaving her fighting for the existence of the person, Jade Snow. Martha J. Cutter says that characters of Chinese American Literature "finally realize that it is precisely their antipodal and divergent cultural/linguistic heritages that engender the ability to produce new meanings, new stories, writerly translations that break down the binary opposition between 'the Ethnic' and 'the American,' enriching and finally recreating both cultural terrains" (582-83). It is difficult to distinguish a feminist approach to the novel from an ethnic approach to the novel; these two approaches become intertwined and inseparable in the text. Gender roles, as Jade Snow understands, are deeply rooted in Chinese cultural beliefs of male dominance, however, she wants to find her independence as a woman in American culture. While Wong's novel documents her life as a woman in the United States, her Chinese cultural beliefs play a large role in her upbringing. Her identity as an American woman is often in conflict with her identity as a Chinese daughter. Wong attempts to address both of these identities, trying to find a balance between the two that she can establish as her own, individual identity, apart from these opposing identities.

Growing up in the 1920s, Jade Snow lives with her father, mother, younger sister, and two younger brothers in the heart of San Francisco's Chinatown. Her household follows Chinese-influenced social order, with male figures holding more power than female figures. From an early age, Jade Snow's identity is diminished in the household and she is taught to be innately obedient and reserved as a woman living in a man's private sphere. Her father, Daddy, is the head of the household, and therefore dictates all aspects of family life, from budgeting to organizing the family hierarchy, with the younger brothers at the top and the women of the household on the bottom. The household is Jade Snow's private sphere, where she has to obey the law set forth by her father's dictatorship. In the narration, Jade Snow recalls "[r]espect and order- these were the key words of life. It did not matter the thoughts of a little girl; she did not voice them" (2). Upon writing *Fifth Chinese Daughter* years later, Wong recognizes the oppression of

women in the domestic sphere; Jade Snow portrays herself as 'little', as if her stature is shrunken in size, in the shadow of her father and younger brothers. Moreover, Wong acknowledges the presence of herself as the silenced female, telling the readers that she was not allowed to voice her thoughts or concerns.

Shirley Geok-Lin Lim further complicates the role of the silenced female by tying it directly to the theme of race. She argues that Jade Snow's struggle to form her own identity is "made even more difficult by the threat of male, legalistic power and shame over female sexuality" (257). Wong's construction of Daddy in the novel is one that shows him to be loyal to traditional Chinese patriarchal beliefs, while also trying to balance the influences from the American culture he is currently living in. Lim describes Daddy's rule as 'legalistic,' as if the authority he holds over his household has been given to him by the law. He wants to maintain his position of power over his wife and daughters within his private Chinese home, but he cannot control the American influences that Jade Snow and her sisters face once they move into the public sphere of American life. Life outside of Jade Snow's small apartment home in Chinatown represents the public sphere, where freedom is both accessible and attainable. As she gets older and becomes increasingly aware of how American culture works against Chinese patriarchy, Jade Snow "was now conscious that 'foreign' American ways were not only generally and vaguely different from their Chinese ways, but that were specifically different, and the specific differences would involve a choice of action" (Wong 21). Jade Snow's need for an identity comes as a result of the intersection between two axes: the American culture she lives in publicly and the Chinese organization of power and behavior that she was raised in privately. She struggles between female autonomy and patriarchy. It is "[t]his 'constant puzzle,' the struggle between Chinese silence and 'propriety' and the daughter's desire to understand and to be free of patriarchal law" (Lim 257) that catalyzes Jade's Snow's quest to identify who she is. Once she moves away to pursue higher education, Daddy cannot fully detail Jade Snow's every move because she is exposed to life outside of her father's home more frequently, thus diminishing his dominance over her.

As Jade Snow gets older, she realizes that education offers a way out of the private sphere that oppresses women. Wong emphasizes the importance of education from the beginning of her novel. Jade Snow has to take private Chinese lessons with Daddy before and after attending American public school, once again blending the influences from both Chinese and American cultures that concurrently exist in her life. Daddy tells Jade Snow that her American teacher "is supreme, and her position in all matters pertaining to your education is as indisputable as the decisions of your mother or father at home. Respect her accordingly" (Wong 12). Education is so important to her well-being that, even at school, it is better if she does not have a voice. She is there to learn from others, and not to question the authority of her teacher, whom her parents equate to their own authority in the household. By telling his daughter that she should have no voice inside the classroom, Daddy extends his power over Jade Snow past the private sphere. However, despite Daddy's interference, Jade Snow sees freedom in pursuing higher education after high school, but, when she comes to Daddy asking for help to fund college, he resists, telling her that her average education is enough and that all of his funds must go to Older Brother for his advanced medical training. Once Jade Snow realizes that she is not her brother's equal, she makes the conscious decision to use education to empower herself and deny the identity of fifth Chinese daughter.

After being denied financial help from her father, she reflects "[h]ow can Daddy know what an

American advanced education can mean to me? ...I can't help being born a girl. Perhaps, even being a girl, I don't want to marry, just to raise sons! Perhaps I have a right to want more than sons! I am a person, besides being a female!" (Wong 109-10) Jade Snow faces the issue of gender binaries head-on in this predicament, noting that being born a female is something that is out of her control. She refers to herself as girl, likening her identity to that of a child and, in effect, stopping her own growth as a person. She calculates the unfairness of her Daddy's decision, and starts to rebel against it by refuting marriage. By verbalizing the opposition to the institution of marriage, something that she feels is expected of her both in the public and private spheres, she uses her status as a female to go against the social order of the household. She seeks to create and maintain a life outside of the domestic sphere that she grew up in. As Jade Snow observes her mother growing up, she makes up her mind that marriage is the ultimate form of female submission and silent participation in patriarchy. By rejecting marriage in this instance, and placing marriage on the negative side of the binary against a higher education, she rejects the established hierarchy, with sons coming before daughters and husbands coming before wives. She also designates that she is a person in addition to being a female, showcasing her desire to break from the realm of the domestic and indulge in the freedoms that are in the public sphere of education.

Eventually, Jade Snow is admitted into the all-women's Mills College in Oakland, where she is exposed to the camaraderie of womanhood for the first time. She is able to outwardly live against the ideas of male dominance that she grew up supporting. Back at home, the women in her family were not able to voice their concerns; at Mills, female congregation and communication is encouraged. In her article, Leslie Bow notes that "the rhetoric of liberal feminism becomes coherent with Jade Snow's desire for American acceptance. The convergence between early feminist concerns with autonomy, equal rights, and access to individualism allow Jade Snow to constitute her 'unfilial piety'- the break she makes with her Chinese family- as a feminist resistance" (162). Living and working among other women, Jade Snow finally participates in the formation of her own sense of identity as a woman. She places herself besides other people, instead of positioning herself above or under others, as she did in her father's home in Chinatown. Jade Snow relates to the reader that, "[n]ow, living became fun! ...Mills living was democratic living in the truest sense; the emphasis was entirely on how you used what you had within you" (Wong 156-7). Jade Snow is able to freely express herself, this being a power that she did not have growing up, and she also witnesses how a woman in a position of power can still be considered an equal when it comes to identity when she lives with the dean of her college. The role of the dean foils the role of Daddy; they play the same role as authority figures in Jade Snow's life, yet the former gives Jade Snow freedom while the latter actively oppresses it. Jade Snow recognizes that she does not get lost in a crowd of faces and gendered labels, but instead is addressed by her name, a mark of privilege and right that she enjoys and appreciates. In this part of the narrative, Wong highlights Jade Snow being treated as an individual, not as property or as inferior to another being.

A few weeks into instruction, Jade Snow hosts a dinner party for her peers, as a way to exercise her new identity. She prepares two native Chinese dishes for a group of her peers, still acknowledging her Chinese culture. It is true that cooking can still be read as being part of the stifling domestic sphere that she is trying to escape, and Patricia Lin Blinde argues that "the affirmation of identity is also, however, and affirmation of place. Specifically, it is an affirmation of one's place in society *as designated by others*. The insidiousness of a work like *Fifth Chinese Daughter* is that it is, consciously or unconsciously, in compliance with the sociocultural forces which designate the specific place (and hence rights)…of

women" (59). Blinde explains self-identification in a negative light. Her argument works to enforce the objectification of women through the eyes of others. Using Blinde's theory, one can read Jade Snow's preparation of food as her duty, rather than her own desire and right. When her peers applaud her on a wonderful meal, they are truly applauding her Chinese culture, and Jade Snow as being part of that culture. This is where Jade Snow is meant to be; she is merely a vehicle through which Chinese culture is perpetuated and distributed to others in the public sphere. Her place in society is to prepare Chinese food, as is expected by a Chinese woman by others on the outside. In this case, Blinde's argument effectively prevents Jade Snow from forming her won identity by proving that Jade Snow is not separated from her identity as fifth Chinese Daughter.

However, Blinde's argument can be disproved by Wong's third-person narration of the dinner party, and this narration serves to show Jade Snow seeing her own self in a positive light:

> That was a wonderful evening, which Jade Snow thoroughly enjoyed…[f]or the first time, Jade Snow felt an important participant in the role of hostess…she soon lost her shyness in the presence of celebrities and acted naturally. And Jade Snow ceased thinking of famous people as "those" in a world apart. She had a glimpse of the truth, that the great people of any race are unpretentious, genuinely honest, and nonpatronizing in their interest of other human beings. (Wong 172-73)

Jade Snow orchestrates and carries out a social event of her own design. She oversees her own operation; it is one of her first positions of complete control. She transforms into a leader, and feels appreciated by those that came to support her. She no longer feels herself distanced from the public sphere, but now feels as if she is a part of American culture. She places herself among others, as an equal part of the conversation and situation. In addition, Jade Snow gives herself some credit, referring to herself as a human being, as opposed to her early self-references of 'little girl' and 'fifth Chinese daughter.' The dinner party only helps Jade Snow to acknowledge herself as a human being and helps her create a new confidence in herself and her abilities out into the public sphere. This opportunity to demonstrate her identity as an individual within the public sphere comes as a result of her Jade Snow being able to seize the freedom she finds at college in order to create her sense of self among her peers.

Higher education gives Jade Snow the confidence to outwardly reject and step out of the domestic sphere and move into the public sphere, where she can form her own identity. Jade Snow begins to gain confidence in herself because she does not feel the burden of upsetting her father's power structure. The move into a public sphere allows Jade Snow to begin forming her identity as a woman. By uprooting herself from her home in Chinatown and then transplanting herself to Mills College, she is able to physically distance herself from the expectations of the Chinese-influenced domestic sphere where she grew up. It is within this distance, this open, non-determined space that Jade Snow is able to break away from the male domination that kept her silent all these years. The narration states that, "[w]ith humor, honesty, and affection, Jade Snow was given guidance and comfort without judgment pronounced, and by daily example she was impressed with the marvel of inner spiritual strength and the meaning of gentleness" (Wong 156). Jade Snow feels freedom at college because she does not have to be under her father's gaze. She is no longer an object, but instead is a subject, a human that can do as she pleases without having some sort of strict law to abide by. Gentleness is also meaningful in Jade Snow's transformation

into an individual. In contrast to Daddy's rigid expectation of submissive and oppressed women in the household, she finds that college has a softer approach to the expectation of individuals. Daddy does not show emotion or sympathy; the dean of the college hugs Jade Snow and tells Jade Snow that she is proud of her. Jade Snow gains the necessity of reciprocated human emotion, which allows her to form strong bonds with the women around her both professionally and leisurely.

Once this break happens at Mills, Jade Snow begins to construct her own opinions and reflect on her life back in Chinatown, realizing that she has lived most of her life in the suffocating domestic sphere that has systemically repressed her individuality and sense of identity. This revelation disgusts her and she further distances herself from her father's home. In her break from the private sphere of home, she reflects "[m]y parents demand unquestioning obedience. Older brother demands unquestioning obedience. By what right? I am an individual besides being a Chinese daughter. I have rights too" (Wong 125). In this narration, she still places her parents and her brother before herself, literally. Daddy and older brother's male authority comes before her concerns, as a result of the Chinese structure of propriety that was instilled in her from a young age. However, it is crucial to note the shift in Jade Snow's understanding of identity. Unquestioning obedience is interrupted by a sudden question. "By what right?" she asks herself. With this question, Jade Snow realizes that her sense of totality and finality is not as solid as she had been raised to think it was. She realizes that her father's legalistic power over her is not a birthright, but rather a social construct that he enforces and she follows under the guise of Chinese culture. And in her resolution comes the fact that she is more than just a Chinese daughter, followed by the bold statement, "I have rights too." The linear progression of male authority is outright defied by Jade Snow questioning the power structure of the private sphere that she was cultivated in. This pivotal moment provides insight into the intertwined relationship between Chinese culture and female identity, and could only have come about with Jade Snow's exposure to a more female-centered, egalitarian, and public education.

It is important to contemplate the significant role that higher education plays in Wong's text. Though Daddy made sure that it was known at an early age that education was important for self-betterment through knowledge, he never gave her the opportunity to apply her knowledge in the public sphere. At Mills, she is out of Daddy's grasp, and he is no longer able to police her identity and mind. In addition to opening avenues for self-confidence and female empowerment, American education also represents westernization. In a westernized setting, Jade Snow is free to experiment with independence without the judgement of Daddy. By attending public school and pursuing higher education, Wong shows the reader the process through which Jade Snow makes the transition from her Chinese heritage into western American culture. This crossover helps the narrative structure effectively communicate the struggle between Chinese-ness and Western-ness that Jade Snow feels, by detailing the stark differences in the treatment and expectation of women. Bow claims "[t]he text enacts a division between tradition and modernization through gender; in marking self-fulfillment as the logical and inevitable result of Westernization, both locate ethnic difference within an implicitly liberal agenda and a chronology of collective self- improvement" (212). In her identity as a Chinese woman, Jade Snow is expected to be submissive and obedient. In her identity as a Western woman, Jade Snow has the power to make her own decisions, speak her mind, and see herself as an equal to both men and women in the society constructed within the novel. In the formation of her new identity between Chinese-ness and Western-ness, she settles on a point halfway between the two conflicting cultural systems, where she can both respect

the Chinese beliefs she grew up with as well as integrate facets of western life that she is drawn to in her independence.

Jade Snow's move into the public sphere of the workforce after college strengthens her sense of identity. Using her education in combination with dedication and determination, she works her way up the workplace ladder until she assumes a position of power over men by becoming a secretary at a war-plant facility. She "developed confidence in dealing and working with the men…[s]he found dignity and respect accorded to her in the shipyard. Sometimes at conferences, she would be the only woman present in a room full of men" (Wong 194). Being in charge of men, she upsets the gender binaries that have thus far dictated her childhood and early adult life. In Daddy's household, she always respected and followed male authority. The reversal of gender roles harkens back to her status as the silent female. Whereas she could never find a spot in the private sphere to voice her concerns and opinions to others, now she "gave advice; sometimes she ignored [the men]" (Wong 194). She has the confidence to suggest how others should handle situations, as well as the luxury of ignoring the men who work beside her and under her. When one has the option to ignore somebody else in the workplace, that means the former is above the other socially. Jade Snow is no longer the silenced female that was painted in the beginning pages of the narration. She is now directing and silencing others, specifically men, as a foil to her previous non-identity of fifth Chinese daughter.

The final stages of the formation of Jade Snow's identity comes when she wins a writing contest with an essay titled, "Absenteeism- Its Causes and Cures." With this accomplishment, she wins the privilege of christening a Liberty Ship. It is in this scene that Daddy finally recognizes Jade Snow as an individual. In combination with her going to college, Jade Snow is now equipped with the knowledge and skills to make an impact in with her writing. In her father's eyes, she has mastered the English language, enabling her to successfully cross over into American culture. Daddy acknowledges how her experiences with higher education has shaped her into a respectable individual that is celebrated by society. Jade Snow proves to her father that she can be a successful, powerful woman in society. And though he never admits to being wrong in denying her the funds to pursue higher education, he does make sure to be present to watch her christen the ship. He publicly accepts that his daughter is an excellent human being, and, more importantly, he steps out of his private sphere and into her public sphere to rejoice in her accomplishments. She has finally created an identity independent of her father's authority that he himself respects. The moment when she strikes a champagne bottle on the ship is a testament to all her hard work and perseverance without his financial and emotional help throughout the last few years. The breaking of the champagne bottle symbolizes Jade Snow's own personal celebration, the formation of her identity as a woman and as an individual. Jade Snow's freedom and autonomy as a woman is represented by the Liberty Ship. This is the beginning of her allowing herself to own independence and outwardly express her independence to others in the community. Where she was reluctant to claim her autonomy before, she understands that she is no longer a disappointment to her father, but is instead a hero. After the ship christening, Daddy shares with her part a letter that he wrote his to his cousin when he first came to the United States from China:

You do not realize the shameful and degraded position into which the Chinese culture has pushed its women. Here in America, the Christian concept allows women their freedom and individuality. I wish my daughters to have this Christian opportunity. I am hoping that some day I may be

able to claim that by my stand I have washed away the former disgraces suffered by the women of our family. (Wong 246). This insight into Daddy's attitude towards Chinese-American women is significant because it is Wong's confirmation that Jade Snow now has her own identity. With her success comes the idea that, "the daughter is an individual example of the exceptional Asian woman, an example made possible only through living in American society; and her achievements finally wring from the patriarch a concession on the rights of women" (Lim 259). Jade Snow is Daddy's vision of an empowered woman realized. He respects her not only as an established woman, but also as his daughter. Moreover, the letter shows a parallel that connects Jade Snow and Daddy: Daddy's internal struggle to find balance between the private Chinese sphere and the public American sphere is the same struggle that Jade Snow wrestles with throughout the novel.

Blinde states that identity "is possible for Jade Snow because of her view of life as self-determined totalities. She defines life according to the conventions and expectations that have been transported wholesale from China and whose relevance in the context of American life she fails to question without any real depth" (Blinde 54). Yet, within the context of Wong's narrative, readers can see that Jade Snow constantly questions Chinese-influenced conventions and expectations. The refusal to accept these gendered social constructions in the private sphere is what propels Jade Snow's desire to empower herself through public education. In questioning her role as nothing more than a subject in her father's Chinese household, she is able to create separation between her identity as a child, the fifth Chinese daughter, and her identity as an adult female, Jade Snow.

Jade Snow enjoys her newfound sense of Western-ness. The sense of Other that she feels diminishes as she is exposed to public life outside the reach of her father. She appreciates the idea that gender does not necessarily have to be a marker of success in the western world, as it is in the private sphere of her father's Chinese-influenced household. Through opportunities that higher education provides, Jade Snow is able to form and claim and establish her own identity as a woman. Her desire for autonomy is fueled by her exposure to female-dominated power structures that she encounters once she leaves home and enters Mills College. She becomes brave and more reflective once she is able to break from the private, domestic sphere and finds a comfortable space within a public, feminine sphere. Her journey to create an identity as a woman amidst her stifled upbringing comes in the intersection of multiple opposing forces: oppression and freedom, domestic sphere and non-domestic sphere, and Chinese-ness and Western-ness. In this transformation from silenced woman to a woman with an identity, readers no longer see just a fifth Chinese daughter, but the individual Jade Snow. Though she is not completely able to sever herself from all ties to her Chinese culture, as she never does quite stop searching for her father's approval, she does come into her own identity by the close of the novel. Jade Snow's successes are the result of the delicate balance between trying to please Daddy, while also trying to form her own identity opposite from, yet equal, to his.

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Ruins and Wastelands: Technology's Influence on Everydayness in H.G. Wells's *The War of the Worlds* and T.S. Eliot's *The Waste Land: Facsimile*

Jonathan Patterson

Literary studies has yet to fully realize the potential that the study of ruins can have on increasing our understanding of the inseparable relationship between everyday technologies and the reshaping of everydayness in modern fiction and poetry. Technology, whether it is the war-technologies of H.G. Wells's *The War of the Worlds* or the ancillary devices that permeate T.S. Eliot's *The Waste Land*, is depicted as the primary agent for quotidian entrapment. The ordinariness and acceptance of the technologies we employ from day to day masks the power that they have in our lives. Wells's novel and Eliot's poem illustrate how the quotidian is a direct progeny of technology's mass integration into modern societies. The byproducts of the relationship between the quotidian and technology are what Kevin Lynch calls "the dark side of change" (1) creating the need to explore the method in which technology effectively creates wastelands punctuated by images of ruined architecture and abandoned warehouses in a technology-dominated London.

The term "ruin," for Cailin DeSilvey and Tim Edensor, refers to both an "object and process—'a ruin' (noun) and 'to ruin' (verb)" (465). The result, then—as buildings become derelict and erode— is that people are inclined to mimic their physical surroundings. Both Wells and Eliot forewarn of technology's inherent power to ruin places, experiences, and ultimately, people. This essay makes the often overlooked link between the theories of ruination proposed by these authors and argues that literary studies can benefit by making inquiries about contemporary studies of ruins to include the wasting of time and the dissolution of personal identity within ruins. At stake is the larger question: what is the often hidden effect of the technological objects that surround us in daily life? This essay explores the unique vectors of daily experience, providing an analysis that emphasizes an ontological reorientation of daily, personal experience centered on the flux and changes of mobile and accessible technologies, the influence of pervasive technology on the acceptable behaviors and attitudes within society, and the contribution of nonhuman intelligence to fundamentally reshaping what it means to be human.

The origin of ruins can be directly attributed to the use and expansion of modern technology. An inherent problem with ruin studies, however, is that findings typically focus too heavily upon "ruin-gazing"—the perspective of the onlooker gazing into the ruin—rather than an analysis of one who inhabits the ruin and gazes out into the public sphere (Ginsberg 41). John Jackson, for example, has argued that the ruin itself also symbolizes for some the "absence of order" (101). Such a view, however, would reveal the ways in which the ruined self must consider the quotidian. Hence ruins, if anything, symbolize the link to those comforts that can be restored. To this end, Jackson concludes his book *The Necessity for Ruins* with, "ruins provide the incentive for restoration, and for a return to origins" (102). Yet, it seems that he omits a crucial part of his own argument by overlooking the "immense changes still being made by the growth of population and technology" (101). The role of technology on a personal level cannot be rejected from a society whose large-scale technological advancements continue to rapidly develop. Both Wells and Eliot, to again use DeSilvey and Edensor's terminology, classify war-technology as the causes for "fast destruction," quickly rendering once fixed staples of a cityscape into ruins. But, more importantly for Wells and Eliot, people are more akin to "slow" ruins that "slip into ruination more gradually, sidelined by social or economic transitions, or incrementally abandoned" (467). This point is often excluded from the dialogue in favor of non-corporeal structures. But both Eliot and Wells are cognizant that technologies ranging from the benign everyday objects of alarm clocks, radios, gramophones, and transportation in *The Waste Land* to the large-scale military technologies in Wells's *The War of the Worlds*, are permanent fixtures in a modern society and an integral part of the human experience. Any idea, then, of a "return to origins" has to account for how technologies in their most subtle forms will find place within any modern conceptions of origins or normalcy.

Similarly, little has been done in connecting Eliot to Wells. Cecil Eby comes closest when he writes that Eliot employs the same imagery as Wells to describe the pervading view "the empty panorama of death-in-life" that followed from WWI and that typically follows any particular war or conflict (Eby 43). But scholars have yet to put these two texts in conversation with each other with any degree of specificity. Perhaps another reason for the absence of criticism unifying these two authors is that most criticism of *The Waste Land* is done using the 1922 published version, ignoring the content from the early drafts. For Wells and Eliot, technology is the catalyst for war and mass terror and disrupts the contours of daily life. In *The Facsimile* of *The Waste Land*, the daily technological devices that inundate our homes are of particular interest. Their usage also captures the early philosophical side of Eliot who, leaning on his Harvard studies of F.H. Bradley, begins to question the value of our experience with technology once we "find ourselves as conscious souls in a world of objects" (*Knowledge and Experience* 31). When we become "conscious souls," we give power and validation even to seemingly ancillary technologies because we then recognize their power to redefine and reshape daily human experience. But even those conscious of this vitality must negotiate the value of said experience within a ruined and vacuous landscape, which, for Wells, is a place desolate and derelict. In *The Waste Land: Facsimile*, citizens of London can be read as the literary continuum of Wells's desolate London where technology still punctuates the landscape and the everyday has played out as prophesized by Wells.

In his book *Wasting Away*, Kevin Lynch informs that "[d]erelict land is often defined as land

so damaged by development that it is incapable of beneficial use without further treatment" (97). Eliot's speaker in "The Fire Sermon" occupies the derelict landscape to emphasize this point:

> The river's tent is broken; the last fingers of leaf
>
> Clutch and sink into the wet bank. The wind
>
> Crosses the brown land, unheard. The nymphs are departed.
>
> The river bears no empty bottles, sandwich papers,
>
> Silk handkerchiefs, cardboard boxes, cigarette ends
>
> Or other testimony of summer nights. (173-9)

The Waste Land is a stagnant, insipid landscape ruined in the wake of the war-technology wrought upon London and Europe after WWI. But Lynch claims: "Wastelands are 'timeless' places—not that they are eternal, but that there is no organization there; time does not seem to pass of itself" (150). The issue with Lynch's findings is in his distinction between ruined and abandoned places. For Lynch, a ruin is something "old, romantic, and disconnected from their own lives […] Ruins mean a lost civilization; they are exciting" (218). Though these scenes from *The Waste Land* would seem to agree that the ruins within the city represent a "lost" civilization, they are in no way exciting. Eliot's depiction of the technology-induced wasteland undermines pastoral conventions of preceding Romantic poets with the intent of absolving the city of its Romantic aesthetics. Furthermore, the city is not an abandoned place. The debris of civilization continues to litter an inhabited geography of ruined structures and ruined identities. The routine has, at least in Eliot's mind, reduced people into a stagnant society alienated by labor. Lynch's romanticized analysis does not account for the people who then return to inhabit these ruins within the context of modern, technology-driven societies. Once again, it presents ruins as a romanticized ideal from the limited vantage point of the ruin-gazer.

This same inhabited cityscape is described by Wells as, "a heap of fiery ruins" (55) with "countless ruins of shattered and gutted houses and blasted and blackened trees" (55). Wells concludes his assessment of these early "white and fresh" ruins by realizing: "[n]ever before in the history of warfare had destruction been so indiscriminate and so universal" (55). Thus, ruins have a sense of permanence even in the wake of being declassified from habitable to inhospitable, but it is also a stark reminder that the ruin's human counterparts and subjects are corporeal and subject to death and permanent decay. But Eliot had initially planned for a more sinister, darker vision of London. In an untitled draft in *The Waste Land*, Eliot writes: "To the sullen sunbaked houses and the withered trees…which winds and this wrinkled road twists and guesses…gathered strange images through which I walked alone" (1-5). The hopeless desolation and isolation of the individual stand out amidst the barren landscape. Consequently, Eliot can opine with confidence that his view of London, in the continuum of warfare's indiscriminate destruction and ruination of the city, is a "heap of broken images / where the sun beats, / And the dead tree gives no shelter" (22-3), which allows him to show his reader "fear in a handful of dust" (30). In Eliot's vision, "The river bears no

empty bottles, sandwich papers, / Silk handkerchiefs, cardboard boxes, cigarette ends / Or other testimony of summer nights" (176-8), is in similitude with Wells's "countless ruins of shattered and gutted houses and blasted (88). This splintered vision of London is the kind of evidence, or testimony, modern ruins produce.

In *The War of the Worlds*, Wells is overt in his concern that technology has the ability to displace people both temporally and psychologically by disrupting their relations to everydayness. The novel begins with an observation: "With infinite complacency men went to and fro over this globe about their little affairs" (7) accomplishing their "petty concerns" (12). But the technological invasion disrupts and reconfigures the everyday to the point where people are stunned, taken out of the familiar, and placed within a frame of mind where temporal and physical surroundings are a "crumbling ruin" (29). But still, we read of people who attempt to continue their mundane rituals as a way of coping with the inevitably changing landscape of the familiar. People within Wells's vision of London are stunned into disbelief and continue in the "labours of the day" (35) where "for the most part the daily routine of working, eating, drinking, sleeping, went on as it had done for countless years—as though no planet Mars existed in the sky" (36). In this way, the quotidian is also a vestige of days past because of the people's impulse to proceed in the "most ordinary way" to evade the terrors about them via the trains that run "about nine o'clock" (36). The people are acting out of a rational need to survive but they do so by attempting to revert back to their daily commuting schedule. Their attempts to rely on once familiar habits proves to be futile because soon this same crowd was "fighting savagely for standing-room at two o'clock" and "[b]y three, people were being trampled and crushed" (92). These structures, which had once been the steady emblem of reliable transportation that navigated between the public and private, are now mere illusions of past quotidian comforts. Transportation terminals are redefined as places "losing coherency, losing shape and efficiency, guttering, softening, running at last in that swift liquefaction of the social body" (92).

Eliot picks up on Wells's group of people who constitute the post-war social body when he views the marauding commuters in "The Burial of the Dead" as moving:

> Under the brown fog of a winter dawn,
>
> A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many,
>
> I had not thought death had undone so many.
>
> Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled,
>
> And each man fixed his eyes before his feet.
>
> Flowed up the hill and down King William Street,
>
> To where Saint Mary Woolworth kept the hours
>
> With a dead sound on a final stroke of nine. (61-8)

In this case, culture has lost its vibrancy; the setting is locked in a post-apocalyptic tenor by being cloaked under a dirty "brown fog" on a gloomy winter morning. Wells's text begins the initial, physical changes of ruined buildings and ruined days; it is Eliot who shifts focus from the remnants of man-made structures to individuals as vestiges of pre-war technological societies whose movements within a city are governed by the ringing bells that signal the start of a work day. In effect, this challenges Robert Ginsberg's notion that, through the survival of the ruin, "[w]e are released from the world's temporal and material limits" (322). If anything, society is confined by the temporality of the human body and the material limits of a capitalist society. Gail Cunningham's study of the everyday acknowledges that the optimal way to understand modern cities are through terms like "alienation, disconnection and anonymity" (8). Commuters, in particular, "represent a social and cultural shift in relations between different categories of space" while an individual commuter "experienced a daily spatial and temporal change, mediated by train" (8). In addition, Wells and Eliot encourage more discussion on the value of daily experience and emphasize the need for more comparisons between concrete structures and the human body.

Eliot's analysis of the day-to-day from the early drafts of *The Waste Land* is imperative to understanding the version published in 1922. The opening stanza to the first draft of "The Fire Sermon," for example, begins with the speaker being "Admonished by the sun's inclining ray" (1). The subversive religious register of the opening line is Eliot's early, pre-conversion writing; any religious allusions are diluted by his overt consternation with the routine of the modern world's temporality. The speaker feels reprimanded because the sunrise signals the start of another day not necessarily different than the day before. Nature, then, is illustrated as being complicit in its construction of the quotidian because of its cyclical patterns that parallel the repetition of daily habits. The speaker is disinclined to answer the "Electric summons of the busy bell" (5) that call him from the private sphere of his bedroom and into London's quotidian landscape. As a response, the speaker slips "back between conscious sheets" (15). It is tempting to understand this initial action as a rejection of participating in the quotidian, but it is more a confirmation of his lack of desire to participate in his mandated engagement with society. The private and public domains are fused by quotidian impulses when noting that "conscious sheets" has the same phonetic register as "concrete streets." This encourages the reader to make a connection to the speaker walking the streets of London, "Huddled between the concrete and the sky" (107). The speaker becomes metaphorically blanketed between manmade structures, confined within the geography of the city. But in this instance, the alarm clock, a benign yet prevalent fixture in any home, is the non-human actant that weakens an individual's capacity to form a substantial part of the public. Consequently, this negates any intimate relationship the self can have with his or her community.

Similarly, when Wells depicts the "liquefaction of the social body" (92), it is technology that reinforces quotidian action upon which the people of the city are subconsciously dependent. When the misuse of the more malignant "intensity" of war-technologies disrupts the dependency of transportation, it is the social body that is weakened to the point of ruination. This creates an equation that has technology as the initial actant that results in the ruination of architecture and the bifurcation of the quotidian as constitution of public workplace tasks and private mundane rituals. Thus, we see suburban areas begin to inundate the peripheries of the city, which eventually has its own

transitional phase into the makings of what parallels modern urban landscapes.

In the suburb, the benign technologies that are of concern to Eliot become the tools for coping with the devaluation of everyday experience. In so doing, as Phil Turner found in his recent study, "we adjust our everyday practices to accommodate [new technologies]" (127). These new technologies, according to Jane Bennett, contain the power to easily "slip through" and "startle" daily practices (107). This creates a palimpsest between the memories of yesterday's rituals with today's practices. For example, in the midst of the traumatic events of *The War of the Worlds*, Wells's narrator observes how "the milkman came" as if nothing had happened (38); the narrator himself realizes that he quickly became "immediately the self of every day again—a decent, ordinary citizen" (31). People comfortable within the quotidian, by nature, are more inclined to resist change on a large-scale, but technology's agentic qualities curtail this resistance by becoming the catalyst for gradual changes in both private and public life. And for its inhabitants, the suburb itself is a realm of conatus juxtaposed with the atemporal ruin.

Wells, like Eliot, has always been critical of the suburb. In *The War in the Air*, he writes, "This little community had returned from its original habits of suburban parasitism to what no doubt had been the normal life of humanity for nearly immemorial years…a life that breaths and exhales the scent of cows and finds the need for stimulants satisfied by the activity of the bacteria and vermin it engenders" (264). In *The War of the Worlds*, the people reside within what is described as the "silent wilderness of houses" (169). Thus, similar to Wells, Eliot's description of London is consciously not a salubrious cityscape. References to the quotidian survived the early drafts of *The Waste Land* and are more than what Sultan Sabbar mislabels as "superfluous elements" (93). Instead, Eliot's intent is the same as Wells's: to display mundane everydayness in the wake of war-torn London. Both illustrate technologies as actants for change within social and political spheres while simultaneously calling attention to traumatic post-war experience. Wells uses the familiarity with and nostalgia of the everyday to provide a way for the narrative observer to cope with and process technology's violence and overall capacity for destruction. The paradox is that war technology's disruption and creation of a ruin is the intercession between individuals and awareness of mundane everydayness. Thus, reconstituted is the modern quotidian where Eliot's marauders of bleak London inhabit. When Wells's characters flee from the Martian technology, which is the cause of the ruined landscape, they symbolize modern citizens running from technological advancements.

Both authors rely on the everyday to cope with tragedy, violence, and technology's over-abundance. Warning to the over-abundant use of technology creates a distance between an individual in society and the natural surroundings with which familiarity is preferred. For Edensor, these occurrences produce: "[t]he ghosts of place…provoking a homely recognition of forgotten familiarity…[S]uch traces can rouse involuntary memories, an unexpected catapulting of the past into the present…they are able to conjure up intimations of an intangible hazy past ("Vernacular Workplace Culture" 1-2). This is precisely what happens to the narrator in *The War of the Worlds*, when he divulges: "At times I suffer from the strangest sense of detachment from myself and the world about me; I seem to watch it all from the outside, from somewhere inconceivably remote, out of time, out of space, out of stress and tragedy from it all" (32).

Ultimately, Wells's traumatized inhabitants of London and people within Eliot's post-war London began to dehumanize the people around them by illustrating them as "human machines." The adoption of technological jargon to describe the human body also suggests a more significant alteration in perceptual imagery and understanding of what it means to be human in a post-war society (51). Because of the power and pronounced placement of technology and its ability to control, Eliot articulates a similar description: At the violet hour, when the eyes and back // Turn upward from the desk, when the human engine waits // Like a taxi throbbing waiting (215-7). Being set within the everyday work environment, the rhapsody of "the violet hour" is denied any positive outlook with individual experience because the quotidian has ensnared the people who lack an internal compass. The only movement afforded them is "when the eyes and back // Turn upward from the desk" travelling home via the permissive stroke of the five o'clock bell. There is no existence outside the mundane; therefore, there can be no ideal in a city infused only by the pattern of daily routine from the workers walking the streets to the typist at home participating in her daily routine. The mechanized motions used by both Eliot and Wells speak to the troubles of a population ensnared within the technological confines of modernity.

These ruined sites become the testimonials that Eliot's speaker will use as the evidentiary "fragments I have shored against my ruins" (430). The first person "my" places the speaker within the ruined landscape without escape from the city or the technology that controls it. For example, a recent sociological study presents a paradox in that technologies "can facilitate and simplify everyday occupations; on the other hand, it might also be a hindrance or a potential hazard…Due to the increased use of technology, the performance of a number of everyday activities has changed" ("Management of Everyday Technology Assessment" 26). The difficultly is in the idea of "making it our own" (26). Neither Wells nor Eliot have much faith in the ability of the people who inhabit the modern city to adjust and adapt to the sudden influx of culture-defining technology without adopting the verbiage and technological jargon for describing personal human interactions.

In particular, Eliot seems to have the desire to completely renounce technology and wishes the rest of civilization would do the same. However, Eliot's veridical account of early twentieth century London is one that recognizes that technology cannot be evicted from common experience. The "machine aesthetic" breeds discontinuity for Wells, when he observes: "I had not realised what had been happening to the world, had not anticipated this startling vision of unfamiliar things. I had expected to see Sheen in ruins--I found about me the landscape, weird and lurid, of another planet" (144). Here, the scenery changes from the strange and unfamiliar to the wreckage of the familiar. When daily comforts are effectively ruined, the realities of immediate surroundings are realized and understood in a new way. Even when Eliot's speaker inhabits a murky corner near the gashouses, he can still hear the buzzing of the streets. As for Wells, the detachment is noticeable and the ruined lot is inescapable. Unable to evade the decayed structures, their sermonized voices reverberate within the texts: "Woe unto this unfaithful city" (137-8); and Eliot's famed line that laments London as "Unreal City" suggests that it is a desolate place even though it may not be abandoned.

Abandoned places are relatively easy to define, as Dylan Trigg confers with Lynch that an absence of reason "acts as a spatial terminus in which the embodiment of silence and nothingness

occurs" (95) and "[i]ndividualized decay mirrors social decay" (99). These points of view result in the "nostalgic idealization of the past" (99). Perhaps both Wells and Eliot are at fault here; both are complicit in overlooking the technologies that produce music and art or the technology that makes literature and publication possible. However, their nostalgia never veers towards seeing the ruin in the suburb or within London as "an object of aesthetic contemplation" (99). Such views often omit from consideration the myriad psychological effects upon the people who inhabit ruined structures. Depictions of ruins as liminal spaces that transcend temporality have their weaknesses. Primarily, it ignores the human consciousness and any consideration of the traumatic. For Wells, the people who inhabit ruins have experienced great social and individual traumas that contort their understanding of time, but the technologies that caused the desolation are still visible within the periphery, suggesting the kind of dystopic future that Eliot illustrates in his poem.

In a similar vein, Ted Gournelos suggests that "hyper-masculinity and faith in technology have destroyed the utopia of family and country the suburbs were supposed to protect" (510). Joe Moran cites criticism of the suburban utopia with scorn saying, "suburbia…is imagined as a space of vulgarity, insularity, and conformity" (122). Sequestered within formerly suburbanite areas are the potential for individual non-conformists to arise from within the ruin. Wells does offer some hope for this by noticing that "[t]he most extraordinary thing came to mind, of all the strange and wonderful things that happened upon that Friday, was the dovetailing of the commonplace habits of our social order with the first beginnings of the series of events that was to topple that social order headlong" (35). The movement between the discontinuity of the social order within the construction of Moran's "new town" and the treatment of non-human objects as actants for social change also allows for the argument of new ideas and beliefs that can be progenies of technological advancements, alienation, and trauma.

Robert Romanyshyn distinguishes two characteristics of thought: alienation and homecoming. Alienation is "the kind of thinking that in distancing itself from the lived body breaks the bonds between the sensual flesh of the body and sensuous allures of the world" (211). The artillery-man is a representation of thinking from the point of exile. The ruin is a monument within the present but also a structure transcendent of time in the sense that its metaphorical representation cannot always be demarcated by time. The trauma induced by technology puts limitations on contemporary society's ability to think within the parameters of "responsive thinking" classified as "homecoming" (211). Homecoming, he summarizes, is a "home which does not exist but paradoxically always is…a nostalgic home of desire. It is the home out of which dreams of paradise and tales of the gardens of Eden are born" (51-2). The issue here is Romanyshyn's notion of "homecoming" as "thinking, which is being responsive to technology" is a recapitulation of the romantic views held by Edensor, Ginsberg, and others. This reading of both Wells and Eliot complicates this theory because the meditation and reflection on technology is the very entity that forces them to think from exile. Both the artillery-man and the speaker in *The Waste Land* are forced to think from exile: exiled by the dominant presence of technology and the many derelict features of the city.

Moreover, the artillery-man's appearance in the appropriately titled chapter, "What we saw from the ruined house," touches on the issue that scholars of ruin and decay often discuss mini-

mally, or overlook completely: the occupant's psychological state of mind while within the ruin. This identity exists within a fragmented space disconnected from the contours of the familiar but in a liminal state in which technological forces are determined as the culprit behind individual alienation. Thinking in exile gives the artillery-man, whose occupation, it can be presumed, was to operate heavy guns to fight the invading alien race, a certain ethos; however, he is also experiencing post-traumatic stress. It is in this state of mind that he has an epiphany:

> All these--the sort of people that lived in these houses, and all those damn little clerks that used to live down that way--they'd be no good…skedaddling back for fear they wouldn't be in time for dinner; keeping indoors after dinner for fear of the back streets, and sleeping with the wives they married, not because they wanted them, but because they had a bit of money that would make for safety in their one little miserable skedaddle through the world….They'll wonder what people did before there were Martians to take care of them. (155)

The non-human objects and the desolated state of the neighborhood are the impetus for critically analyzing the use of technology and how easily it caused the destruction around him. From exile, this raging critique produces repugnance for the everyday from one who is resistant but cognizant of the actants that forced upon them this ruined condition. Consequently, as the artillery-man predicts, technology keeps people performing the mundane, working-class tasks that have and will continue to make them weak. Furthermore, it evicts individual identity and begets dreamless, passionless drones who occupy very little of the external world around them in favor of commuting to and from work and staying indoors. The mass production and quick integration of technology has retarded the intellectual and emotional development of the human race and dehumanized the people of London into rodents who breed generations of offspring whose primary function will be to propel the mundane cycle as promulgated by the modern city.

Thus, while ensconced in the ruin, the artillery-man devises a plan: "The risk is that we who keep wild will go savage--degenerate into a sort of big, savage rat.... You see, how I mean to live is underground" (157). The artillery-man reconstitutes the city as a "non-place," which Mark Auge suggests are places of "supermodernity" where daily habitué becomes suspended temporally while technology can be assessed and reintegrated (2). Designated places once used to discharge human waste and to carry people about their daily tasks become reconstituted as an underground haven and the only way by which humans can escape technology's power for devastation. Similarly, it can be read as an example of reverse evolution that reshapes Darwin's notion of the survival of the fittest. But it is also Wells's social commentary pertaining to the question of national power: those who have the most advanced weaponry will dominate, and those who are defeated must then learn to live within the dirty periphery of a devalued city.

The rat is also a powerful image in Eliot's poem. The flowing crowds are oblivious to the external world, whose movements are marked not by individual expression, but complete conformity that is confirmed, "With a dead sound on the final stroke of nine" (68). Consonance in "brown," "dawn," "crowd," and "flowed" add to the cyclical pattern. The quotidian bells from the early draft are heard now in the clock tower signaling the start of another work day. The final version of "The

Fire Sermon" confirms this fixation with quotidian landscapes:

> A rat crept softly through the vegetation
>
> Dragging its slimy belly on the bank
>
> While I was fishing the dull canal
>
> On a winter evening round behind the gashouse
>
> [...]
>
> But at my back from time to time I hear
>
> The sounds of horns and motors, which shall bring
>
> Sweeney to Mrs. Porter in the Spring. (187-99)

The technology brought in by William Murdoch involving manufactured gas in London allowed for electricity to be distributed to homes, but this technology also required large gashouses and ultimately gas house districts which reconstituted an area of London for blue-collar workers. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, gashouses and gashouse districts were always a place of grime and low-income housing. With the advent of different, more efficient technologies, this created what Edensor calls the "dynamism of capitalism and its tendencies to rearrange economic and social ordering" ("Vernacular Workplace Culture" 3). In both texts, derelict factories are not the victims of time's passage, but the result of either the oppressive use of technology or simply examples of technology that is outdated and whose remnants must now occupy previously vacant space for indefinite storage. But the bleak landscape offers no renewal of spirit. Al-Joulan, et al. call attention to this question of authenticity by claiming: "The natural cannot stand the cultivated, falsified notion of its genuine essence" (267). The rat is evidence of such a "falsified notion" against the romanticized ideal. Hence, the bleak register of "The Fire Sermon" is now trampled by the rat; it is tainted and the river yields no fish because pastoral rhetoric has failed, and, while the speaker has his back to the humdrum nature of city life, he is not completely detached from it; hence, nature rejects his quest for solidarity. The "dull canal" is impotent (189); its presence is connected to the gashouse where natural resources are extracted from the land and used to perpetuate the quotidian cycle that leads away from nature. The senses are then dulled by the sounds of motorists navigating the labyrinth of London's city streets.

The degenerate images and metaphors in both texts support the notion that ruination of physical structures precedes the eventual and subtle degradation of the individual human psyche. To this effect, as Patricia Dunmire writes, Wells was always keen on providing a warning on the consequences of "new inventions and new devices…from the automobile to armaments" (30). Dunmire reminds us that Wells was always prescient to not only how technology functioned in the present but how technology would evolve and shape the future. By employing futural thinking, he wanted to educate people on the inevitable consequences of technology, particularly devastating war-technology "before, rather than after, 'they hit us hard'" (Dunmire 30). Wells, who is writing in

the shadows of the Boer War, seemingly anticipates a greater war than even that conflict had been. In an address to the BBC, Wells adopted the same tone as used in *The War of the Worlds* and warned that "if it is not to be peace foreseen and planned and established, then it will be disaster and death" ("Wanted--Professors of Foresight" 2). After all, it was the speaker in *The War of the Worlds* who said that the impending disasters were available for him to view, as the alien technology: "must have fallen while I was sitting, visible to me had I only looked up as it passed" (13). Wells wanted people to not be caught stunned like the people depicted in *The Waste Land* whose only view of the external world was of their feet striding along the pavement.

It is not until the conclusion of *The War of the Worlds*, the ominously titled "Dead London," that the rhetoric underlines the potential for both disaster and death. The speaker concludes somberly: "I go to London and see the busy multitudes…and it comes across my mind that they are but the ghosts of the past, haunting the streets that I have seen silent and wretched, going to and fro, phantasms in a dead city, the mockery of life in a galvanised body" (180). These are scenes that can easily be set within the context of the early draft of *The Waste Land* and the final, published version where the "Phantasmal gnomes" (changed from "Phantasmal goblins" before complete omission in the final poem) loiter the streets, themselves as the living ghosts of their former selves. There is an implicit disassociation of the body when it is stunned by traumatic experience, which is then set against the silhouette of vacant lots and derelict buildings. Wells gives us a dead London, which Eliot neither revives, nor offers much hope that it will be resuscitated as the poem begins with a rejection of spring-time rejuvenation in the "dead land" (2) set within "The Burial of the Dead."

Few could argue that Wells's prophecy and Eliot's anxiety are not relevant for a twenty-first century audience. And I agree with Stephen Kern that "technological developments are temporally specific events that often affect great numbers of people" (6). One need only to read a recent New York Times article by Frank Burni in which he describes portable technologies as keeping us "[i]n our digital cocoons, we go everywhere and nowhere" ("Traveling Without Seeing") or John Markoff's front-page story detailing Google's new plans to build robots "to free humans from drudgery and repetitive tasks" ("Google Puts Money on Robots, Using the Man behind Android"). We are finding quite easily that technology can be made our own and can reshape our daily activities. Handheld technologies, in particular, have upended our communications with one another. These are not fictional narratives from *fin de siècle*. These are the result of technological advancements made for the alleviation of the quotidian, a remedy for the mundane. And in texts where non-human actants continue to reshape the everyday, in the future, non-corporeal humanoids will perhaps attempt to wholly circumvent the quotidian. In either case, it appears that in our over-indulgence of technological gadgetry, we are creating our own narrative in which the humans that occupy the cityscape and rural landscape will become more like phantoms in a technologically-advanced but nevertheless *un*real city.

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Isolation as a Source of Insanity: *The Prisoner of Chillon* and Failed Communities

Brittany Radine

Romantic period authors often focus on the concept of community in their writings, as well as shared intimate communities with other writers, such as the Wordsworth-Coleridge circle and the Byron-Shelley circle. However, these Romantic writers often explore the desire to be part of a community, or the desire to escape a community, through isolated narrators. The isolated protagonists often seek solace in a place apart from their community or are often forcefully removed and kept in places of solitude. One such poem that features the second scenario is Lord Byron's poem *The Prisoner of Chillon*, where the narrator is imprisoned because of his status as a rebel. *The Prisoner of Chillon* has garnished little academic attention within the past decade, making it an ideal candidate for scholarly revival and academic focus. Pre-2000's scholars, including Gerald Wood, William Ulmer, and Vincent Newey, often studied Byron's poem in regards to the Prisoner's mental state, his relationship to nature, and his imprisonment. A more recent scholar, Emily Bernhard Jackson, contradicted previous ideas on the Prisoner's lapse into mental degradation by stating the text actually displays mental growth through a reconfiguration of surroundings.[1] I disagree with Bernhard's argument and believe *The Prisoner of Chillon* shows the progression of the narrator's mental lapse; however, I believe this mental lapse is a result of isolation and failed attempts to escape solitude. The Prisoner's mental breakdown can be traced through his diction that changes from community based ("we") to isolation ("I") in the duration of the poem as a result of his failed attempts to form and maintain a community.

At the start of the poem, the unnamed Prisoner reveals his idea that communities are linked by family lineage and fate. As Colin Jager acknowledges, Byron demonstrates a specific interest with "blood," the literal substance as well as family connections, in his personal life and his writings. He notes Byron's fixation on lineage and claims that both his personal life and literary works seem to leave problems associated with blood unanswered and without a solution (21). In *The Prisoner*

1 For the full article and argument, please refer to Bernhard Jackson's article "Underground Knowledge: *The Prisoner of Chillon* and the Genesis of Byronic Knowing" (2011).

of Chillon, the Prisoner uses lineage to establish a community with his family, "And for the same his lineal race/ In darkness found a dwelling place" (15-16). Even further, the Prisoner claims his community, which is based on blood, is also communally linked because the members share the same fate, "And mine has been the fate of those/ To whom the goodly earth and air/ Are bann'd and barr'd-" (8-10). These lines explain that the Prisoner's community is not only his blood family, but also a community of rebels and martyrs. He forms his own identity not by describing himself, but by describing how his perceived community suffers the same fate. His entire community of rebels, which includes his father, his family, and himself, have all been imprisoned and "bann'd" from participating in other communities, thus segregating them and strengthening internal community bonds. The concept of a community linked by both family ties and fate is perfectly summarized in the following line, "Dying how their father died," (23). The Prisoner's community follows their family's footsteps and shares the same end- death. Additionally, the Prisoner uses plural language to demonstrate his familial relationships, "We were seven-who now are one," (17).[2] This line depicts the beginning of the Prisoner's movement from community towards isolation. The dash punctuation in the middle of the line severs and separates his communal identity from his isolated identity as he reveals that he is now "one" and alone. At the beginning of the poem, the Prisoner's inclusive plural diction of "we" allows him to express a community based on lineage and fate and allows him to mold his own communal identity as a rebel.

The death of the Prisoner's last remaining brother permanently detaches him from his communal identity. The narrator becomes self-aware of his isolation and realizes there is no one left alive for him to share a community with. He realizes that his connection to his family has ended, "His martry'd father's dearest thought" (168). His brother, his father's favorite, symbolically connected the narrator with his father and his father's rebel identity. Without his brother, the narrator has little or no connection to his father. The Prisoner begins to transform into a Byronic hero who is aware of his isolation and pities himself and his circumstances; however, it is interesting to note that the Prisoner does not display the Byronic quality of invulnerability. He expresses his grief over his brother's death as well as his own self-pity in a long emotional rant:

And rush'd to him:- I found him not,

I only stirr'd in this black spot,

I only lived, *I* only drew

The accursed breath of dungeon-dew;

The last- the sole- the dearest link

Between me and the eternal brink,

Which bound me to my failing race,

Was broken in this fatal place. (211-218)

Again, the first dash plays with the idea of his changing identity from a community member into an

2 This line also alludes to William Wordsworth's poem "We are Seven" that also explores the idea of family ties and the death of siblings.

isolated individual as he discovers his last living brother is dead. This passage also clearly reiterates the importance of his brother as the last link between himself and the "eternal brink," or isolation. He admits that he no longer has a connection to his community because his brother died. The alliteration of the consonant "d" helps create a dreary tone that emphasizes the desperation and desolation of the narrator's new lonely situation. Perhaps the most austere change, the Prisoner changes his diction to reflect his state of isolation by using "I". Not only is it amply used four times in three lines (211-213), but the italics also draw attention to his new situation and hyperbolize his expression of Byronic traits.

After his isolation and a mental slip into anguish, the narrator attempts to create a new community in place of the one he lost. When a bird comes to visit him during his grieving, the Prisoner believes it is his brother's freed spirit and endeavors to form a new community with it. The poem, narrated by the unreliable Prisoner, draws uncanny parallels between the Prisoner's brother and the bird. The first description of the brother in the poem states:

> The youngest, whom my father loved,
>
> Because our mother's brow was given
>
> To him, with eyes as blue as heaven-
>
> For him my soul was sorely moved;
>
> And truly might it be distress'd
>
> To see such bird in such a nest;
>
> For he was beautiful as day. (73-79)

The brother is described as a beautiful creature with blue eyes and is interestingly linked to a bird and the daytime. Similarly, the bird comes to visit the Prisoner during the day and represents the same kind of beauty as the brother. He describes the bird as "A lovely bird, with azure wings" (268). The blue wings correspond directly with the brother's eyes. Additionally, the bird appears to represent the Prisoner's community he shared with his brother by displaying the same type of love and relationship, "And it was come to love me when/ None lived to love me so again" (275-276). The Prisoner's brother was the last one alive who loved him, and now the bird has come when the Prisoner is the last one alive to give him love again. David Punter explores the use of animals in romantic poetry and coined the term "shadow animal" to explain that, in Romantic period texts, animals are often shadows of the "inner world" of characters and authors that are outwardly projected and cast by people's bodies (230-231). In other words, animals are projections of people's inner desires. Interestingly, the Prisoner gives a rationale for the bird's visit, "It seemed like me to want a mate" (273). Weather the bird wants a mate or not is irrelevant, but, according to Punter, the Prisoner's claim that the bird desires a mate is a reflection of the Prisoner's own internal longings for a friend, or a community.[3] This corresponds with Ian Dennis' claim that Byron's imprisonment narratives turn "the attention of the poems inward upon their respective protagonists" (145). The utilization of

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3 The bird alludes to the Albatross in Samuel Taylor Coleridge's *Rime of the Ancient Mariner*, where the Albatross also presents the possibility of forming a new community.

the bird and the Prisoner's projection reveals that communities are essential in maintaining sanity.

After the bird flies away, the Prisoner abandons hope and fails to form a lasting community. Perhaps the happiest moment in the poem, the Prisoner seeks solace in the possibility of being friends with the bird and appears to heal from his long lapse into insanity where time, light, and air appear not to exist- only darkness. The bird brought light and hope. However, once the bird flies away, the Prisoner slips back into an unhealthy mental state and reverts to Byronic tendencies:

And then 'twas mortal well I knew,

For he would never thus have flown,

And left me twice so doubly lone,

Lone- as the corse within its shroud,

Lone- as a solitary cloud. (290-294).

The narrator's psyche worsens two-fold, signified by "doubly," as he begins to display self-pity again. "Doubly" is followed by two repetitive lines that start with "Lone" to accentuate his solitude. His speech also displays the use of "I" to signify his failed attempt to form a community with the bird as he relapses into crippling and toxic self-degradation.

At the end of the poem, the Prisoner is freed by his captors and released from his chains, but sees no point in leaving his cell because he has no community. Despite the failed effort with the bird, the Prisoner makes one last attempt to avoid solitude and the lonely world that awaits him outside his cell:

These heavy walks to me had grown

A hermitage- and all my own!

And half I felt as they were come

To tear me from my second home:

With spiders I had friendship made,

And watch'd them in their sullen trade,

Had seen the mice by moonlight play,

And why should I feel less that they?

We were all inmates of one place,

And I, the monarch of each race,

Had power to kill- yet, strange to tell! (377-387)

At first, the narrator contemplates isolation by stating that the hermitage was solely his; however, he

quickly changes his mind and attempts to incorporate the spiders and mice into his community. His jail cell has become his "home," which connotes a sense of comfort and complacency with his cell. His comparison of himself to the spiders and mice degrades his humanity as he endeavors to form a community with the creatures. His attempt also depicts his negative mental state and desperation to have someone aside from himself. Interestingly, the Prisoner does not focus on the spider and mice's value in comparison to his own life; instead, he hints that the difference between himself and the creatures is that the spiders and mice still have other members left of their species, unlike the Prisoner whose relations were severed. This failed community of creatures suggests that the Prisoner desires a community with his own race, not just with anyone or anything. He strives to feel better by allocating himself power and stating that he can kill the other creatures. However, he eventually decides against it, possibly realizing that the creatures would then be in his same painful and isolated situation. The Prisoner uses the diction of "we" to refer to his cellmate creatures, but reverts back to "I", further symbolizing a failed community. Although physically free, the narrator exemplifies the concept of "open entombment," which Erin Shelley notes is associated with Lord Byron's writings such as *Manfred* and *The Prisoner of Chillon* (56). The narrator is no longer physically captured, but he is mentally imprisoned, or entombed, by his own mind. His action of giving up trying to form a community displays the ultimate mental degradation. Without a community of his own, such as the ones the spiders and mice share with their own species, the narrator sees no point in being free to explore the world. He views the possibility of an isolated world as an oppressive and lonely tomb.

The last part of the poem provides a hint as to why the Prisoner desires to avoid isolation. The Prisoner essentially explains that he desires a community based on the fact that he has always been a part of one. He suggests he does not know another lifestyle and has become complacent:

> My very chains and I grew friends,
>
> So much a long communion tends
>
> To make us what we are:- even I
>
> Regain'd my freedom with a sigh. (389-392)

The Prisoner reveals that "communion," a pun on the religious term that suggests a relationship and union with God, makes people comfortable with their situation. In other words, communities make people feel comfortable being around other people. The Prisoner dislikes his new situation because it is new and forces him to change. He was happy with his family, but had to alter his life when they died. Then, the Prisoner became friends with his chains, further suggesting his mental degradation by accepting his isolated state and giving up hope, but was unhappily forced to change again when he received his freedom. He expresses this sentiment elsewhere in the poem after he receives his freedom and looks out the window at nature,

> Once more, the mountains high,
>
> The quiet of a loving eye.
>
> I saw them- and they were the same.
>
> They were not changed like me in frame. (330-333)

The Prisoner constructs his vision of his external world through his own gaze and memory and decides that it is unchanged (Hubbell 16). Nature displays enduring aspects that the Prisoner does not. He severs himself from nature by commenting on how his situation and frame has changed repeatedly as opposed to nature's permanence. He uses this as validation to feed his unhealthy mental state and decides to remain in his prison cell rather than explore his new freedom. Additionally, his diction demonstrates his separation from nature. He uses the diction "I" to show his isolated state and describes the mountains as "they," a separate entity from himself and a stark contrast from the "we" he repeatedly uses when trying to create a community. At the lowest point of his mental state, the Prisoner abandons all hope in trying to form a community even though nature appears to hold the stability he desperately craves. The end of the poem reveals the Prisoner's uneasiness with new situations that involve isolation and quickens his mental degradation by allowing him to think he does not belong in nature's permanence.

As a result of his failed attempts to form and maintain a community, the Prisoner's mental breakdown can be traced through his changing diction throughout the poem. The Prisoner begins his story by explaining that his ties to his community are based on family lineage and blood. Ironically, the familial blood that links him to this community of rebels is also spilled as a result as member dies off. He initially begins the poem using the inclusive diction "we" but begins to use "I" in order to show his transition into solitude after his brother's death. His brother's death severs his last remaining tie to his family and results in the Prisoner's display of Byronic qualities, save for invincibility, that exhibit self-pity for his lonely state. After displaying mental degradation for a time, the Prisoner receives his first opportunity at reforming a community with a free bird. The poem parallels the bird to the Prisoner's dead brother and reveals the Prisoner's internal desire to form a community. However, after the bird flies away, the Prisoner reverts back to Byronic tendencies and pities his situation. His diction switches to "I" again to express his isolation. In one last ditch effort that exemplifies his mental deterioration, the Prisoner attempts to form a community with his cell mates- the spiders and mice. However, the Prisoner notes that the difference between himself and the creatures is that the critters still have members of their own species. His revelation reveals his desire for a community with people of his own species. Additionally, his language changes from "we," originally including the creatures, to "I" to signify another failed community. The end of the text suggests why the Prisoner seeks a community. He declares his longing to be with other people because he has always had companions; therefore, he is uncomfortable with isolation and change. He further presents his disquiet by separating himself from nature because he observes nature's stability. He suggests that he does not belong in nature because he has changed numerous times along with his situation. The Prisoner demonstrates an extreme low in his mental state by foregoing attempts to form communities. Although he receives his freedom, he exhibits the ultimate mental deterioration by remaining in his cell instead of seeking the permanence of nature.

The Prisoner of Chillon emphasizes the importance and power of communities. Without a solid community or family, isolation has the power to negatively affect people's psyches. People have an innate connection with other humans and often seek lasting communities, thus making the idea of acceptance, especially for children, detrimental for healthy brain development as well as for the formation of a unique and stable self-identity. As a result of his isolation, the Prisoner lost his connection to his family and his shared identity. A concept familiar to Lord Byron, loneliness possesses the power to disrupt people's lives and mental states. Even though the *Prisoner of Chillon* ends neg-

atively for the Prisoner because his mental lapse results from several failed attempts to form a community, it does present the positive notion that it only takes one other person to from a community and improve a person's mental psyche. The poem reveals the importance of stable communities and the concept of inclusion in order to allow for a firm mind and a well-developed personal identity.

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Guantánamo Bay: The Contortion of Law for a Neo-Imperialist Agenda

Queenie Sukhadia

Guantánamo Bay, which has been a space used by the American government post-9/11 to detain and interrogate suspected terrorists, shares a fraught relationship with the American law. While some theorists claim that this space represents a legal vacuum where the government disregards the law, other theorists such as Muneer Ahmad claim that Guantánamo is marked by hyperlegality. However, I think that this theoretical conversation about Guantánamo often blurs two distinct time frames that mark the Guantánamo Bay detention operations – the time frame before the federal courts first adjudicated a case in relation to Guantánamo, Rasul v. Bush (2004), deciding that "Guantánamo detainees have a right to bring habeas petitions to the federal courts" (Saito 160), and the time frame after federal courts intervened in the American detention operations at Guantánamo. I want to use this paper to parse out how American law is functioning in Guantánamo and why it is being made to function in this way, while locating such an analysis firmly in the period before the federal courts intervened.

In his article "Resisting Guantánamo," Ahmad analyzes hyperlegality at Guantánamo through a discussion of the "contest for judicial involvement" (1707) between the federal courts and the Executive, where the federal courts would pass a law and the Executive would contest it or try to narrow its scope by moving the Congress to create an "ad hoc system" (Ahmad 1729) of military commissions and tribunals that functioned as law. Thus, Ahmad's discussion of hyperlegality is situated primarily in the moments after the federal courts have intervened. He makes only a cursory gesture to the time of Guantánamo's inception, when "it sought to detain and interrogate indefinitely, without charge, and without opportunity for judicial review, any non-US citizen in the world whom the Executive deemed to be an 'enemy combatant' (Ahmad 1705). However, Ahmad, in his discussion of post- federal court intervention, makes a critical insight when he cedes that "law has been deployed to create the preconditions of a state power …[that is] brutal" (1687). I am interested in transposing this claim back to the time of Guantánamo's inception and investigating whether the American law was functioning in this perverse way even then, and if it was, what objects it was achieving through such a function.

Thus, in this paper, I argue that the law was used as a political instrument at Guantánamo's inception and through a close reading of Mohamedou Ould Slahi's memoir, *Guantánamo Diary,* I claim that the law was employed in this way to serve the American neo-imperialist agenda of disciplining racialized bodies and governments threatening to disrupt American hegemony over the global political order. I will first use some research to build a framework to understand how the law is being deployed as a political instrument before I perform a reading of Slahi's *Guantánamo Diary* to closely investigate why the law is being made to function in this manner.

Guantánamo Bay is an American naval base located in Cuba, "held in perpetual lease by the U.S. military" (Sims 58). As per United States Code, the U.S. has "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction" over "any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States" (U.S. Code Title 18, §7). However, this territory is still "under the sovereignty of Cuba" (Franklin). This unique situation implies a dual territorial jurisdiction claim – while America had jurisdiction over Guantánamo, Cuba had ultimate jurisdiction.

However, the American jurisdictional claim over Guantánamo changed post 9/11. As Natsu Taylor Saito notes, "In September 2001, immediately after nineteen young men used hijacked airliners to destroy the twin towers of the World Trade Center and significantly damage the Pentagon, President George W. Bush declared war on terrorism" (153). Further, since the U.S. "was at war with terrorists, and because it was at war, the president enjoyed unlimited war powers" (Pyle 21). Thus, through a declaration of a war on terror, the political branches of the American government suspended the law and enjoyed amplified wartime powers. Since Guantánamo did partly come under American jurisdiction as established earlier, here too, law was suspended and the Bush administration exerted increased powers.

Based on this situation, where, through a declaration of war on terror, a precarious federal jurisdiction over Guantánamo was suspended, Guantánamo has often been theoretically conceptualized to exist in a legal vacuum. Christopher Pyle states that the American government created "legal 'black holes'… [that] evade[d] the application of American law" (21), whereas Ahmad, in his fleeting reference to Guantánamo at inception, claims that this detention camp was a "stand-in for… abandonment of the rule of law" (1689). Thus, the theoretical conversation about Guantánamo Bay, prior to federal court intervention, centers on the notion of "*inter armas silent leges* (in times of war the laws are silent)" (Saito 4).

However, I propose that Guantánamo was a rights-vacuum, in that the prisoners were removed from the "ambit of both the Geneva Conventions and the U.S. courts" (Ahmad 1705), but it was not a legal vacuum, where such a term is understood to be a total absence of law. This is so because the Bush administration enacted a suspension of law through the law. Here, it is important to take into consideration the plenary power doctrine – "a doctrine … used by the Supreme Court … to say that Congress and the executive, as the political branches of government, have plenary – full or complete and therefore unchallengeable - power with respect to national security" (Saito 5). In other words, as Saito states, "when the plenary power is invoked, the courts will not intervene to enforce otherwise applicable guarantees of the Constitution" (5). Thus, the Presidential decision to suspend the law occurred through a reliance on law and the Guantánamo detention camp is not marked by a silence or absence of law, but bears the imprint of a fully legal decision.

Further, as Giorgio Agamben states, “The expression *full powers* … which is sometimes used to characterize the state of exception refers to the expansion of the powers of the government, and in particular the conferral on the executive of the power to issue decrees having the force of law” (5). In declaring the war on terror as an exception to normal governance practices, the government not only suspended American law using the law, but also substituted federal law with a fully political version of the law. At this juncture, it is important to pay heed to Agamben's directive that “if exceptional measures are the results of periods of political crisis, … [they] must be understood on political and not juridico - constitutional grounds” (1). Therefore, it is now imperative to think of the American government's suspension of the law through the law on political grounds, with a political agenda. The next question to follow, then, is – what political agendas does this serve?

Carl Schmitt intervenes here to connect the declaration of a state of exception to a dictatorship by defining the sovereign as “he who decides on the state of exception” (qtd. in Humphreys 680). Judith Butler reinforces this fact when she explains that the two forms of government – governmentality, “a mode of power concerned with the maintenance and control of bodies and persons, the production and regulation of persons and populations, and the circulation of goods insofar as they maintain and restrict the life of the population” (52) and sovereignty, may not be as chronologically distinct as commonly assumed. Butler observes that, “sovereignty is reintroduced [into governmentality] in the very acts by which state suspends law, or contorts law to its own uses” (55). Thus, in the act of declaring the war on terror as a state of exception and substituting the federal law with a political approximation of law, the American government allows for the resurgence of sovereignty within the folds of governmentality, and arrogates to itself position of sovereign or dictator.

It is important to consider Kristine A. Miller's warning that “the way that nations tell … stories of victimization defines their political and military responses to violence” (7). One way to pay attention to how America narrativizes this war on terror is to consider this declaration as an “exemplary speech act of sovereignty” (Redfield 51), where sovereignty implies absolute control over its own territory. Marc Redfield, in his article, examines the moment where President Bush declared this war on terror to a journalist, immediately after the 9/11 attack, with the statement, “They had declared war on us” (53). Redfield examines the implications of this performative act, concluding that “it is the other, the terrorist, who declares war; the president … merely declares war back” (53). Thus, in this act, where “war as declaration originates elsewhere” (Redfield 53), the American president performs a “double gesture through which sovereign power is given away so as to be more securely reclaimed” (Redfield 53). In other words, via this declaration, the American government, through the President, performs two significant acts – it insinuates a threat posed to its sovereignty by an Other, and in response, seeks to reassert this “symbolically compromised” sovereignty (Redfield 64). Here, the American government reasserts absolute control over its own territory in the face of a force that threatens to upset this notion.

However, I seek to extend Redfield's examination of this declaration of a war on terror through a reading of Slahi's *Guantánamo Diary*, so it can function as a synecdoche for the holistic political project of the American government. Since the 9/11 attack threatened to destabilize not only America's absolute control over its own territory but also its position as sovereign in neo-imperialist terms, where it functions as a hegemon over the global political order, the American government's war on terror serves to respond to this threat, neutralize it and cement America's role as “Empire …

the unrivaled superpower" (Williams 152). Moreover, since "Empire, in its present form, relies less on the control of territory or the creation of colonies than on the disciplining of other governments (and … their populations)" (Williams 152), I will present a reading of Slahi's memoir to demonstrate how America disciplines other governments and racializes Muslim bodies in order to secure itself as global hegemon.

Slahi, in his memoir, *Guantánamo Diary*, paints the Guantánamo detention camp as a space where the hegemony of historically powerful bodies is preserved. Slahi writes, "My observations resulted in knowing that only white Americans were appointed to deal with me, both guards and interrogators. There was only one black guard, but he had no say" (287). Apart from white bodies, masculinity too is privileged in the space of the detention camp. This is evident in the fact that most of Slahi's interrogators are male. When women interrogators are present, they are mainly utilized as tools to sexually humiliate Slahi, as evinced when the two women interrogators force Slahi to stand up, then "[take] off their blouses, and [start] to talk all kind of dirty stuff you can imagine … forcing [Slahi] to take part in a sexual threesome in the most degrading manner" (Slahi 230). Even when women interrogators are present, words that indicate femininity, such as 'woman' or feminine pronouns, are redacted by the government in Slahi's manuscript, only to be suggested by Slahi's editor in footnotes, almost functioning to emphasize Guantánamo as a hypermasculine space.

What is more, Guantánamo is not simply a space saturated with hegemonic identities, but also one that constantly mobilizes colonialist rhetoric. This is evinced explicitly in the ideology that forms the premise on which this detention camp is constructed – President Bush's description of the "holy war against … terrorism as a war between the civilized and barbaric world" (Slahi 241). Colonialist insinuations are also present in the civilizing impulses toward the prisoners in Guantánamo, both through practices sanctioned by the government, and in more informal interactions. The government tries to 'civilize' Slahi by providing him with "books in English … most of them Western literature" (Slahi 343), almost as though it is attempting to cultivate Western sensibilities in a seemingly barbaric mind. Likewise, a guard attempts to do the same by "trying to convert [Slahi] to Christianity" (Slahi 12), a religion of the West and, hence, supposedly superior.

While the fact of Guantánamo being a space dominated by hegemonic bodies and saturated with colonialist rhetoric does important work in setting the stage to argue America's neo-imperialist agenda of reasserting its hegemonic position in the global political order through the war on terror, the most potent evidence for this agenda is derived from America's stance toward al-Qaeda. Editor Larry Siems states that "Mohamedou had joined al-Qaeda in 1991 … but that was a very different al-Qaeda, practically an ally of the United States (Slahi xliii). Thus, earlier, America supported the terrorist organization al-Qaeda in its other endeavors. It was only when this organization threatened to destabilize America's hegemonic position did America convert it into an enemy that had to be fought.

To establish itself as global hegemon, America's first task would be to discipline other governments. America achieves this through the practice of extraordinary rendition or torture by proxy, where "suspected terrorists [are] kidnapped from the United States or other countries and delivered for questioning to countries that routinely practice torture" (Pyle 61). As per his memoir, Slahi was transported to and interrogated in four countries, Senegal, Mauritania, Afghanistan and Jordan, before he was brought to the Guantánamo Bay detention camp. When Slahi was held in these countries,

it is evident that these countries themselves had no interest in detaining Slahi but were compelled to do so because of America's commanding power. Slahi's observation that "the Senegalese government was not interested in holding [him], but the U.S. was the one that was going to call the shots" (Slahi 80-81), as well as the Mauritanian interrogator's statement that "When it comes to [Mauritania], you're a free man...However, those people [the U.S.] want to interrogate you" (Slahi 101), stand testament to this fact.

American disciplining of Muslim governments did not simply limit itself to compelling them to detain individuals. In fact, it extended to the point where the U.S. compelled these governments to contort their own laws to accommodate America's wishes. Slahi states that for Mauritania to comply with the U.S. directive for it to turn him over to Jordan, "the Mauritanian constitution would have to be broken" (129), and yet "the independent and sovereign Republic of Mauritania turned over one of its own citizens … [and] broke the Constitution" (Slahi 132). In fact, the U.S. government did not simply wield authority over Muslim governments, but also established its hegemony over other Western powers, such as Canada. This is evident in Slahi's discussion of how the Canadian government maintained constant surveillance over him when he was in Canada:

> Canadian intelligence wished I were a criminal, so they could make up for their failure when [Abu Ressam (a terrorist)] slipped from their country to the U.S. carrying explosives. The U.S. blamed Canada for being a preparation ground for terrorist attacks against the U.S. and that's why Canadians Intel freaked out. They really completely lost their composure, trying everything to calm the rage of their big brother, the U.S. (Slahi 96).

Thus, the U.S., by wielding control over Muslim governments through extraordinary rendition, and over Western governments, attempted to reassert itself as hegemon over the global political order. As Slahi astutely observes, "You could clearly tell that that the [countries] had no sovereignty: this was still colonization in its ugliest face" (85).

Having disciplined foreign governments, to concretely reassert its hegemony over the global political order, America now had to enact a "drama of state power … [which would] serve as a warning to those who witnessed the ordeal" (Williams 181) by using its "might [to bear] down visibly on the body of its adversary" (Williams 181). Thus, in order to ward off any further attacks on its supremacy over the world order, America was compelled to metaphorically counter the threat posed by the terrorist by neutralizing/erasing the body of the terrorist.

The bodies being neutralized in the space of such detention camps were colored and Islamic. Slahi, in his memoir, quotes an interrogator saying, "Being Muslim and Arabic is enough to convict you" (220). This quote is backed up by Slahi's observation that his neighbors in Guantánamo were "an Afghani teenager … [a] twenty-year old Mauritanian guy who was born in Nigeria and moved to Saudi Arabia …[and] a Palestinian from Jordan" (22 – 23), as well as the fact that "the war against the Islamic religion was more than obvious … there was no sign to Mecca … the ritual prayers were also forbidden … reciting the Koran was forbidden. Practicing any Islamic-related ritual was strictly forbidden" (Slahi 265). As a result, the war on terror, represented by the Guantánamo Bay detention camp, "associate[d] specific material markers with otherness… conflate[d] those markers of otherness with terror" (Jayawardane 93) and "commodified [dark, Muslim bodies] into fetish objects embodying American terror" (Jayawardane 94). Having translated these bodies into embodiments of

terror, the American government sought to neutralize the threat of terror by erasing these bodies.

At this juncture, a discussion of Hannah Arendt's conceptualization of personhood, as presented by political theorist Ayten Gundogdu, would be helpful in understanding how the detainees at Guantánamo Bay were involved in the American government's project of erasure. Personhood entails a possession of rights. Human rights discourse is "premised on the idea that each human being is born with inalienable rights … moral entitlements that are derived from inherent human attributes such as reason, autonomy and dignity" (Gundogdu 4). In this way, human rights are "expected to transcend the contingencies of particular political contexts" (Gundogdu 4), and personhood is assumed to be inherently present in every human being by virtue of being human. However, Arendt's critical inquiry rejects this notion, by stating that "human rights must be politically enacted, recognized, and affirmed in particular institutions, orders and communities if they are to find relatively stable guarantees" (Gundogdu 4). Thus, "the effective guarantees of human rights rely on membership in an organized political community" (Gundogdu 3). As a result of this, an Arendtian perspective locates personhood as "not an inherent essence, but instead a legal artifact" (Gundogdu 18). Based on these premises, Arendt finally conceptualizes personhood as an "artificial mask provided by law … [that] allows public appearance without the pervasive fear of arbitrary violence and enables rights claims to be articulated" (Gundogdu 92).

Slahi uses his memoir to dramatize how he, as a detainee at Guantánamo Bay, was deprived of this legal personhood. Mauritania was compelled to "turn over its own citizen" (Slahi 126) to the U.S. – "kidnapping [Slahi] from [his] own house in [his] country and giving [him] to the U.S., breaking the constitution of Mauritania" (Slahi 126). In this process of being extradited from Mauritania, Slahi was no longer entitled to Mauritanian protection. As he was then shuttled to Jordan and Afghanistan, he had no claim to rights in those countries either, since he was not a citizen of those countries and, as the Afghani interrogator states, "We didn't arrest you, the U.S. did" (Slahi 207). Slahi was merely being held in these other countries at the behest of the U.S. When Slahi was finally transported to Guantánamo Bay, he was not entitled to any constitutional rights there either, since he was not an American citizen. As Slahi states, "A U.S. citizen cannot be arrested without due process of law, but a Mauritanian (redacted, based on Siem's conjecture) can" (269). William Conklin defines what such a precarious status implies in his book, *Statelessness: The Enigma of an International Community*:

> Many detainees … [were] left diplomatically unprotected by their states of nationality. Without such diplomatic protection of their states of nationality, their states of origin, their states of habitual residence, or the state of their detention, such persons have been effectively stateless. (112)

America, in its extraordinary rendition, thus produces Slahi as effectively stateless, dispossessed of any political community, and therefore rendered as void of rights. Since personhood is based on the possession of rights that are guaranteed based on inclusion in a political community, Slahi is thus deprived of the mask of personhood, almost in direct contrast to the "Halloween-masked" American guards and interrogators, who possess rights and protections on account of not being stateless (Slahi 266).

Arendt continues her analysis to indicate that individuals "deprived of the artificial mask provided by legal personhood … appear to others in their naked humanness or as "unqualified, mere

existence"" (Gundogdu 101). America, in depriving Slahi of his legal personhood, thus leaves him as merely a "natural man" (Gundogdu 100). To erase his existence as a darkened, Muslim body threatening to eject America from its status as global hegemon, the U.S. further jeopardizes his status as mere human, and eventually threatens to erase him altogether.

Slahi's status as human is jeopardized when he is treated as sub-human. The American government first achieves this by treating Slahi and the other detainees as animals – they are "tied together with a rope around [their] upper arms" (Slahi 25), "crowded in the truck shoulder-to-shoulder and thigh-to-high" (Slahi 28) and "thrown in a cattle track" (Slahi 76). Further, an American interrogator explicitly likens Slahi to an animal when explaining to him why the American government thinks he is a terrorist - "looks like a dog, walks like a dog, smells like a dog, barks like a dog, must be a dog" (Slahi 276). This "bestialization of the human" (Butler 78) is important not only because it jeopardizes Slahi's human status, but also because "it is a figure of the animal against which the human is defined" (Butler 78) – only once the detainee is reduced to animal status is the American government's human, and therefore superior, status hyperevident.

The American government also dehumanizes Slahi by treating him as an object, especially in the act of shipping him from country to country for torture-by-proxy. Slahi writes that he was "treated like a UPS package" (135) – a conception reinforced by a pilot's words when she delivers Slahi to Mauritania, "she told her friends in Nouakchott about the package she delivered from Dakar" (Slahi 86) and the fact that the Americans often "brought people … in bags" (Slahi 141) and assigned detainees "ISN numbers" (Slahi 40), instead of referring to them by name. Here too, Slahi, a detainee, functions as an object, against whom the personhood of the American government is defined.

Further, another way the American government dehumanizes Slahi and the other detainees is by depriving them of all those aspects that contribute to their humanity – they aren't "allowed to know the time or date" (Slahi 158), to create a sense of atemporality. They are deprived of a sense of agency, as demonstrated by the fact that "you don't decide when you eat, when you sleep, when you take a shower, when you wake up, when you see the doctor, when you see the interrogator" (Slahi 314 -15) and are deprived of human emotions such as shame when "you cannot even squeeze a drop of urine without being watched" (Slahi 315).

The fact that the government briefed the guards that Slahi was "a high-level, smart-beyond-belief terrorist" (Slahi 271) may seem to subvert this dehumanization. However, here, it is essential to note that the American government grants Slahi provisional humanity only so that it can then be taken away through his treatment in Guantánamo, thereby reestablishing American domination over Slahi's body.

Thus, by depriving Slahi of legal personhood and by dehumanizing him, the American government threatens to render him as nothing, to erase him. The government establishes this desire to erase Slahi concretely in the threats it constantly deploys – "If you don't cooperate, we're going to put you in a hole and wipe your name out of our detainee database" (Slahi 220), an interrogator threatens, while a report unearthed by the editor states that until the detainee, Slahi, talks:

> He will … disappear down a very dark hole. His very existence will become erased. His electronic files will be deleted from the computer, his paper files will be packed up and filed away,

and his existence will be forgotten by all. (Slahi 247)

Thus, through this threat to erase Slahi, the body that supposedly threatened to compromise America's dominant status in the world order, America reestablishes itself as global hegemon, an act rendered tangible in Slahi's interrogators' constant refrain – "We are stronger than you" (Slahi 238).

However, Slahi's memoir, while illustrating the American's government desire to reestablish itself as global hegemon, also functions to reveal the limits of the government's success in this endeavor. One of the primary reasons that America holds a dominant position in the world order is because it has convinced other political bodies of their inherent inferiority. As Slahi states in his memoir, he wanted to be interrogated in the U.S. as opposed to any other country, because he suspected that "it might take some time until the U.S. government overthrows the law completely, like in the third world and the communist regimes" (92-93). Consequently, other governments and Slahi believe that the U.S. is a country where law is supreme. At another point in the book, when Slahi is in Jordan, he observes that pictures of King Abdullah and his father, Hussein, were on the wall of the prison. Slahi immediately remarks - "such pictures are the proof of dictatorship in the uncivilized world" (153)., Through the war on terror, the U.S. has abrogated the law and appointed itself as supreme dictator, thus effectively reducing itself to the level of third world countries it seeks to establish it's dominance over. Therefore, if civility and thus hegemony is marked by a reliance on law and the lack of a dictatorship, how successful can it be in its venture to establish itself as global hegemon?

Furthermore, the American government not only lowers itself to the same standard as the countries it seeks to establish dominance over, but through its practice of extraordinary rendition, risks slipping beneath their level. This is particularly evident when the Mauritanian member of the DSE, the "Directeur de la Sûrete de l'État" (Slahi 113) tells Slahi when he is being extradited to Jordan, "The Senegalese, the Canadians, the Germans, and I myself believe that you're innocent. I don't know how many witnesses the Americans need to acquit you" (Slahi 134), as well as in Jordan, when the American interrogators had to take torture into their own hands, because "the Jordanians don't take anybody and torture [them]; they must have reason to practice heavy physical torture" (Slahi 178). This serves to imply that the American standard of law is more permissive, and therefore unjust, than that in the third world countries the U.S. paints to be barbaric and, therefore, more villainous than America.

Last, as established before, the U.S. government officially sought to erase the detainees by depriving them of legal personhood and by dehumanizing them. However, within the detention camp, the guards' friendship with Slahi serves to render complete dehumanization an ambition rather than a reality. Slahi discusses how he established a positive relationship with a particular guard, "and so with the rest of the guards, too, because they regarded him highly" (326). This relationship progresses to the point where Slahi and the guards "became a society and started to gossip about the interrogators and call them names" (Slahi 327). Thus, although the American government attempts to destabilize all those aspects that humanize Slahi, in establishing a rapport and community with Slahi, the guards, his sub-oppressors still grant him a fragile recognition of his humanity.

All in all, the government uses American law to suspend and replace it with a political version of law, thus giving credence to Ahmad's claim that law is deployed to create the preconditions of a brutal state power before the federal courts have stepped into the detention camp situation. A read-

ing of Slahi's *Guantanamo Diary* reveals that the American government seeks to do this in a desire to secure its threatened position as global hegemon, yet it is not wholly successful in this endeavor.

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Representational Means in *The School for Scandal*

Chelsea Taylor

Richard Brinsley Sheridan's play, *The School for Scandal,* creates dramatic plots through the permeation of scandal. The artistic form of drama inherently accentuates dialogue and gestures as a means of communication. Dialogue and gesture are the only dramatic techniques for giving a character an interiority. A play's reliance on dialogue and gesture creates a problem for the analysis of a play text because the text loses most of the performativity needed for gestures and dialogue. Like scandal, these problems permeate the play text as part of the stylistic and creative elements of Sheridan's play. I will argue that the central trope in the play of the misrepresentation of the self and others through language and gesture is indicative of the social impossibility of presenting an intrinsic truth of character through representational means. I do not mean that there are no intrinsic truths, but that the structure of eighteenth-century society, with its focus on reputation and social position, creates an environment in which every word or gesture is consciously used to create a socially beneficial image of themselves.

Jacques Derrida's theory argues that writing and speech are supplements for reality. His theory contradicts the traditional Western philosophy that distinguishes reality and appearances, and that views representations as a means of getting at truth or reality. Derrida argues that signs or representations of speech and writing are always a supplement for the thing or signified. Derrida's idea is that nothing can reach reality because there is no way to get outside of the process of signification. (Culler 9-12). Derrida's theory is significant because it argues that the basic means of human expression lacks the ability to represent reality. Patricia Meyer Spacks' article, "Borderlands: Letters and Gossip," directs attention to that fact that letters are crafted pieces of self-representation that are created for a particular audience (Spacks 792). Building on Derrida's ideas, Spacks' argument expresses the inability of words to express intrinsic truth of the self, because self-representation is consciously creating itself for a particular purpose and audience. All forms of self-presentation are in some way forms of misrepresentation.

Sheridan wrote a dedication of *The School for Scandal* to Mrs. Frances Anne Crewe titled "A Portrait" that is included at the beginning of the play text. "A Portrait" begins the trope of misrepresentation, and Derrida's theory can retroactively be applied to it. Sheridan begins the poem with the

stated purpose to provide scandal's adepts with "a model shall attract your view" (Sheridan ix). The model that he calls forth to praise as a character of grace is Amoret, a heroine from Edmund Spenser's *The Fairie Queene* (Constantakis). Sheridan praises her self-presentation as,

"No state has *Amoret!* no studied mien;

She frowns no *goddess*, and moves *no queen*

The softer charm that in her manner lies

Is framed to captivate, yet not surprise" (Sheridan x).

This praise is indicating that Amoret does not fit into any category of binary attitudes, instead she is ambiguous and her self-presentation does not allow access into her interiority. Amoret's self-presentation is carefully created by her to block access to her interiority, as indicated by the use of the word "framed" in conjunction with the title's "portrait." Sheridan utilizes the image of her painted lips to comment on her ambiguous interiority,

"But moving Love himself appears to teach

Their action, though denied to rule her speech;

And thou who seest her speak and dost not hear,

Mourn not her distant accents 'scape thine ear;

Viewing those lips, thou still may'st make pretence

To judge of what she says, and swear 'tis sense:

Cloth'd with such grace, with such expression fraught,

They move in meaning, and they pause in thought!" (Sheridan x-xi).

This passage focuses on the disjunction between the internal self and the external representations through the medium of interpreting others. The male Love is not allowed to dictate her thoughts or speech, but instead, focuses on her external beauty and projects his own interpretation of her thoughts and words. This creates a fundamental misrepresentation, one dictated by the terms of the society and gender relations. My reading of Amoret as misrepresented and ambiguously self-presented is supported by Derrida's theory because language is proven to be an inadequate means of representing a truth of her character. When she speaks, she is misrepresented through the interpretation of others, and she is shown to be projecting an image of herself that does not allow access to her interiority.

The themes of misrepresentation and ambiguous self-presentation in "A Portrait" are connected to *The School for Scandal* through specific language and images used by Sheridan. The title "A Portrait" invokes the mental image of a painting, and Sheridan plays upon this image by using words throughout the poem such as: "model," "sketch," "framed," "colour," "hue," and "paint." A

portrait is a work of art that is stationary, capturing a moment of representation. Harry Berger Jr., in his study of early modern portraiture, argues portraits are created representations of both the sitter and the artist that does not correspond to the psychology of either (Berger 87). Berger claims that "a painting ought to change as you look at it, and as you think, talk, and write about it" (Berger 87). Berger's idea that a stationary work of art is constantly changing is significant because it suggests that it is not the presentation of the painting that is changing, but the viewer's perception of it. The viewer's constant need to interpret the painting and its presentation allows for a variety of misrepresentations, as does the multiple representations contained within the portrait. Berger's argument about portraits supports Derrida's theory about the impossibility of arriving at reality because it is impossible to get outside the realm of signification. Portraits carry this symbolic weight into the main text of the play by becoming the most significant prop. In 4.1 of *The School for Scandal*, the Surface family portraits become the means by which Sir Oliver decides that Charles deserves to be his heir, believing that Charles' reaction to selling Sir Oliver's portrait is a means of knowing the truth of Charles' character.

The prop portraits physically anchor the trope of misrepresentation of the self and others in the play. The same themes of misrepresentation are embedded within the structure of the play. The play is framed by scenes of the scandal group circulating gossip. Christine Wiesenthal argues that the framing device is a structural means of exploring different mediums of misrepresentation (Wiesenthal 321). I agree with Wiesenthal's argument that the framing device is an intentional structural principle of the play rather than poor craftsmanship as James Thompson argues, but her argument focuses on how the misrepresentations are developed in each of the plots without exploring its effects (Thompson 89). The first characters to take the stage are Lady Sneerwell and her partner in scandal, Snake. By introducing these characters first, immediately the truth of speech and the representations of characters are called into question by their blatant creation of scandals for newspaper publication. The first stage direction is "*Discovered* Lady Sneerwell *at dressing-table;* Snake *drinking chocolate*" (Sheridan 1). The use of the word "discovered" creates the idea of their actions being secret and duplicitous. The audience is discovering that written sources of information cannot be relied on for the truth. The first two lines of the play reinforce the unreliability of written information, "*Lady Sneerwell*. The paragraphs, you say, Mr. Snake, were all inserted? *Snake.* They were, madam; and as I copied them myself in a feigned hand, there can be no suspicion whence they came," (Sheridan 1). The language used, specifically "inserted" and "feigned," lets the audience know right away that false information is being published. John Picker argues that Lady Sneerwell acts as an author and editor of scandal (Picker 641).

In order to give historical precedent, Picker notes that in 1772 Rev. Henry Bate created *The Morning Post,* which was the first scandal magazine in London and the forerunner of the modern tabloid magazine (Picker 641). The relatively new invention of a newspaper with no real news, but one that allows the dangerous possibility of printing gossip, would have been significant as part of the play's social commentary. The damage of scandal is made explicit right away with Snake's comment,

"to my knowledge she has been the cause of six matches being broken off, and three sons dis-

> inherited; of four forced elopements, and as many close confinements; nine separate maintenances, and two divorces. Nay, I have more than once traced her causing a tête-à-tête in the *Town and Country Magazine*, when the parties, perhaps, had never seen each other's face before in the course of their lives" (Sheridan 1).

While the scandal group is presented as a part of the comedy, I disagree with Thompson that the scandal group's ridicule and aggression is meant solely for comedic purposes (Thompson 97). By mentioning concrete consequences for the scandal that contemporary and modern audiences would have experience with, the dangers of misrepresentation move beyond humor to a social critique. Snake specifically mentions a real magazine that publishes some of their damaging scandal. Publishing gives scandal a wider distribution and it gives the scandalous lies or misrepresentations authority, which in turn makes scandal and gossip extremely dangerous. Closing out the structural frame with the scandal group mostly intact promises the continuation of scandal to permeate the society. The shame casted onto Lady Teazle, Lady Sneerwell, and Joseph does not stop the perpetuation of scandal but feeds it more fodder for its fire.

Sheridan places the story of the Surface brothers within this framing device. Structurally, the narrative for these characters supports the trope of misrepresentation of the self and others. Joseph Surface is introduced in the first act of the play in the company of Lady Sneerwell. She explains their relationship to Snake as "I know him to be artful, selfish, and malicious – in short, a sentimental knave; while with Sir Peter, and indeed with all his acquaintance, he passes for a youthful miracle of prudence, good sense, and benevolence" (Sheridan 2-3). Lady Sneerwell's assessment of Joseph's character posits itself as the true representation of him by uncovering a discrepancy between his interior self and exterior presentation. The rest of the play is spent watching how Joseph builds his reputation as a model of virtue and eventually how that reputation is damaged. The affectation of his sentiment seems to be where the play focuses on his duplicity. Lady Sneerwell's comment to Joseph, "you shall study sentiment" contains an apt concept for thinking of different forms of representations (Sheridan 10). Joseph learns to act as a man of sentiment, knowing it will be socially beneficial to him. The importance of this idea to the play is set up with the word "School" in the title, *The School for Scandal*. It implies that means of representation are socially learned behaviors. Charles, on the other hand, is not introduced on stage until the third act, but the audience already knows his "character" from other characters in the play creating his poor reputation before he makes his first appearance. He is described from the first scene of the play as "Charles, that libertine, that extravagant, that bankrupt in fortune and reputation" (Sheridan 2). Such repeated descriptions set up an expectation for Charles' behavior when he is finally presented to the audience. Charles' himself then complicates these expectations.

Joseph's constant affectation of sentiment and his habit of speaking to different characters in different manners demonstrates his awareness of his self-presentation. Spacks' argument about the crafted nature of personal letters can be extended to encompass verbal and gestural self-presentation, as well. Her claims that writing and gossip are ways to consciously and unconsciously create a legacy for the writer and the subjects of that writing (Spacks 801). From the dialogue between Joseph and Lady Sneerwell, it is clear that Joseph is meticulously creating a reputation that will

serve his ulterior motives of marrying a rich heiress. He projects the image of a man of sentiment to all, but Lady Sneerwell and for her he is projecting the image of a knave. The discrepancy between his exteriority and interiority is verbally stated for the audience. There are multiple instances in the text where Joseph's demeanor and language change depending on who he is speaking with. During the screen scene Joseph is constantly changing as different characters enter the stage with him. His changeability makes it difficult to arrive at the intrinsic truth of his character. Picker's argument that scandal fragments a person's personality and physical attributes can be applied to Joseph's self-presentation, which fragments different faucets of his personality (Picker 642). Joseph chooses to present fragments of his personality that will benefit his stated motives.

However, there is one instance in the play that seems to be a genuine reaction or speech from him. It comes at the end of his conversation with Mr. Stanley, in which Joseph makes an excuse for being unable to financially help him and Mr. Stanley leaves. At this point following the screen scene Joseph seems to be emotionally distressed, and when he discovers that his uncle has arrived he says, "I am astonished! – William! stop Mr. Stanley, if he's not gone" (Sheridan 62). This scene is important because it is a moment that Joseph is not attempting to present himself in a certain way. This outburst also complicates the view of Joseph as purely knavish. Even though he is not willing to help Mr. Stanley himself, he still tries to help him by attempting to gain access to his rich uncle Oliver. The brief line hints at an intrinsic truth of his character, at his selfishness and his small capacity for compassion. This small moment where all pretensions have been dropped hints at Joseph neither being wholly a man of sentiment as he presents himself, nor the knave as Rowley and Lady Sneerwell claim he is.

For Charles, the misrepresentation of his character by his brother and the scandal group creates the bulk of the inability to see the truth of his character. However, Charles' own self-presentation is as artificial as Joseph's. When the audience first meets him, his deviant behavior appears to match the gossip about him. The first view of Charles on stage is at a table drinking wine with a large company of revelers. The stage setting of the scene is described as "Charles Surface, Careless, *etc., etc., at a table with wine, etc."* (Sheridan 33). The use of multiple "etc." demonstrates the abundance of revelers and alcohol on stage. Charles' first lines representing himself on stage are "'Fore heaven, 'tis true! – there's the great degeneracy of the age. Many of our acquaintance have taste, spirit, and politeness; but, plague on't, they won't drink" (Sheridan 33). In these lines of the play Charles seems to be reinforcing the misrepresentation of his character circulated by the scandal group. Charles' condemnation of their abstaining acquaintances is a condemnation of the artificiality of the society because the act of drinking is placed in opposition to "taste," "spirit," and "politeness," which are all socially constructed behaviors or preferences for fads. In response to this Charles's closest friend Careless links drinking to wit or the mind. Drinking is being portrayed as a way into the mind or a character's interiority, thus denoting drinking as an honest act. Yet, Charles himself is not honest, evening when he is drinking. When Sir Oliver arrives as Mr. Premium, Charles claims "plain dealing in business I always think best," breaths away from speaking the lie "the climate has hurt him considerably, poor Uncle Oliver! Yes, yes, he breaks apace, I'm told – and is so much altered lately, that his nearest relations don't know him" (Sheridan 37-8). The audience as visual proof of Charles' lie in the form of Mr. Premium/Sir Oliver, which calls into question the accuracy of his

presenting himself as honest.

To complicate the gossip about Charles that appears to be upheld by his own behavior, Charles uses some of the money from Mr. Premium for altruistic purposes. Charles instructs Rowley to "take a hundred pounds of it immediately to Old Stanley" (Sheridan 45). Charles acts out of a desire to help Mr. Stanley, even though he himself could use the money. Another moment in which Charles seems to lack an affectation of character is when he refuses to sell his uncle's portrait. Charles responds to the offer by saying that he will "not part with poor Noll. The old fellow has been very good to me, and, egad, I'll keep his picture while I've a room to put it in" (Sheridan 43) is the sole reason that Sir Oliver keeps Charles as his heir. Berger's concept of portraits changing is enlightening for this scene because it is not the portrait or the representation of Sir Oliver in the portrait that Charles is keeping but his interpretation of the representation. Charles associates the image of Sir Oliver with his relationship with Sir Oliver. Sir Oliver sees this gratitude in Charles and from it bases his judgment on both brothers' worthiness as his heir. Even this moment only hints at an intrinsic truth of Charles' character because it is only a fragment of it. Just as the scandal group focuses on one fragment of Charles' personality, Sir Oliver focuses on another fragment. Sir Oliver conflates one of Charles' honest actions to represent his whole character.

Just like both Surface brothers, Lady Teazle is important for the trope of misrepresentation of the self and others. As the newest member of Lady Sneerwell's scandal group, Lady Teazle's vicious comments are a part of the image she wishes to project of herself to fit in. The artificiality of her gossip is shown when Mrs. Candour responds to her comments with "How can you be so ill-natured?" and Lady Sneerwell responds with "Very well Lady Teazle; I see you can be a little severe?" (Sheridan 17). Lady Teazle attempts to construct a version of herself to fit into the scandal group but it is ultimately unsuccessful, instead becoming an object of their scandal making. For all she tries she is not one of them, as Sir Peter constantly reminds her. Like Joseph and Charles, Lady Teazle has a moment of outing in the play. At the end of the screen scene Lady Teazle makes an impassioned speech to Sir Peter about her remorse and their relationship, saying "the tenderness you expressed for me, when I am sure you could not think I was a witness to it, has penetrated so to my heart, that had I left the place without the shame of this discovery, my future life should have spoken the sincerity of my gratitude" (Sheridan 56). Her moment of redemption does not show her letting down her guard and it does not offer a moment where she is free of creating a self-presentation. Instead, Lady Teazle has a very specific goal in mind, the allowance and inheritance, conveniently visible to her and the audience as a prop held by Sir Peter. While this does not concretely discount her remorse, it at least creates reasonable doubt about its sincerity. Yet, greed cannot be conflated to embody her entire character. Her desire to fit into the scandal group, and her desiring, but not acting on a sexual relationship with Joseph, functions to expand the depth of her character. This is all done without her representing or being misrepresented but demonstrated by her actions.

The problems with the inability of reaching the intrinsic truth of the characters is important for how the play functions. One of the debates in the critical conversations about the play is the morality or lack thereof. Kerstin Fest argues that the systematic idleness demonstrates a morally dubious way of life, while Picker, Thompson, and Wiesenthal argue against the traditional view of the

play as conventionally moral. Picker, Thompson, and Wiesenthal reject moralism in favor of artistic and comedic ambiguity or aggression. I agree with Picker, Thompson, and Wiesenthal that the play is not overly concerned with morality, though I think the play's ambiguity and aggressive comedy is more than an artistic choice by Sheridan. The ambiguity of characters brought on by misrepresentation of the self and others functions within the play as a social criticism. The ending of the play offers no punishment for the antagonistic characters. Lady Sneerwell and Joseph are discovered in their scheming, but Lady Sneerwell has survived being the object of scandal before and presumably can again. Joseph loses his inheritance from Sir Oliver and from Maria as a wealthy wife, but that does not mean he is out of money or even loses the chance to marry a wealthy heiress. In this moment, Lady Sneerwell and Joseph's reputations are damaged, but their mastery of the circulation of scandal and scandal's habit of quickly moving onto new subjects allows for potential recovery. To Joseph's last lines of the play, "lest her (Lady Sneerwell) revengeful spirit should prompt her to injure my brother, I had certainly better follow her directly" Sir Peter responds, "Moral to the last drop!" (Sheridan 74). Joseph's comment is certainly trying to salvage his reputation, but Sir Peter's response is ambiguous. Sir Peter knows that Joseph attempted to seduce Lady Teazle, yet without an actor giving this line meaning through intonation or gesture it can be read as alluding to the possibility of Joseph regaining his reputation as a man of sentiment. This possibility creates a greater uncertainty of punishment, which moves the play farther from the realm of moral tales.

Even for the "good" characters the end of the play is not morally resolved. Charles, after manhandling his disguised benefactor is still named his heir and allowed to marry Maria. Yet, Charles' awful behavior has not ended and Maria is never given a choice in their engagement. There is no swearing off drinking and gambling from Charles, just this final statement "why, as to reforming, Sir Peter, I'll make no promises, and that I take to be a proof that I intend to set about it" (Sheridan 75). Charles' proof through the lack of commitment is ambiguous. What is the 'it' that he is referring to and what actions do 'set about' entail? By making no promises, Charles is not articulating his objective. He is merely stating he 'intends' to 'set about it', but intends is not binding and the rest is vague. Charles' ambiguity here recalls to mind his duplicity in his business dealing with Mr. Premium. The only reason he remains the heir is his refusal to sell the portrait or to defend himself at Sir Oliver's revealing. The resolution of the play does not offer a moral message, because none of the characters are moral models. Instead the fragmentation of their personalities, meaning the portion of their representations or misrepresentations the ending focuses on, offers a means to critically evaluate the text and the social structures that allow such an ending.

One aspect of the social criticism revolves around the way in which the importance of self-presentation and scandal fragments the character's personalities. Joseph Roach argues that gossip circulates like money in the play (Roach 297). Roach's connection between gossip and money demonstrates how gossip and scandal have value within society. Financial and personal reputations are important aspects of society's judgment of character. The play's critique of the aristocratic society points out that they are merely fragments of a person's personality or being. Joseph claims that the scandal group "appear more ill-natured than they are, - they have no malice at heart" (Sheridan 20). The gossip is not spread from hatred of the person whose reputation they are damaging, but from the expectation of personal gain. Lady Sneerwell wants to gain Charles as a lover, Joseph

wants to marry Maria for a source of income, Lady Teazle wants to gain acceptance into the city's aristocratic social group, and the other members of the scandal group want to gain reputations for wit. The value placed on scandal and the complimentary need to present oneself in such a way as to avoid it creates the fragmentation of persons. The play points out how these fragments of personality on their own can easily make or break a person regardless of all the other factors of their personality. This tendency in the aristocratic society is demonstrated as dangerous through the scandal group and the real-world consequences that their gossip has for their subjects. Characters are awarded and punished based off these fragments of their personalities in the play and this helps to create the lack of morality.

Judgment based on fragmentation of personalities is particularly damaging to the women. Lady Sneerwell admits that "wounded myself in the early part of my life by the envenomed tongue of slander, I confess I have since known no pleasure equal to the reducing others to the level of my own injured reputation" (Sheridan 2). Lady Sneerwell survives the early damage to her reputation, but the experience has tainted her character. That one past instance of misrepresentation shapes her present actions and motivations. There is a connection between the damage done to her reputation and her status as the only female character that is not married or engaged at any point in the play. Lady Sneerwell's stated desire for a relationship with Charles consistently draws attention to his poor reputation, which she helps to perpetuate. His poor reputation allows Lady Sneerwell to view Charles as an attainable marriage match, yet her damaged reputation and subsequence scandal mongering eliminates her from being considered by him. The fact that Lady Sneerwell and Charles are never seen on stage together until the very end when they are in a large group of people, supports my idea that the connection between her desire and his damage reputation has significance for the reason why she desires him. Lady Sneerwell is able to participate in the society still through the scandal group, but she is marginalized by her damaged reputation.

Maria, while not a part of the scandal group, is damaged by the social tendency to judge a person based on a fragment of their personality. Unlike Lady Sneerwell, Maria's damage is projected into the future, rather than the past. The end of *The School for Scandal* leaves Maria engaged to marry Charles the next morning, yet her last line of the play lacks the joy normally associated with a person marrying someone they love. Instead of joy, the lines revolve around consent. The marriage proposal between Charles and Maria is "*Charles*. I have done that a long time – a minute ago – and she has looked yes. *Maria*. For shame, Charles! – I protest, Sir Peter, there has not been a word" (Sheridan 75). These lines are problematic for a multitude of reasons, chiefly that Maria has no say in her future marriage to Charles. Maria's protest is that she is not given the chance to response. Instead, like Amoret in "A Portrait", Maria is visually interpreted by the male lover in such a way that projects his own desires onto her. The dominance of Charles' misrepresented projection of Maria is demonstrated by Sir Oliver's response to Maria "the fewer the better" which effectively silences Maria (Sheridan 75). The fragmentation of Charles' personality by Sir Oliver removes Maria's voice and agency. Earlier in the play Maria says of Charles, "I have heard enough to convince me that he is unworthy my regard. Yet I cannot think it culpable, if, while my understanding severely condemns his vices, my heart suggests some pity for his distresses" (Sheridan 28-9). Maria's own words are ignored and her pity is conflated with love. Again, like Amoret, Maria is incapable of using language

to accurately present herself. The male characters and the genre of the play itself force her into the role of the lover in order to have the happy ending and marriage.

Multiple aspects of *The School for Scandal* use the trope of misrepresentation of the self and others: from Sheridan's dedication of the play, to the structure of the play, to the characters themselves. These creative elements point to the inability of the forms of representation to accurately present the intrinsic truth of a person's character. The fragmentation that is an inherent part of representation guarantees a degree of misrepresentation. This inability to represent an intrinsic truth forms the basis of the social criticism of the play, rather than a moral lesson for the audience to take away.

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Virtue as a Game of Appearances in Charlotte Lennox's *Henrietta*

Charles White

As it appears in Charlotte Lennox's novel *Henrietta*, virtue is a sign-system consisting of speech-acts, mannerisms, and gestures and these are organized under the headings of various characteristics mandated by society. In order to be deemed virtuous, one must perform politeness, chastity, delicacy, sentiment, sincerity, and innocence, all according to the rules of expression delineated by societal custom; a perfect performance gives the appearance that the performance is an essence, while poor performance or falsity invites the censure and condemnation of society. Only marriage is the final assurance of virtue and financial stability for women. Virtue must thus be maintained at all costs. I strive to demonstrate that those vices of artifice, design, and dissimulation, which are set up as antithetical to virtue, are actually necessary for its maintenance, since virtue always contains the conditions of its own dissolution. Certain characteristics of virtue contradict, or detract from, one another, and pure virtue is eternally deferred, making it a game of appearances where it should convey something essential in an individual. This can be demonstrated by studying three fundamental and interpenetrating characteristics of virtue—namely, politeness, innocence, and sincerity—each of which is governed by a combination of two contradictory states of mind: sensibility and insensibility. By satirizing virtue, Charlotte Lennox's *Henrietta* participates in a tradition of the women-centered novel of sensibility that simultaneously upholds, and yet, chastises the social strictures placed upon women. It might be argued that *Henrietta's* close negates the novel's subversive potential, but along with Alison Conway, I assert that the novel cleverly accounts even for that seemingly disappointing generic submission.

But why is there such a heavy emphasis placed upon the maintenance of virtue for women? And why is virtue, which is commonly taken to mean "chastity," seemingly divested of that valence in *Henrietta*? To comprehend this, we require at least a cursory understanding of the tight relationship between virtue and virginity. Although the two had been closely linked prior to the eighteenth-century, Corrinne Harol identifies an epistemological turn following the advent of the scientific revolution, which makes legible *Henrietta's* insistence upon the deep necessity of virtue for women's survival. Prior to this turn, virginity was taken as the surest sign of virtue, and thus

of marriageability. However, the hymen's "fragility, variability, and inaccessibility make its secrets elusive," and, as such, "the inaccessibility of the hymen meant that men were forced to rely on a woman's 'word' about the status of her virginity," (Harol 200) a prospect that produced anxiety for the men who held up virginity as a transcendent sign of virtue, since that sign was always open to misinterpretation on the part of the men. This anxiety had to be displaced in order for patriarchal society to solidify its subjection and discipline of women's bodies.

As Harol shows, despite the development of scientific investigation, the hymen still proved elusive; it resisted inquiry, since the very process of pursuing its proof might destroy that proof, and since it was unclear whether every woman even possessed a hymen in the first place. Due to an overvaluation of the hymen as the locus of difference between men and women and "cultural proscriptions against investigating (live) virgin females, as well as (presumably) a shortage of dead virgin females among bodies available for dissection, anatomists had little opportunity to dissect the hymen" (Harol 204). Thus, argues Harol, due to the failure of empirical investigation to resolve the question of virginity, a new method that still met the scientific revolution's standards of direct experience and ostensibly objectively verifiable observation was required to circumvent the necessity of taking a woman's virginity at her word.

Harol goes on to assert that Samuel Richardson's *Pamela* can be read as the proving ground for this new methodology: "By making Pamela the defender of her own virginity, more concerned with it and valuing it more highly than Mr. B. does, *Pamela* displaces anxiety over virginity from the male to the female" (206). Later in the novel, after the editor assures us of Pamela's virginity, the narrative switches gears and begins an intensive investigation of Pamela's interiority, which is splayed out on the dissection table of her journals, making her virtue, which "depends on thoughts, feelings, and intentions, not merely on actions or physical signs," (Harol 208) accessible to examination in a way that her virginity never could be. Thus, virtue, since it can be put to trial in spite of its immateriality, becomes the locus of feminine social value.

In this way, chastity is obscured in favor of the performance of the social signs of virtue, which are incredibly difficult to maintain as they are subject to constant surveillance and the scrutiny of society at large; resisting pre-marital penetration is no longer enough, and chastity cannot safely be assumed to convey an essence from which the other virtues are assumed to flow. At the same time, the strictures of chastity lurk behind all evaluations of virtue; if one is taken to be virtuous, then, by extension, one is taken to be chaste. A violation of the decorum of virtue constitutes, if not an actual penetration, at least a sign that the violator has opened themselves *to* penetration. Actual chastity becomes a moot point, and a violation of decorum utterly undermines a commitment to chastity, even though this too is expected of the virtuous woman. These are the incredibly high stakes of the game into which Henrietta enters, where a balance of sensibility/insensibility is not only "proper," but wholly necessary to navigate a treacherous society that is always already suspicious of the intentions of women. *Henrietta* aptly demonstrates the weight of the burden of proof that has been placed upon women, in that the eponymous heroine is constantly and rigorously monitored and her virtue closely examined and under assault regardless of her material virginity.

However, in virtue's game of appearances, Henrietta does possess one ostensible trump card

that often serves as a saving grace, namely, her beauty. Henrietta's beauty in the novel operates as a virtue par excellence in the sense that anyone who looks upon it is instantly awestruck and convinced that this outward appearance is a sign of essential interior goodness. When Henrietta is presented to Lord B—'s mother, "who expected to see a very different person," the countess finds herself "so struck with her beauty and the dignity of her air, that she rose from her seat, and returned the graceful courtesy she made her with a complaisance that surprised her own woman…" (Lennox 155). Henrietta's beauty so startles the countess that she forgets her class and position and interacts with Henrietta as if they were on an equal footing. What could have been an interrogation now becomes a polite conversation.

However, as Isobel Grundy points out, "to give a fictional character beauty is to construct her as a sexual object, and more generally as material, as a sign traditionally placed to be read and responded to by the male subject" (75). As such, beauty is inextricably linked to the male gaze, and so, while Henrietta's beauty is sometimes her salvation, it is also perceived by male interlocutors as an invitation to intense scrutiny, greatly augmenting her predicament. For example, earlier in the novel, Lord B—, who is also struck dumb by Henrietta's exquisite beauty, decides to steal himself away in her closet in order to catch a candid glimpse of her, and, through surveillance, satisfy himself of her virtue. While the Lord makes the blunder of opening "the closet-door a little way, that he might have the pleasure of contemplating her at leisure," (Lennox 94) thus exposing himself, his attention puts her in a precarious situation. Henrietta designs to depart Mrs. Eccles' house at once, but when her landlady demands an explanation, Henrietta simply declares that she has been "insulted" (96). She also refrains from naming Lord B— as the perpetrator. The dictates of politeness and innocence are at play here; since the Lord is of a higher class than Henrietta, to question his honor would be a bold conjecture, likely to elicit more scrutiny of her virtue than of his, and Henrietta's innocence (or desire to appear innocent) dilutes her conception of the severity of Lord B—'s indiscretion. This combination of sensibility (of social distinctions) and insensibility (of the depths Lord B—'s deviance) allows her to preserve her virtue.

Thus, while in Grundy's words, Henrietta's "beautiful outside is the sign of wisdom and goodness inside," (74) it opens her to attempts on her virtue that complicate her ability to navigate society without drawing too much attention to herself. Furthermore, since beauty is thought to be a transcendent sign of goodness, "when someone bad looks beautiful, that is the lie direct" (75). Grundy thus demonstrates that if Henrietta were found to be guilty of vice, her beauty would only add to her crime, as a violation of social assumptions and expectations. Even the highly visible virtue of beauty gives no secure assurance of virtue, by virtue of precisely that visibility, which encourages attempts upon innocence, and augments the necessity of sincerity. While the woman dispossessed of beauty must actively compensate for her lack thereof, beauty alone is itself a detriment without the scaffolding of sensibility/insensibility possessed by Henrietta.

Every characteristic particular to virtue can only be maintained through these two mindstates. However, an excess of either threatens to dismantle the virtue they design to protect. According to the OED, sensibility suggests a "capacity for refined emotion; delicate sensitiveness of taste; also, readiness to feel compassion for suffering." On the other hand, a mind inclined to sensibility also has the "quality of being easily and strongly affected by emotional influences." It is for this rea-

son that one must also be insensible to certain input.

In the practice of sensibility, one must be sensitive to the emotions and mindsets of others, which may be deduced from an attentiveness to the form and content of another's speech, their facial expressions, gestures, hesitations, and even their silence. All of these must be interpreted, and a complex response must be prepared. This response must simultaneously attend to the class/birth/position of both the speaker and their interlocutor and the honor/virtue of the latter. Furthermore, it must entertain a respect for the appearance that the interlocutor wishes to put forth, regardless of how inadequately they play their part; this is especially true when there is a disparity of rank or social position between the parties, as when Henrietta must hide her disdain for the follies espoused by the deluded Mrs. Autumn. This unfortunate benefactress enjoins Henrietta to refrain from "circulating reports" of her husband's "jealousy" in the world, in order to save face:

> 'They never shall by me, madam,' said Henrietta. 'Enough, enough,' cried Mrs. Autumn, hastily; 'I hate long speeches.' Henrietta was pleased with a declaration which enjoined her silence; for if it be tiresome to listen to the sallies of affectation and impertinence, it is much more so to be obliged to answer them. (Lennox 181)

In this instance, Henrietta understands that any overt censure of her mistress' conduct might compromise her position or incur the wrath of her superior. Even so, as a virtuous woman, Henrietta must be sincere to her own sense of moral outrage at Mrs. Autumn's behavior. As such, when Mrs. Autumn misinterprets Mr. Autumn's irritation and exasperation as jealous anger, Henrietta lightly hints at her benefactor's folly by suggesting that "Mr. Autumn did not seem to… be angry" (180). Mrs. Autumn brushes off this check on her powers of perception, dismissing Henrietta's instead as inferior. In this way, Henrietta manages both to be sincere to her own moral sense of outrage, as well as to seemingly uphold the servant/superior dynamic necessary to maintaining her position. Mrs. Autumn cuts Henrietta off, citing a displeasure for long speeches, which brings Henrietta satisfaction; she would much rather listen to Mrs. Autumn's impertinences than respond to them because an obligation to respond entails a process of mental gymnastics that quickly tires Henrietta and her patience. While Henrietta's sensibility allows her to provide the proper appearance in this instance, an insensibility to Autumn's folly would have avoided the situation altogether.

This tension between sincerity and politeness occurs elsewhere in the novel. In her account of Lady Manning's ill use of her, Henrietta declares: "in strict justice I was not obliged to shew any respect to a woman who had violated all the laws of hospitality with regard to me; but custom decides arbitrarily in these cases…" (53). Although Lady Manning's breach of one custom, that of hospitality, should free Henrietta from her obligation to maintain her polite demeanor in dealing with Manning, the general custom of politeness, especially towards a supposed benefactress and social superior, requires that Henrietta forgo the sincerity required of virtue in order to maintain the politeness demanded by the same. Henrietta thus speaks truly when she says that "politeness… is sometimes a great tax upon sincerity" (53). One cannot be

perfectly sincere without sacrificing politeness, and the strictures of politeness must be followed in spite of sincerity in order to maintain social survival. Politeness itself is thus not far from artifice, as it sometimes requires an insincere show of respect, which, if discovered, would reflect very poorly

on Henrietta indeed. She must thus be sensible enough to read the situation to her advantage, but not so sensible that she betrays the passionate sincerity of her sentiments.

This is why insensibility is just as crucial to her performance as sensibility. Insensibility, as a "want of sense" (OED) is a state of innocence, and innocence is another fundamental characteristic of virtue. An innocent mind would be insensible to untoward designs upon itself because "malice attains its ends by arts, which a good mind cannot conceive." Innocence is maintained when a good mind is incapable of having knowledge of the arts of malice, since this knowledge would contaminate the mind. Once knowledge of the malice of artifice is attained, that artifice takes a seat in the mind, infecting and damaging innocence. However, what this means is that, because the good mind cannot conceive of the arts of malice, it is "therefore unable to guard against" them. As such, "innocence is not always a security to its possessor" (Lennox 68). While innocence guards against the attainment of unsavory knowledge, it also keeps its possessor from realizing when unsavory knowledge is being employed against them.

Lord B— understands this, and he proceeds to lay designs upon Henrietta's virtue. His avarice keeps him from countenancing a clandestine marriage with Henrietta, but the magnetic attraction of her virtue produces in him a passion which urges him to employ artifice in order to corrupt that virtue, so that he may possess Henrietta with impunity, as a mistress or otherwise:

> He was convinced she was virtuous; and that the only way to undermine that virtue was to make himself sure of her heart, before he discovered that his repentance was but feigned, and his intentions not honourable; when the passion she had for him would excuse, if not justify, an attempt that passion forced him to make; firmly depending on the poet's maxim, that, *the faults of love by love are justified.* (100)

Henrietta's ostensibly impenetrable virtue should be a shield against the predatory intentions of Lord B—, but he understands that if he is able to dissemble to perfection, a truly virtuous heart should not be able to detect the artifice because to admit to having knowledge of the art of artifice opens that virtue up to contamination by the same. If Lord B— can employ his artifice to inculcate a passion for himself in Henrietta, his violation of her virtue will be justified, since she will no longer be innocent, let alone virtuous. Lord B— would design to destroy that which attracts him to Henrietta in the first place. Thus, insensibility, while it protects innocence, also opens that innocence to penetration, which partly explains why Henrietta must acquire a guardian who is capable of protecting her innocence against the designs of others.

Despite this innocence ensured by insensibility, it is undeniable that Henrietta herself has recourse to artifice and dissimulation in the novel, albeit employed in the service of the maintenance of her virtue. Here too, her insensibility proves to be her salvation. What is important is not that Henrietta avoids artifice altogether, but rather that she *appears* to shun it, both to others, as well as to herself. Her insensibility shields her from having knowledge of her own employment of artifice, and thus her conscience remains unsullied. We can see this process at work when Henrietta's aunt discovers that she has been writing a correspondence, which is taken to be a love letter to a suitor. While her aunt presumes wrongly, Henrietta cannot hand over the letter to dispel her aunt's supposition because it contains a "humorous rallying upon some of her notions," which have been placed

"in the most glaring light" (64); Henrietta has employed her sensibility to search her true feelings about her aunt, in order to generate a sincere depiction of her aunt's actions. In this dire situation, Henrietta's prior sincerity ensures that she simply cannot be sincere now. By not showing the letter, she confirms her aunt's suspicions, but by showing it, she would be "sure to incur" the "resentment" of her aunt "for the liberties [she] had taken with her" (65). Henrietta's response is thus to destroy the evidence of both her folly and her innocence. This forces her aunt to either take Henrietta at her word or to condemn her without proof, aside from that conferred by appearances. After this first design is completed, Henrietta is questioned by her aunt. She asserts that the letter was for Mr. Damer, prompting her aunt to ask, "why might not I see it if it was to Mr. Damer?" To this Henrietta responds:

> Again I protest… that it was to him; but I did not chuse to let you see it, it was a long letter, full of impertinences: you would have thought I was very free in my observations on some particular persons, more free than became me perhaps - You might have been offended, and I tore it to prevent your seeing it. (67)

This is clearly not the whole truth. It is undeniably true, but not completely sincere. In this instance, Henrietta cannot have recourse to the sincerity required of virtue. She has to resort to dissimulation, to an artful turn of speech to appear to speak the truth while actually withholding a part of it. However, Henrietta turns in for the night with faith in her virtue: "I went to bed, full of hope that I had in part removed my aunt's suspicions, and relying on my innocence, I was persuaded I should soon restore myself to her good opinion" (68). The fact of the matter is that Henrietta is not entirely innocent in this case. She is guilty of committing an impertinent description of her aunt to paper in a breach of politeness, guilty of a design to destroy the evidence thereof, and finally, guilty of withholding the truth from her aunt in a breach of sincerity. But in her mind, Henrietta remains innocent; she is insensible to the artifice she employs in navigating this precarious social situation, just as she is insensible to the artifice employed by the malicious. Since she does not acknowledge the artifice in herself and her aunt cannot prove its presence, Henrietta's insensibility shields her from a recognition that would damage her own opinion of her virtue; a problem generated by an excess of sensibility is mitigated by artifice and insensibility.

This is not an isolated instance either. Early in the novel, Henrietta finds herself in a carriage with a particularly inquisitive old woman who attempts to glean the truth of Henrietta's situation through a line of questioning. The conclusion that the woman arrives at is not quite the truth, and yet, Henrietta chooses to "to be silent than violate truth, by feigning circumstances, to deceive her" (16). Silence seems to admit nothing, and Henrietta offers no corroboration of the old woman's imaginings. However, Henrietta knows perfectly well that her silence on this occasion is subject to interpretation. To the old woman, Henrietta's silence constitutes an admission without needing a verbal declaration. This is in line with other instances of silence in the novel, as when Mr. Courteney's "silence, accompanied with looks the most expressive that can be imagined" proves to be "more eloquent than any language could be" (256). Through a process of careful mental calculation, Henrietta seems to avoid violating the truth by withholding it and allowing the old woman to continue in her misinterpretation of Henrietta's circumstances. However, this is no frivolous insincerity; there is a very real threat that her flight from her aunt might be discovered if she reveals the truth

of her situation to this woman, which would crush her hopes of avoiding Mr. Danvers or the convent.

Henrietta's insensibility to her own cunning keeps her conscience clean, and the other characters in the novel are unable to detect it themselves (although Henrietta comes perilously close to discovery during the letter incident). The reader knows that Henrietta is not perfectly virtuous, but in the logic of the novel, the reward for virtue is nonetheless conferred upon her person, as she attains an agreeable marriage and an elevation in social status. This is because what is important is not an essential virtue. Indeed, due to the impossibly high demands of sincerity, innocence, politeness, and the other characteristics that constitute virtue, no one is sanctified enough to follow their directives without privileging one characteristic over the other in a given situation, and the delicate balance of sensibility and insensibility hinders as much as it helps. Henrietta is rewarded because she successfully maintains the *appearance* of perfect virtue. Thus, while virtue is always designed and maintained by artifice or dissimulation, this is not to say that Henrietta should be condemned for bending the rules of the game. In reality, artifice, design, and dissimulation are tactics that, so long as their use remains undetected, contribute to women's survival in a social field that requires them to take on characteristics that immediately open them up to attacks on their character, and virtue itself is always already a game of appearances.

The novel thus engages with the conventions of the eighteenth-century novel of female sentiment where "sensibility complicates even as it confirms existing hierarchies, at once exposing the gender inequities on which social authority rests and insisting on the need for the heroines' final and self-conscious compliance with that authority" (London 57). *Henrietta* complicates the existing hierarchies by satirizing virtue; Lennox gives us a heroine who seems to perfectly embody the virtuous ideal, only to show that virtue inevitably must have recourse to vice in order to be maintained. Henrietta also attempts to actively shape her destiny, refusing to convert to Catholicism in order to secure monetary stability, which is an apt demonstration of her pretensions towards independence. However, the novel also confirms these hierarchies in its method of narrative closure; the question of Henrietta's dedication to her religion falls by the wayside in the second volume of the novel, and her independence is sterilized through her submission to the trope of the marriage plot, as Alison Conway has indicated in her article, "'Uncommon Sentiments': Religious Freedom and the Marriage Plot in

Charlotte Lennox's *Henrietta*." This dedication is perceived by society as an "uncommon sentiment," as a mark of Henrietta's willful individuality, and as an impediment to her own social mobility. Lord B— offers Henrietta marriage, but only on the paradoxical condition that she practice dissimulation and pretend towards Catholicism, even though the Lord supposedly values Henrietta for her virtue, and, by extension, her sincerity. Conway draws our attention to the fact that "in the face of Henrietta's objection to the idea of dissimulation, Lord B— protests, 'to industriously seek occasions of suffering for a religion… is to give the world reason to suspect that ostentation has a greater share in your resolves than piety'" (237). Henrietta's active performance of her Protestantism, which relies upon a personal narrative of one's own salvation, is taken by Lord B— as reason to suspect her integrity. What gets Henrietta in trouble is the fact that she is attempting to actively shape her own religious narrative. Thus, she is engaging with what Alison Case calls 'feminine narration.'

Feminine narration is "characterized by the restriction of the female narrator to the role of narrative *witness*; that is, by her exclusion from the active shaping of narrative form and meaning—from... 'shap[ing] a story' and telling 'right' from 'wrong' within it," and Case rebrands these narrative processes as "*plotting* and *preaching*" (4). While Case is describing a literary narrative convention which "excludes female narrators from the process of shaping the experiences they narrate into a coherent and meaningful story," she indicates that it seems to arise in conjunction with a social convention of gender, which "concern[s] women's purported inability to take purposive action—to be goal oriented—and the inappropriateness of their assuming certain kinds of authority over others" (13). Henrietta's original predicament arises from just such a presumption of (moral) authority, and her intentional desertion of Lady Meadows' home constitutes a purposive action. The rest of the novel is an account of Henrietta's attempt to justify this bid for religious independence while retaining her virtue, thus critiquing a fallen society that is obsessed with policing women's bodies, but which is also paradoxically suspicious of religious sentiment. However, "the marriage plot marks the end point of this critique and a move into a sentimental register that subordinates Henrietta's religious principle to the principle of love" (Conway 243).

I suggested earlier that this submission to the marriage plot constitutes a confirmation of existing authority and gender hierarchy, but I argue that this compliance with convention is far from an endorsement thereof. As Conway points out, "marriage everywhere appears a mercenary transaction, governed by the self-interest of families eager to secure or enhance their fortunes," and since *Henrietta* concerns itself heavily with the hypocrisy of social conventions and their stranglehold on women's behavior, "the promise of companionate marriage can only appear in the final instance as deeply compromised" (243). In this way, the novel "register[s] a protest that does not finally endorse the status quo in an unequivocal fashion, even though the narrative can find no path out of the maze it represents" (244). Thus, while the novel must finally submit to generic conventions in order to conclude itself, the marriage plot is figured as a cynical compromise that necessitates the obviation of female pretensions towards independence in favor of financial security; the conventions governing virtue are revealed as deeply coercive, and their telos, the marriage plot, puts an end to both the narrative of the novel and to Henrietta's narrative agency. Now that the heroine has been entirely integrated into convention, her voice is silenced, and her actions are rendered irrelevant.

This novel is powerful for the subtly satiric story that it tells, but the singularity of its heroine also gestures towards the multitudes of stories that go untold: stories of women who lacked the ability to maintain the tenuous balance of sensibility and insensibility, the inimitable physical beauty, and the gentle birth that Lennox confers upon Henrietta. *Henrietta* is a pleasurable jaunt for contemporary readers, as we watch its heroine deftly maneuver a corrupt society, and we even breathe a sigh of relief, against our better judgement, when her trials are finally put to an end. But what of the real women of the period who lacked the happy complex of privileges that allow Henrietta to make her way in this world (especially considering the fact that none of these attributes alone or in combination are ever enough to actually ensure virtue without some recourse to artifice)? Their stories go untold, or else end in tragedy, because eighteenth-century society demanded narratives that reinscribe the conventions that produce the subjugation of women. Those stories that deviated from pre-determined narrative and social templates had to be suppressed or roundly condemned to

make socially-constructed convention appear natural. While the eighteenth-century appears remote to our current historical consciousness, *Henrietta* reminds us that the stories we tell are still policed by gender and class expectations that place a limit on forms of representation. In telling its heroine's story, *Henrietta* directs us to interrogate the governing forces that authorize the relation of certain stories, and to recognize that something as seemingly natural and universal as a narrative is always already deeply political, two of the most valuable functions of the study of literature generally.

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